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SUMMARY 
The process by which two or more parties with conflict of interests reach a compromise or 
agreement is a much researched topic of many disciplines, which is referred by economists as a 
market mechanism or “negotiation”. Recent advancements in information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) have triggered a surge of interest in the computerization of negotiations. The 
computer-based negotiation systems take many forms in terms of their design goals, the 
underlying technologies and system architectures, collectively studied in the broad field of e-
Negotiation Systems (ENSs) research. In contrast to the ever-growing attention, the awareness 
and widespread adoption of ENSs still seem to be slow-paced in the industry. This dissertation is 
highly motivated to contribute towards the successful design and use of advanced negotiation 
support technologies as an endeavor to shed light on ENS-application in organizations, through 
the development of a theoretical framework and subsequent empirical investigation. In this 
endeavor, the effectiveness and efficacy of differing ENS functionalities are evaluated by a dual 
theoretical lens employing the economic, game-theoretic perspective of negotiation outcomes in 
terms of efficiency and fairness, as well as the social-psychological measures of negotiation 
process and outcomes such as negotiators’ satisfaction and perceived collaboration. Furthermore, 
we also examine how the task characteristics interplay with the different configurations of system 
design in affecting negotiations.  
This dissertation attempts to address three appealing research issues centered on ENSs: 1) the 
conceptual classification of key ENS functionalities incorporating decision support, multimedia 
communication support and agent-based automation, 2) the systematic examination of the effects 
of different ENSs, and 3) elucidating the practitioners’ perceptions of e-Negotiations in B2B e-
marketplaces. A theoretical research framework is proposed which triangulates the effects of ENS 
functionalities with respect to both economic and social-psychological measures of the 
negotiation process and outcome. Based on this framework, system prototypes featuring key ENS 
 ix 
functionalities are developed, followed by a series of experimental studies utilizing factorial 
design. Together, our findings suggest that ENS technologies have significant effectiveness and 
efficacy when situated in appropriate settings. Among others, pre-negotiation support, decision 
support and multilingual support tools are shown to have positive impacts in enhancing 
negotiators’ joint outcomes. Compared to decision support tools, the effects of agent-based 
negotiation systems differ significantly in terms of negotiators’ satisfaction with negotiated 
settlement and on their perceived control towards the system. In addition, a field study is carried 
out in a B2B e-market context with the aim of inquiring potential ENS-users’ perceptions of e-
Negotiation technologies. The findings highlight important situational factors leading to ENS 
adoption intentions and suggest positive opportunities in jointly engaging diverse forms of e-
Negotiation technologies in B2B e-market growth. The dissertation ends by envisioning the 
outlook of e-Negotiations and articulating directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
  1 
1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
Bargaining and negotiation has long been a topic of interest to economists, social scientists, 
psychologists and organizational behavior researchers. Being common in the business and social 
world, negotiation is also a rather complex task and its success is dependent on a variety of 
factors. Weak information processing capacities and capabilities, cognitive biases, and socio-
emotional problems associated with human negotiators often hinder the achievement of optimal 
negotiations (Foroughi and Jelassi, 1990; Foroughi et al., 1995). These “stumbling blocks” to 
successful negotiation have led researchers to pursue computer-supported negotiations in the 
form of Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs) since the 1990s. Rather than considering 
negotiation as an “art”, NSSs stress a “scientific” approach to the negotiation process. This 
“scientific” approach (Raiffa, 1982) refers to a systematic analysis of problem solving. In the 
realm of negotiation, the focus of the analytical approach is on optimizing the outcomes for both 
parties and achieving a win-win solution rather than on specific strategies, tactics, and maneuvers, 
which will allow one party to “beat” the other. Early research on NSSs has primarily focused on 
two key technological aspects: (1) group decision and/or conflict resolution models to help 
negotiators reduce discord and increase the chances of reaching consensus, and, (2) providing 
rich communication media to enhance communication exchange between negotiators (Bui and 
Shakun, 1997).  
With the advance of information and communication technologies (ICTs) over the years, the 
notion of NSS has apparently evolved. Automated negotiations using advanced agent-based 
technologies have become an increasingly important area of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research 
(Sycara, 1990; Huang and Sycara, 2002; Li and Cao, 2004). Furthermore, with the globalization 
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of the world’s economy as well as the growth of e-commerce, an increasing number of business 
activities are going online. Negotiation, as one of the key activities of business transaction in the 
marketplace, has to be effectively and efficiently supported by mechanisms such as process 
facilitation and automation. Compared to the traditional view of NSS which focuses on 
supplementing face-to-face negotiations, web-based systems deployed over the Internet are 
designed to support and/or automate online negotiation activities. These systems are thus 
collectively referred to as e-Negotiation Systems, or ENSs (Braun et al., 2006; Goh et al., 2000; 
Kersten, 2003; Strobel and Weinhardt, 2003).   
More recently, the development and evolution of B2B e-commerce has demonstrated great 
potential for applying e-Negotiation technologies to online markets. In today’s growing e-
marketplaces, intermediaries match tens of thousands of small and medium size enterprises 
(SMEs) globally, thus opening doors for global buyers and sellers to interact and gain access to 
previously unattainable foreign markets. This has triggered awareness of a number of new issues 
related to e-Negotiations which have not been addressed adequately in existing literature. While 
both researchers and practitioners have come to realize the potential contributions and 
commercial values of “negotiated e-commerce” (Moai.com, 2000), it is just as critical to 
understand the complications behind the possible success of e-Negotiations. How the exact nature 
of negotiation and the ever-changing contextual environment interplay with various forms of e-
Negotiation technologies have become compelling and important issues. 
There are two intertwining themes throughout this dissertation: the various forms of e-
Negotiation technologies that assume different roles in supporting negotiations, and the contexts 
in which the theoretical and empirical investigations take place. In other words, this dissertation 
makes attempts to investigate the joint effects of technological artifacts and contextual factors by 
addressing a few key arenas which impose contemporary, noteworthy and contextual challenges 
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to ENS research. This doctoral dissertation is concerned with theoretical and empirical work 
incorporating the following arenas. 
The first arena deals with the need to provision effective support for all stages of negotiation. In 
existing literature, tasks employed in many NSS laboratory studies (e.g., Jones, 1998; Foroughi et 
al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997; Goh et al., 2000) are largely structured with clearly-defined issues 
and values for the negotiation task. The common assumption is that the pre-negotiation activities 
which involve defining the negotiation problem, selecting issues and discussing value options, 
have taken place a priori. As such, research findings could be rather limited vis-à-vis the complex 
nature of real-world negotiations involving problem definitions at the pre-negotiation stage. 
Empirical examination on how pre-negotiation preparation tools can improve negotiation 
outcomes is lacking. (See Chapter 5) 
The second arena concerns the phenomenal number of negotiations involving cross cultural and 
linguistic groups. As a result of globalization, the cultural dimension has become more and more 
prevalent in business negotiations, i.e., the number of business negotiations involving people 
from different national and cultural backgrounds has increased tremendously. When international 
business partners speaking different languages interact, potential communication problems are 
expected to affect the effective and efficient conduct of negotiation processes. This problem has 
triggered a growing reliance on computer-based multilingual support. With multilingual support, 
communication barriers and problems are expected to be addressed among international 
negotiators of different language backgrounds. (See Chapter 6) 
The third arena concerns the use of electronic communication media with every-growing 
capabilities. Advances in ICTs such as videoconferencing essentially shrink geographical 
distances, and result in considerable savings in costs and time which are both associated with 
business trading activities. However, despite the increasing use of videoconferencing for cross-
regional businesses, most NSS experimental studies have been limited to simple keyboard 
Chapter 1   Introduction 
  4 
interactions like email or other text-based chat facilities, thus limiting their findings on 
negotiators who are using advanced communication technologies. Empirical study is required to 
gain insights that will provide evidence regarding the capability and efficacy of ENS to enhance 
negotiation outcomes via the videoconferencing communication channel. (See Chapter 7) 
The fourth arena pertains to how advances in agent-based technologies of AI research affect the 
design of ENS. While the traditional approach to designing an e-Negotiation system has been 
centered on providing decision support tools, the AI approach advocates the use of intelligent 
autonomous agents, equipped with personality configurations and learning capabilities, to 
conduct negotiation on behalf of human users. While each approach has received increasing 
attention, little empirical research has been conducted to critically compare the effects of alternate 
design approaches, including both economic and user-perception measures. Experimental 
investigation on alternate designs for agent-based negotiation is deemed relevant and important. 
(See Chapter 8) 
The fifth arena deals with the role of e-Negotiations in contributing to the success and growth of 
online marketplaces. Despite research efforts which have centered on ENS over the past decades, 
the adoption of such technologies has been slow-paced. Not surprisingly, the adoption of e-
Negotiations is a very complex issue involving interplay of technological, social-cultural, 
infrastructural, and institutional factors. The goal of this part of our research efforts is to explore a 
set of specific factors pertaining to ENS adoption in emerging e-marketplaces. (See Chapter 9) 
1.2 RESEARCH SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Due to the large volume of published literature on negotiation from various disciplines, it is 
necessary to keep the research scope focused so that the intended propositions are empirically 
examinable. Prudently, defining the following-mentioned research scope helps to confine this 
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thesis from overly general discussions and to concentrate on issues that are important from the 
theoretical and practical perspectives. 
The central phenomenon of interest in my dissertation is on multiple-issue, two-party 
negotiations between mostly geographically-dispersed negotiators in the business context. The 
underlying rationales for this interest are: 1) When multiple issues are present, an integrative 
bargaining (win-win) situation is likely to emerge in contrast to single-issue bargaining.  
Accordingly, there are opportunities for the use of computer support tools to help structure and 
facilitate negotiations between buyers and sellers.  
2) Being a complex process, a negotiation situation involving more than two parties, such as in 
the case of multilateral negotiations or group negotiations, is even more complicated to examine. 
By concentrating on the simplest and most common form of dyadic negotiation, the findings of 
empirical research are free from the confounding complexity of multilateral/group negotiation 
scenarios.  
3) Some earlier empirical research has been conducted in the context where an NSS system is 
used to complement face-to-face negotiation, in which verbal communication and direct contact 
are available. However, with an increase in trading activities being transacted over the Internet, 
the scope of NSS should also grow to incorporate effective telecommunication support. In such 
situations, geographically-dispersed business partners from different regions or countries should 
be able to negotiate through various forms of electronic communication media.  
Currently, research in the NSS/ENS field requires greater effort to be devoted towards theoretical 
development. Existing NSS experimental studies have mostly dealt with comparisons of the 
effects of IT-supported negotiations versus those that are non-supported, and have shown 
inconclusive results. This is arguably due to the confounding effects of different forms of 
technologies when they assume different support roles for negotiations. To clearly understand 
how each technological feature can contribute to the improvement of negotiation processes and 
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outcomes, we need advanced theoretical conceptualizations and empirical underpinnings on e-
Negotiation technologies. It is also important to take into consideration the social and 
psychological processes that underlie the negotiator-ENS interaction.  
The goal of this doctoral research is to develop theoretical classifications of various e-Negotiation 
technologies and to provide a series of empirical studies on their effects from both the economical 
and social-psychological perspectives. As a natural consequence of these endeavors, this 
dissertation also puts forward insights on the application of ENS in emerging e-marketplaces. 
Specifically, three main research objectives are addressed: 
1. How can we holistically conceptualize the numerous e-Negotiation systems available in 
existing literature? Chapter 4 directly addresses this issue. 
2. How do different forms of ENS affect negotiation process and outcomes? How do the 
system artifacts interplay with level of conflict? Chapters 5 to 8 present empirical studies to 
address these questions through experimentation on the effects of different system artifacts. 
3. What are the present and future applications of e-Negotiations in e-marketplaces? 
Chapter 9 focuses on current state and future trends in the commercialization of e-Negotiations 
and examines the practitioners’ perceptions towards this issue, by means of both conceptual 
analysis and an exploratory field study. 
1.3 DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
The dissertation is organized as follows. First, in Chapter 2, we will examine existing negotiation 
literature and then explore the key dynamics and factors involved in negotiations. Chapter 3 
reviews literature specific to IT solutions for negotiation, and considers how e-Negotiations 
literature has evolved as far as empirical studies and theoretical development are concerned. At 
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the end of the literature review chapters, variables studied in previous NSS/ENS studies are 
summarized in a generic framework. 
Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework guiding the empirical investigations for this 
dissertation. Technological factors are examined in terms of three categories differing in their 
design goals and functionalities in supporting negotiations. The negotiation process and outcomes 
are assessed from both the economic and social-psychological perspectives. Theoretical 
constructs are defined along each perspective. High level propositions are presented, based on 
theoretical reflection and justification. 
Chapters 5 to 8 present four experimental studies that are conducted based on the theoretical 
framework. Experiment 1 focuses on the Category I system, while experiments 2 and 3 cover the 
categories I and II systems, and Experiment 4 relates all the three system categories. Each study 
addresses a particular set of technological and contextual configurations and examines their 
effects. For each experiment, we articulate the specific research questions, the relevant research 
models and hypotheses, the experiment design, data analysis and the discussion of results. 
Limitations and implications are also discussed. 
Chapter 9 represents an attempt to step beyond laboratory experiments by seeking practitioners’ 
perceptions towards e-Negotiation technologies in industry. We extend our research context to 
include a particular scope in terms of the “marketplace” concept and functions, and analyze the 
ways e-Negotiation technologies can play a part in the growth of online marketplaces. A field 
study is conducted to enrich our understanding with regard to e-Negotiations in practice. 
Chapter 10 summarizes the overall findings of the dissertation and provides insights and 
recommendations on the industrial use of e-Negotiation technologies. The thesis ends with a 
discussion of the limitations and contributions of the entire dissertation and concludes with future 
research directions. 
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2 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ON NEGOTIATION 
Negotiation is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon which is common in both social life and the 
business world. It is a well-studied topic of many disciplines such as economics, sociology, 
psychology, political science, organizational behavior, and computer science. Although each 
discipline develops its own theories on negotiation, the underlying concepts are intertwined. This 
chapter reviews the various streams of literature in order to holistically understand the impact of 
important dynamics on negotiation process and outcomes. 
We will first define “negotiation”, and then present an overview of three major streams of classic 
negotiation theories, namely the normative, descriptive and prescriptive theories. Next, we will 
look at the factors that influence negotiation, i.e., the negotiation dynamics which form the 
fundamentals of negotiation research. These dynamics include the goals and negotiation strategies, 
task characteristics, individual characteristics, group characteristics, negotiation processes, as 
well as the political and cultural infrastructures.  
2.1 NEGOTIATION 
Success in negotiation was once considered an art, based on “interpersonal skills, the ability to 
convince and to be convinced, the ability to employ a basketful of bargaining ploys, and the 
wisdom to know when and how to use them” (Raiffa, 1982, p. 8). However, not all negotiators 
possess the opportunities, experience or interpersonal skills to master the art of negotiation. Even 
the most capable negotiators frequently find it difficult as well as risky to rely solely on their own 
subjective judgments for obtaining feasible resolutions to conflict (Antrim and Lax, 1987). In 
other cases, even if negotiation parties do reach an agreement, they may not have achieved the 
best possible solution. Traditionally, the focus of negotiation studies has been on complex and 
difficult negotiation problems and on training negotiation experts. Guidelines for negotiators 
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include suggestions for specific strategies, tactics and maneuvers which could help one win in a 
negotiation setting (e.g., Zartman and Berman, 1982). 
Most theorists share the notion of negotiations as a process. To Carnevale and Isen (1986), 
negotiation is a process by which two or more people make a joint decision with regard to one or 
multiple issues about which there are initial differences in preferences. It has four basic features: 
the negotiation parties, their interests, the negotiation processes and the negotiation outcomes 
(Thompson, 1990). Negotiation processes and outcomes are always affected by numerous 
elements such as goals and strategies, the amount of conflict in negotiation interests, negotiators’ 
personalities, relationships, experiences and environment factors and including time pressure and 
information. A large number of theoretical models of negotiation have been developed in 
attempts to understand negotiation in terms of these four basic features. Next, we focus on the 
following three major approaches towards theoretical analyses on negotiation (Raiffa et al., 2002): 
• Normative approach (Game Theory): how ideally negotiation decisions should be made (by 
super-rational individuals) 
• Descriptive approach (Social-Psychological and Behavioral Theories): how real people 
actually negotiate (very often at variance with the normative abstraction) 
• Prescriptive approach (Joint Decision Making Theory or Negotiation Analysis): how real 
people could negotiate more advantageously (with some systematic reflection). 
2.2 THEORETICAL MODELS OF NEGOTIATION 
Normative, game-theoretic models of negotiation (Nash, 1950, 1953; Rubenstein, 1982) assume 
rationality and focus on the outcomes that should emerge from these rational actions by all 
negotiating parties. The objective of normative models is to determine the best decision given 
certain explicit and reasonable assumptions. Because of its explicit assumptions of individual 
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rationality and normative analyses of negotiation behavior, game theory has been simultaneously 
a goal of much descriptive experimental research as well as a foil against such research (Dawes, 
1988; Kahneman et al., 1982). These models focus on the best outcomes but ignore the process of 
the negotiation itself. As such, a major critique of game-theoretic negotiation models is the lack 
of predicting power on how the “best” solution can be made in the real world. Besides its 
limitations, the game-theoretic approach is still well referenced as it provides clear articulation of 
economically modeled negotiation outcomes in terms of bargainers’ utilities received from a 
bargaining session.  
In contrast, descriptive theories of negotiation in sociology, psychology and organizational 
behavior have mostly emphasized the contextual characteristics of negotiation as well as 
negotiators’ cognition and interaction processes (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987; Pruitt and Rubin, 
1986). Instead of having a single, well-established theory as in the normative approach, 
descriptive theory is a collection of hypotheses, predictions and low-level theoretical statements 
covering a wide range of situational determinants. These descriptive theories examine the 
influence of individual differences, situational determinants and cognitive processes on judgment, 
behavior and outcomes in negotiation (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987; Hausken, 1997; Thompson, 
1990).  
On its part, the micro-level perspective of descriptive theories looks at individual differences 
which refer to those individual attributes (such as gender, personality variables, language and 
culture, motivated behavioral tendencies and experience) that are unique to individual negotiators.  
On the contrary, situational research focuses on a macro-level observation of the negotiation 
process and its dynamics, including social norms, the magnitude of negotiators’ conflict of 
interests, relative powers of negotiators, prevailing deadlines and time pressure, the relationship 
between negotiators, third party intervention, and forms of communication between negotiators. 
Research on situational variables has contributed much to understanding of the negotiation 
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process and has directed both practitioners and academics to consider important structural 
components. 
Bazerman and Carroll (1987) proposed another stream of negotiation study from the perspective 
of the behavioral decision theory on human cogitation in general. The cognitive perspective or 
information processing approach of negotiation holds the position that the reasons for not 
achieving optimal or near-optimal outcomes lie in the very limitations of human beings as 
information-processing systems (Bazerman and Neale, 1983). They argue that it is not the 
objective, external aspects of the situation that directly affect negotiator behavior; rather, it is the 
way the negotiator perceives the opponent as well as his/her own bargaining role and the bargain 
situation, and then using these perceptions to interpret and screen information. Examples of 
cognitive bias in negotiation include fixed-pie assumption, frame and escalation. Limitations 
concerning intelligence and perceptions further constrain the ability of decision-makers to make 
necessary calculations and identify the optimal choice from available information.  
The prescriptive theory of negotiation (later referred to as Negotiation Analysis) integrates 
descriptive decision analysis and game theory in order to provide formal and meaningful support 
for the negotiation problem (Raiffa, 1982). The goal of this approach is to bridge the gap between 
descriptive qualitative models and normative formal models of bargaining. The analytical 
approach involves three steps: 1) defining issues and their ranges; 2) preference elicitation 
(weightages and utility functions are elicited from each party1); and 3) (game-theoretic) optimal 
solution(s) is (are) computed for each party’s consideration. 
This “scientific” approach (Raiffa, 1982) refers to a systematic analysis for problem-solving in 
the realm of negotiation. Negotiation Analysis adopts a number of behavioral concepts (e.g., 
reservation values, BATNA, integrative/distributive negotiations, and principled negotiations) 
                                                     
1
 In order to simplify subsequent computations, utility functions are generally assumed to be linear or 
additive. 
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and incorporates them in quantitative game-theoretic models (e.g., utility functions and 
preference elicitation techniques). Its strength and contributions lie in the consideration of aspects 
and features which are disregarded in game-theoretic normal models and decision analysis but 
which take place in real-life situations. In the realm of negotiation, the focus of the analytical 
approach is on optimizing the outcomes for both parties and achieving a win-win solution instead 
of focusing on specific strategies, tactics, and maneuvers, which will allow one party to “beat” the 
other.  
2.3 NEGOTIATION DYNAMICS  
The above overview indicates that in negotiation literature, whereas game theorists focus on the 
issues and value functions for the negotiation tasks, descriptive and behavioral research concerns 
a great variety of social-psychological factors that affect negotiations. Thompson et al. (1995) 
suggest four major social context factors that affect negotiations: 1) the number of parties and 
relationships among those parties; 2) the social norms that govern the negotiation (group and 
cultural norms and practices); 3) the social knowledge and goals that the parties have (what the 
parties want, what they know about each other, and what their outcome objectives are); and 4) the 
communication processes that the parties use (verbal versus written, how the parties interact, and 
the informal rules that govern their interaction). Following the prescriptive perspective suggested 
by Raiffa (1982), we will review notions and concepts studied in both descriptive and normative 
literature in order to obtain a holistic understanding of negotiation. 
While existing literature has been loosely structured in terms of the constructs and hypotheses, we 
attempt to organize this section by visiting the important factors grouped according to task, 
people, process, and environment with regard to negotiations (see Figure 2-1).  
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Figure 2-1. An Overview of Negotiation Dynamics  
2.3.1 Task Characteristics 
2.3.1.1 Goals and Strategies 
Strategies or tactics2 are almost at the heart of negotiation. A negotiation strategy is manipulated 
by a number of concession parameters, such as the initial and final offers, and concession 
frequency and magnitude (Yukl, 1974). How people will choose different strategies depends on 
their goals on negotiation.  
The dual concern model (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) describes the basic orientation that people take 
towards conflict3. In a two-person interaction, individuals in conflict have two levels of inter-
related concerns: the concern for one’s outcomes as well as the concern for the outcomes of 
others. As depicted in Figure 2-2, there are four types of initial strategies for negotiators: 
avoidance, accommodation, competition, and collaboration.  
                                                     
2
 Following standard English language, strategies refer to long-term, high level plan to achieve a goal; 
tactics are the short-term, adaptive moves designed to enact or pursue higher-level broad strategies. 
3
 Savage et al. (1989) have also proposed a similar model for the choice of a negotiation strategy. 
Task: 
-Goals and strategies 
-Issues 
-Conflict of interest 
-Negotiation power 













Processes: Cognition and perceptions, communication and languages, and third party 
intervention 
Environment: Physical, political and cultural environment 
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Figure 2-2. Dual Concern Model (Adapted from Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) 
The avoidance strategy is a non-engagement strategy as both substance and relationship 
outcomes are not concerned, showcasing an “I do not really care” attitude of negotiator. This may 
happen in a situation when it may not worth the time and effort for a party to negotiate; or a party 
has very strong/weak alternative to be engaged in current negotiation; or a negotiator is in a 
trainer’s position (Lewicki et al., 1999). 
Accommodative, competitive and collaborative strategies are more common negotiation 
strategies. The accommodation strategy is an “I may lose, but I would prefer to make sure you 
will win” strategy. It is appropriate when the negotiator believes the relationship outcome is more 
important than substantive outcome. When a long-term relationship is expected, a negotiator may 
engage accommodative strategy in order to obtain future reciprocal accommodation (tit for tat) 
from the counterpart (Homans, 1961).  
Competition is commonly described as distributive or win-lose bargaining where the primary 
goal of a negotiator is to maximize his/her own outcome. In distributive bargaining, the goals of 
one party are usually in direct conflict with the goals of the counterpart. When the goals are 
similar, negotiation parties are mostly in competitive positions in order to win from a limited 
resource (often reflected as money, e.g., price of a product or salary for an employment contract). 
The strategies or tactics that negotiators will employ play an important role in determining one or 
both parties’ negotiation outcomes (Walton and McKersie, 1965). The literature suggest that the 
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information, and try their best to learn  their counterpart’s information as much as possible in 
order to gain a strategic advantage (Lewicki et al., 1999).  One should be cautious that 
competitive strategies are useful and powerful when a negotiator’s goal is to maximize his/her 
own outcome while the relationship with the other party is not important (refer to Figure 2-2). 
In contrast, collaboration is also referred to as integrative or win-win negotiation where a 
negotiator is trying to seek for maximizing joint outcome. When the goals are different, one party 
can gain value not necessarily at the expense of the other party’s value-loss. Through discussion 
and exploration of each others’ goals, negotiation parties can achieve win-win outcome even 
though the conflicts appear win-lose at the initial stage (Walton and McKersie, 1965). The 
literature has suggested at least five different methods to achieve integrative agreement, namely 
expanding the pie, logrolling, nonspecific compensation, cost cutting and bridging (see Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986 for a series of refocusing questions to reveal win-win 
solutions). Logrolling is an important and practical technique to achieve win-win, integrative 
solutions. At the preparation stage, parties can find more than one issues in conflict, then agree to 
trade off among issues so that one party achieves a highly preferred outcome on the first issue and 
the other achieves a highly preferred outcome on the second issue. If only one primary issue is at 
stake at the initial stage, the parties can continue to brainstorm for more issues. “Unbundling” 
(Lax and Sebenius, 1986) or “unlinking” (Pruitt, 1981) can be engaged so that one issue can be 
separated into two or more issues. 
2.3.1.2 Issues and Interests 
Issue is a basic parameter to negotiations and has been frequently discussed in negotiation 
research. An issue is a topic of discussion that is of particular interest in a negotiation. The 
interests of negotiators are the preference or utilities each negotiator placed on the resources to 
be divided among them (Kahneman et al., 1986).  
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The number of issues (i.e., the negotiation domain) divides negotiations into single-issue and 
multiple-issue negotiations (Holsapple et al., 1996; Holsapple et al., 1998; Lomuscio et al., 2001). 
For example, a very common day-to-day form of negotiation is on a single issue4 – the price of a 
product. With more issues (e.g., quantity, delivery time and warranty period), there are more 
opportunities for parties to tradeoff their different interests over the issues and hence achieve 
more integrative solutions. 
2.3.1.3 Conflict of Interests 
Conflict occurs ubiquitously in everyday life as a result of various sources including ideas, 
thoughts, emotions, values, predispositions, or drives that are in conflict with each other between 
or among individuals and groups (Lewicki et al., 1999). There are many ways to resolve conflicts 
traditionally, e.g., surrendering, using violence, filing a lawsuit, and even breaking wars.  
Regardless of the cause of the conflict, negotiation can play an important role in resolving it.  
In the business world, conflicts of interests frequently occur in labor-management contract 
disputes and between organizations over mergers or purchasing contracts. Conflict of interests 
encompasses “situations in which two or more parties have separate interests or goals which 
conflict, such that one party’s goal achievement may prevent the achievement of the opposing 
party’s goals” (Foroughi et al., 1995, p. 486). In the form of negotiation for conflict resolution, 
the intensity of the conflict has been discussed in terms of “size”, “degree”, “amount”, “intensity”, 
etc (Foroughi et al., 2005).  
Based on the degree of conflict between parties’ interests, Walton and McKersie (1965) proposed 
a behavioral theory of bargaining that distinguished between distributive and integrative 
negotiation situations. The integrative negotiation, also known as “soft” negotiation or “win-win” 
                                                     
4
 Single-issue negotiation is often called bargaining, while negotiation is more on multiple issues. In many 
published materials, bargaining and negotiation have been used interchangeably. 
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situation, allows negotiation parties to “expand the pie” through problem-solving, creativity, and 
identification of differences in priorities and/or compatibility of interests; whereas in the 
distributive negotiation, also known as “hard” negotiation or “win-lose” situation,  parties can 
only bargain over a “fixed pie” (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Based on the study of Jelassi and 
Foroughi (1989), the integrative negotiation occurs when the goals of the parties are not mutually 
exclusive and it is possible for both parties to achieve their objectives; yet the distributive 
negotiation is characterized by the fact that (1) the goals of each party are in direct conflict with 
those of the opposing one; (2) resources are fixed and limited; and (3) each party wants to 
maximize its share of the resources. 
The categorization of distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining has influenced many 
negotiation researchers and practitioners and provided a basis for further descriptive studies on 
negotiation processes. Thereafter, significant effort was made in the formulation of principles and 
strategies underlying the integrative negotiation to achieve a win-win situation through 
information sharing (e.g., Pruitt, 1983; Raiffa, 1982; Shakun, 1988). Instead of enhancing one’s 
position or power by strategies and maneuvers, this integrative approach emphasizes the 
optimization of both parties’ outcomes (Jelassi and Jones, 1988). Hence, integrative bargaining 
connotes an element of co-operation often contrary to the conflicting nature of the negotiation 
process. 
2.3.1.4 Negotiation Power 
In negotiations, power is often used synonymously with leverage. Common knowledge tells us 
that bargaining power is important to negotiations, because it gives a negotiator advantage over 
the other party. Being a very intangible concept, power has been defined in many ways. Deutsch 
(1973) suggests a relational notion of power: “power is a relationship concept; it does not reside 
in the individual but rather in the relationship of the person to his environment” and in this way, 
“(An actor) has power in a given situation to the degree that he can satisfy the purposes (goals, 
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desires, or wants) that he is attempting to fulfill in that situation” (Deutsch, 1973, pp. 84-85). 
According to French and Raven (1959), power may come from five major sources, namely expert 
power, reward power, coercive power, legitimate power, and referent power. In negotiation 
context, Lewicki et al. (1999) suggest three variations that negotiation power may come from: 1) 
information and expertise (mastery of a body of information), 2) control over resources such as 
money, material, labor, time, and so on, and 3) location in an organizational structure, e.g., formal 
authority in a hierarchical organization. 
In empirical studies, bargaining power has been manipulated in three major ways – through the 
status of the players, through the experiment’s reward structure, and through Best Alternatives to 
a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs). For the first way in manipulating power through status, 
research finds that subjects made more cooperative choices when playing against an individual of 
equal status, in contrast to playing against an opponent of higher status (Rekosh and Fiegenbaum, 
1966; Faley and Tedeschi, 1971). In the second way using reward structure, it is suggested that 
subjects with equal power were more likely to behave cooperatively than those with unequal 
power (e.g., Swingle, 1970). 
Fisher and Ury (1981) propose a widely-adopted idea to formulate bargaining power, the 
BATNAs concepts. A BATNA represents an alternative option if no agreement can be reached. It 
is an important source of power because it gives a negotiator the power to walk away from any 
negotiations when the emerging deal is not good. If a negotiator has many attractive alternatives, 
he/she can set the goals and reservation value higher and make fewer concessions. When a 
negotiator has no other alternative, such as in a monopoly market dealing with a sole supplier, 
he/she has much less negotiation power and will make more concessions in order to clinch a deal. 
Pinkley et al. (1994) show that dyads that had equal BATNAs, whether high or low, achieved 
superior outcomes when compared to those dyads with unequal power.  
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2.3.1.5 Time Pressure and Deadline 
Time pressure is frequently studied by both economists and psychologists. It is often 
conceptualized as a changing cost over time, and has been generally manipulated in two ways: 1) 
through explicitly setting deadline (e.g., Maule and Hockey, 1993; Pruitt and Drews, 1969; 
Stuhlmacher and Champagne, 2000), and 2) through a discounting function of utility (e.g., 
Contini, 1968). In the first way, high and low time pressure is controlled by the amount of time 
participants are given to reach an agreement. In the second way, time pressure is represented by a 
discounting function of duration or number of rounds. 
Time pressure can influence both the processes and the outcomes of negotiations. Studies have 
shown that high time pressure is believed to affect the speed of the negotiation, producing quicker 
concessions, quicker agreements, and lower demands than low time pressure (e.g., Hamner, 1974; 
Lim and Murnighan, 1994). In terms of final agreement, high time pressure produces less 
efficient outcome (e.g., Contini, 1968).  
The existence of time pressure may also create deadline effect, which is the phenomenon of a 
striking concentration of agreements reached in the very last seconds before the deadline (Roth 
and Murnighan, 1982; Roth et al., 1988). For example, in Roth and Murnighan’s (1982) 
experiment, a significant fraction (35 percent) of all agreements involved settlements in the final 
30 seconds of the 25-minute bargaining period. About half of these occurred in the last five 
second. 
2.3.2 Negotiator(s) Characteristics 
Negotiation is a kind of social interaction. One of its basic features is the negotiation party, i.e., 
the negotiator. Some people can perform better than others in negotiations. How do the better 
negotiators think and behave differently from the average? Researchers have been examining the 
effects of negotiators differences on the process and outcomes of negotiations since 1950s. The 
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first four sub-sections review those factors concerning individual characteristics that affect 
negotiations, including gender, personality, language and culture, motivation and experiences. 
The latter three sections review group level factors such as the number of negotiators, 
negotiators’ relationships and cultural differences. 
2.3.2.1 Gender 
The most empirically researched individual factor in negotiations has been probably the search 
for sex differences – the gender effects on negotiations. While empirical results are numerous, 
the effects of gender on negotiations are rather contradicting. Two meta-analysis studies conclude 
that females behave more cooperatively and less competitively in negotiation than males (Walter 
et al., 1998), and that males tend to negotiate better outcomes than women (Stuhlmacher and 
Walters, 1999). While the reviews suggest some conclusions, it is to be cautioned that the 
differences are small in magnitude. Chodorow (1974) attributed this discrepancy to gender effects 
in early developmental experience: females develop their sex-role identities in an interdependent 
interplay between mother and child, whereas males establish their sex-role identities through 
separation and individuation form their mothers. These different experiences lead women to 
define themselves in relation to others, and men to define themselves in contrast to others.  Kray 
et al. (2001) discuss stereotype threat effect drawing upon a social psychological theory (Steele, 
1997) and examined how the performance of male and female negotiators varies depending on 
the kinds of sex-role stereotypes that are activated in a particular situation.  
With the development of contemporary research in gender and social behavior, researchers argue 
that gender effects in negotiation would arise, be absent, or even reversed under certain 
circumstances (Pruitt et al., 1986; Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999 ; Kray et al., 2001). In all 
means, gender shall be observed carefully when one attempts to understand negotiation processes 
and outcomes. 
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2.3.2.2 Personality 
Personality attributes may include many dimensions of individual traits such as cognitive ability 
(which is synonymous with the general notion of intelligence), emotional intelligence (as 
opposite to cognitive intelligence), risk preference, and so on. Do people who are smarter or more 
capable or more extroversive make themselves better negotiators? Both everyday experience and 
academic research suggest that personality plays an important role in the negotiation process and 
outcomes, however, no single personality trait or characteristic is found consistently linked to 
success in negotiation (Ma and Jaeger, 2005). For example, to the extent that negotiation entails 
the navigation of complex problem-solving tasks, it is reasonable to expect that individual 
cognitive ability may predict negotiation processes and outcomes (Fulmer and Barry, 2002). 
However, the role of cognitive ability is not clear as far as empirical work is concerned. Rubin 
and Brown (1975) review early bargaining research and conclude that intelligence is unrelated to 
bargaining behavior. In contrast, strong relationship has been found between cognitive ability of 
negotiators and the ability to reach integrative settlements in more complex negotiation settings 
(Barry and Friedman, 1998; Kurtzberg, 1998). 
When examined in experiment settings, one would find that personal trait factors do not account 
for much variance in negotiation behaviors; the small and subtle effects of individual differences 
can be easily overridden by other factors, such as situational power (Ma and Jaeger 2005). 
Therefore, even though personality traits deemed important factors that affect negotiation 
behaviors and outcome, they simply offer limited potential for predicting negotiation outcomes.  
2.3.2.3 Motivation 
Researchers have also examined the effects of aspiration on negotiation behaviors and outcomes. 
Generally speaking, negotiators with high aspirations can obtain a large share of joint profit as 
they can make smaller concessions, make larger demands, take longer to reach agreement and 
 Chapter 2   Literature Review on Negotiation 
  22 
earn higher profits than those with low aspirations (Siegel and Fouraker, 1960; Huber and Neale, 
1986; McAlister et al., 1986; Neale and Bazerman, 1985a).  
2.3.2.4 Experiences 
It is a common perception that professional negotiators – the experts who negotiate for a living – 
should be better negotiators than do the novices or inexperienced negotiators. The effects of 
experiences on negotiations have not been a popular topic, probably due to the fact that less 
nontrivial findings can be expected. In two experimental studies that compare the performance of 
experts and novices on integrative task, results show that experts resolved conflicts more quickly 
and were more successful in reaching integrative outcomes (Neale and Northcraft, 1986; Scholz 
et al, 1982).  
2.3.2.5 Number of Negotiators 
Negotiations can take place involving the following social structures differed by number of 
negotiators: a negotiating dyad, agents on behalf of their constituencies, multiparty negotiators, 
two-party negotiation with teams, and third parties (Lewicki et al., 1999). The simplest social 
structure in a negotiation occurs when two isolated individuals negotiate for their own needs and 
interests. The many other possible participants such as additional team members, constituents and 
bystanders may be viewed as audience which may introduce audience effects. The physical 
presence, outcome dependency, and degree of involvement make the effects of different 
audiences vary from each other (see Lewicki et al, 1999, pp. 289-312 for more details on 
negotiation dynamics between agents and constituents).  
When negotiations involve multiple parties, such as two buyers and one seller, the negotiation 
dynamics may change as parties may form coalitions or subgroups in order to strengthen their 
bargaining position. Multiparty negotiations are more complex and difficult to manage due to the 
following the number of parties and their roles, informational and computational complexity, 
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social complexity, procedural complexity, and strategic complexity (Bazerman et al., 1988; 
Kramer, 1991). Touval (1988) outline three key stages that characterize multilateral negotiations 
and provide practical guide how a single negotiator can do in multilateral negotiations. 
2.3.2.6 Relationships 
In real life, negotiations largely take place between negotiators with existing relationships. Even 
in the simplest form of negotiation between a dyad, different forms of relationships may exist. 
Fiske (1991) discuss four types of social relationships: 1) communal sharing which is typically 
found in families, clubs, fraternal organizations and neighborhoods, 2) authority ranking which is 
typically between subordinates to bosses, soldiers to commanders, and negotiators to their 
constituents, 3) equality matching which is tit-for-tat-based reciprocity, and is typically found in 
team members who need to work together and coordinate their actions, and 4) market pricing 
which is in all forms of buyer-seller transactions. According to Lewicki et al. (1999), trust, 
emotions and justice form the three core elements which are common to many negotiations within 
relationships. Among all, trust issues are central to relationships especially communal-sharing 
relationship. Emotion is also critical to relationships. Justice and fairness are also absolutely 
central to relationship negotiations.  
A great amount of negotiation research, which is laboratory-based, has simulated market 
transactions where parties have no prior relationships and expect no future relationships. Parties’ 
past relationship or expectations of future relationships may significantly change the dynamics of 
negotiations. For example, Valley et al. (1995) show that different negotiation outcomes are 
achieved by strangers, friends and married couples in dyadic negotiation with integrative 
potential. Friends reported less competitive behavior and achieved solutions with high joint utility 
than either did strangers or married couples.  
According to Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996), relationships have certain parameters that could 
dramatically change our understanding of negotiation strategy and tactics. For instance, 
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traditional prescriptive theories of negotiation tell that in order to be effective, negotiators must 
separate the person from the problem or the task (Fisher et al., 1991). However, when negotiators 
are in a social relationship, the other person is essentially part of the problem. In some other 
negotiations, relationship preservation is the negotiation goal, and parties may make concessions 
on substantive issues to preserve or enhance the relationship5.  
2.3.2.7 Cultural Differences 
In the 1980’s, the negotiation literature has largely focused on descriptive single-cultural studies 
and multicultural comparative studies, rather than on studies investigating cross-cultural 
interaction. Recently, due to the growth of international negotiations over the last two decades, 
researchers have started to pay more attention to cross-cultural interactions. A great deal of books 
and articles has been written about negotiation styles for people from different nationalities, such 
as American (Druckman, 1996; Le Poole, 1989); Chinese (Pye, 1992; March and Wu, 2007); 
Japanese (De Monte, 1987; March, 1988; Graham, 1993); and comparisons between countries 
(Graham, 1984; Tse et al., 1994). 
How do cultural differences of negotiating parties influence negotiations? Foster (1992) suggests 
that culture can influence negotiations across borders in at least eight different ways, namely 
definition of negotiation, selection of negotiators, protocol, communication, time, risk propensity, 
groups versus individuals, and nature of agreement. Tinsley et al. (1999) suggested that 
intercultural negotiations reflect a “dilemma of differences”, where differences between cultural 
scripts can cause conflict at the bargaining table, but differences in preferences can provide 
                                                     
5
 For example, a car sales negotiation between a dealer and a stranger client may be simple; however, if the 
client is the mother of the dealer, can the dealer easily treat the mother by engaging same bargaining 
strategy? Furthermore, different cultural contexts may have profound impact on people’s view on 
relationships. We will continue to discuss the effects of cultural environment on relationship perceptions, 
which subsequently impact negotiation strategies in Section 2.3.4. 
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opportunities for integrative agreements. That is, if culture leads two negotiators to value issues 
differently, this may provide the basis of a trade on those issues.  
To empirically understand the effects of culture, one has to be able to measure culture in 
operationalizable ways. Among others, the most influential work on culture would include 
defining of cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1989; 1991) and the developing of constructs such as 
communication competence (Holden, 1987). The research by Hofstede (1989; 1991) can be seen 
as a foundation that could help theory building in cross-cultural negotiations at the national level. 
National culture is defined as the “collective mental programming” of people in an environment. 
Primarily, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity and power distance comprise the 
Hofstede framework.  For example, uncertainty avoidance refers to “to what extent a culture 
programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations” 
(Hofstede, 1989, p.196). Unstructured situations are characterized by rapid change and novelty, 
whereas structured situations are stable, secure, and absolutist. Negotiators from high uncertainty-
avoidance cultures are not comfortable with ambiguous situations and are more likely to seek 
stable rules and procedure when they negotiate. Negotiators from cultures more comfortable with 
unstructured situations are likely to adapt to quickly changing situations and will be less 
comfortable when the rules of the negotiation are ambiguous or shifting.  
As far as empirical work is concerned, Graham and Mintu-Wimsat (1997) used a theoretical 
negotiation model to directly test Hofstede’s theories of culture. Graham (1985) conducted an 
exploratory study on the influence of culture on the process of business negotiations. Both verbal 
and nonverbal behaviors among three different cultural groups (Americans, Japanese and 
Brazilians) were observed. His purpose was to identify how the bargaining processes of these 
three groups might differ. His study provided empirical support for greater cooperation in intra-
cultural negotiations compared to cross-cultural ones. It is consistent with Evan’s (1963) idea of 
negotiator similarity. Gelfand and Christakopoulou (1999) examined intercultural negotiations 
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between Greek and U.S. students. They argued that cultural ideals and values in individualistic 
cultures emphasize separating from others and promoting one’s own internal attributes; this led 
them to predict that negotiators in these cultures would focus on their own interests during 
negotiations, which would inhibit an accurate understanding of their counterparts’ interests. They 
also argued that cultural ideals and values in collectivist cultures emphasize maintaining 
relatedness and fitting in with relevant others; this led to the prediction that negotiators in these 
cultures would be directed to the needs of others during negotiations, which would enhance an 
accurate understanding of their counterparts’ interests. The data supported these predictions.  
2.3.3 Negotiation Processes 
2.3.3.1 Cognition and Perception 
Negotiation can be a very difficult process, not only because of the complexity of conflicts 
involved, but also because of the extreme difficulty to eliminate various barriers such as cognitive 
difficulties, negative framing and ego, to fruitful negotiation6. There are numerous laboratory 
experiments that show impacts of negotiators’ cognitive and perceptual differences on negotiation 
outcomes. For example, Whyte (1991a) studied framing effects in decision failure. Many 
examples showed that framing effects underlie the occurrence of many major decision failures. 
He also gave some suggestions to mitigate framing effects. In a separate study by Whyte (1991b), 
the possibility was investigated that group decision making in the initial stages of an investment 
project might reduce the escalation tendency by diffusing responsibility for initiating a failing 
project. It is showed that escalation effects occurred less frequently and were less severe among 
individuals described as participants in a group who originally initiated a failing course of action 
than among individuals described as personally responsible for the initial decision.  
                                                     
6
 Jelassi and Foroughi (1990) summarized major stumbling blocks to successful negotiation, which often 
act as guideline for NSS design and empirical examination of the exact effectiveness of an NSS (see 
Section 3.2.2.1 for details). 
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2.3.3.2 Communication and Language 
Negotiation, after all, is “a process of communicating back and forth for the purpose of reaching a 
joint decision” (Fisher et al., 1991, p.32). The communication component therefore is crucial to 
any negotiation activity. This becomes more evident in cross-cultural negotiations and becomes 
more complex and potentially problematic due to the influence of culture on effective 
communication styles. Generally, communication occurs through many different media which set 
the context for communication, influence communication patterns and affect managerial 
effectiveness (Yates and Orlikowski, 1992). 
Language may be a source of communication barriers. Shakun (2003) highlighted a recent 
example on the significance of language difference over the U.S.-China plane collision 
negotiation. A deadlock took place when China rejected the U.S. government’s ‘regret/bao qian’ 
but demanded for an ‘apology/dao qian’ where the formal wording was believed by the Chinese 
that it carries no acknowledgment of guilt. On the other hand, linguists have indicated that 
language plays a large and significant role in the totality of culture. According to Whorf (1952), 
language is not simply a mode of communication, but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the 
program, and guide for the individual’s mental activity. That is, our pattern thoughts are largely 
shaped by the linguistic systems in our minds. Therefore, it is impossible to understand a 
language outside of its cultural context. 
In traditional face-to-face negotiations, language is the main vehicle for verbal communication. In 
diverse lingual groups where negotiators do not speak a common language, communication can 
be a problem; even when there exists a common language among the parties, one or more 
speakers often may not be fully proficient in the shared language, thus there is potential for 
misunderstandings associated with meanings or contexts associated with supposedly ordinary 
words (Aiken et al., 1998; Tung and Quaddus, 2002). Interpersonal interaction and information 
exchange, which are essential for mutual understanding and co-operation, are hindered.  
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Cross-cultural studies suggest that language patterns are indicative of negotiation outcomes in 
electronic channels. In computer-based negotiations or e-Negotiations, the mode of 
communication is essentially different from that in face-to-face negotiations. For instance, the use 
of text-based chatting facilities essentially imposes a lack of visual cues and social presence to 
negotiations. While text-based interaction represents a depersonalized mode of business 
communication, it can also help negotiators to focus on task-orientated bargaining process. 
Language used in e-Negotiations is inevitably significant as negotiators’ communication is 
largely relying on text-based information exchanges. Therefore, the exchanges of message (in the 
form of written language) are vitally important to help researchers to interpret the outcome of 
negotiations (Sokolova et al. 2005).  
2.3.3.3 Third Party Intervention 
Negotiations often enter deadlocks when critical issues or emotional conflicts heat up or both. 
Under such circumstances, without external help, it would be impossible for the negotiators to 
proceed to resolve their dispute. This is the situation when a third party is needed to come into the 
scene to assist the negotiating parties in reaching an agreement.  
Third-party interventions may take different forms. Sheppard (1984) suggests that negotiators 
may surrender control over the dispute process and the dispute outcome, and the levels of control 
surrender create four forms of third-party interventions for conflict resolution. Figure 2-3 
depicts the model. 
 
Figure 2-3. Four Forms of Third-Party Intervention (Adapted from Sheppard, 1984) 
Level of Negotiator’s Control of Outcome 
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In the upper left cell, surrender of both process and outcome controls constitutes an extreme case 
of “Autocracy”: a complete withdrawal of the negotiators by allowing a third party to manage 
the dispute in whatever process and outcome. In the lower right cell, “Negotiation” represents the 
situation where negotiators surrender control neither to the process and outcome. This is exactly 
the basic form of conflict resolution that we have discussed in earlier sections. 
“Arbitration” is probably the most common form of third-party dispute resolution, which is 
often used as a dispute resolution mechanism in labor relations (e.g., Elkouri and Elkouri, 1985) 
or in violations of legal contracts in business transactions (Corley et al., 1977). Parties in dispute, 
after having reached a deadlock or time deadline without obtaining any solutions, may send their 
positions to a neutral third party. In other words, arbitration takes place at a point when 
negotiators have gone through controlling the process yet are willing to surrender control over 
outcome. Apart from the clear advantage of imposing clear-cut outcome in a non-prolonged 
fashion, arbitration appears to have several negative consequences such as chilling effect and 
narcotic effect (Kochan, 1980).  
“Mediation”, including other similar forms of process-only control such as facilitation or process 
consultation, is less intrusive in that negotiators surrender control only over the process while 
maintaining control over outcomes. The major difference between arbitration and mediation is 
that mediation seeks to achieve the object – to resolve conflict – by having the parties themselves 
develop and endorse the agreement (Lewicki et al., 1999). Brett et al. (1996) have found that 
mediation, when compared to arbitration, was les costly, less time-consuming, and produced 
greater disputant satisfaction. In fact, mediation has been called “an extension and elaboration of 
the negotiation process” (Moore, 1996, p. 136) that “has always been an informal accompanist of 
negotiation” (Wall and Blum, 1991, p. 284).  Mediation is also to reconcile the competing 
interests of the conflicting parties, and help them coordinate their activities (needs) and to be 
more effective in their bargaining.   
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2.3.4 Political and Cultural Environment  
Negotiation, being a social process, cannot be completely understood without reference to the 
context in which it takes place. We have discussed the impact of cultural differences on 
negotiation process and outcomes at group levels (see Section 2.3.2.7), when negotiation takes 
place in a new environment as a result of global trading, the negotiation process and outcomes 
may change. As Rubin and Brown (1975) suggested, the physical environment and the cultural 
context in which a negotiation takes place will also have major impact on its process and 
outcomes. 
The globalization of today’s economy has attracted great attention in studying negotiations in 
culturally sensitive situations such as the Eastern context. Of particular interest to our research is 
the emerging economy of China. China is a radically distinct context in both ethnic and cultural 
terms; it is highly conceivable that the Chinese social behavioral patterns and business norms 
dynamically intervene with the way negotiations are conducted. At the same time, policies may 
also play a role in international trade negotiations. Anecdotal evidence and industry experience 
suggest that successful international trade in China could not be fully explained without 
considering the factors associated with the governmental policies. 
According to Hofstede (1991), besides the four popular dimensions of culture, there exists a fifth 
dimension named the long-term orientation. The notion of long-term orientation is used to 
capture a unique characteristic of the Chinese culture, which is fundamentally based on 
Confucian dynamism7. The key ideas include belief in substantial savings, willingness to invest 
for long-term benefits, acceptance of slow results, and sensitivity to social relationships. Along 
with this fifth dimension, China and other Asian countries are found to have an extraordinary 
                                                     
7
 Confucian dynamism refers to the selective promotion of particular sets of ethics found in Confucian 
teachings (Hofstede and Bond, 1988) 
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long-term orientation compared to Western countries8. Previous negotiation studies concerning 
cultural influences suggest that compared to North America, Australia and most European 
countries, Asian countries display a higher level of cooperation behavior due to the collectivistic 
character (Graham et al., 1994). 
The Chinese culture inherently views some of negotiation dynamics differently. For example, 
while people customarily discuss the outcome of labor negotiations, divorce suits and business 
deals in terms of its “fairness” to the parties involved, the degree in which they perceive a certain 
agreement is efficient and fair may depend on the underlying social and cultural norms. With an 
inherent Confucian mindset, the Asians relatively treasure a deep sense of harmony and stability 
of relationships. Such relationship-centric perspective is advantageous for the conduct of long-
term businesses (Hofstede and Bond, 1988). Compared to the Western approach that emphasizes 
and strives for outcome balance and equality, the Asian approach tends to avoid open and direct 
conflicts, accomplished by the search for sufficiently favorable – versus optimal – outcome. It is 
pertinent to recognize the existence of implicitness as well as its importance for Asian negotiators. 
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 Indeed, Confucian Ethic is at the heart of the Chinese cultural value system that has even influenced the 
Korean and Japanese civilizations. 
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3 CHAPTER 3   LITERATURE REVIEW ON E-NEGOTIATIONS         
Chapter 2 reviews a wide range of factors that may influence the process and outcomes of 
negotiations. With the advent and advancements of computer technologies, the IT solution to 
negotiation represents a new weapon to approach the negotiation problem. There are at least two 
primary motivations behind the development of computer-based systems to supporting 
negotiations: 1) to find ways to overcome the limitations of face-to-face negotiations, i.e., to 
remove the stumbling blocks to successful negotiations, and 2) to deploy newer and more 
advanced technologies to improve the process and outcomes of negotiations (Starke and 
Rangaswamy, 2000). In recent years, the growth of e-commerce has created another motivation 
which is to look into the roles and values of e-Negotiations in the growth of electronic 
marketplaces. The potential value of e-Negotiation technologies is spurring researchers and 
practitioners to step beyond traditional NSS design and extend ENS research to a larger, newer 
context. 
This chapter is dedicated on the IT artifacts to negotiation problem, and on how computer 
technologies can theoretically and practically facilitate or enable successful negotiations. We will 
overview the evolution of NSS/ENS empirical studies in three chronological periods, and discuss 
the theories and models that are specific to computer-based negotiations at large.  
3.1 CHRONOLOGICAL EVOLUTION OF E-NEGOTIATIONS RESEARCH 
Similar to negotiation research, ENS studies have gained research interest from a great variety of 
disciplines for several decades. This section organizes existing NSS/ENS literature into three 
chronological “eras”, in which each era is characterized with a particular theme of research 
interest. Collectively, the historical view of the ENS-related literature is helpful for understanding 
the current state as well as future directions for negotiation support technologies. 
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3.1.1 Early 1960s to 1980s: “Era” of Decision Support  
Since the 1960s, when computer models were first employed for the support of human decision 
making, interest has been growing in the possibility of using computer technology and 
information systems to support negotiations.  This era is featured with the excitement of the 
advanced information-processing capabilities and capacities of computers, and the attempts that 
researchers have made to match the need to approach classic negotiation problems with computer 
technologies. 
The first attempt is known as DSSs (Decision Support Systems), which combine the use of 
computer models and analytic techniques with traditional data access and retrieval functions to 
support individual decision makers. Decision analysis or especially Multi-Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) has been studied extensively. MAUT (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991) is a tool for 
making rational decisions involving multiple interdependent objectives based on uncertainty and 
preference (utility) analysis. Originally MAUT was used as a tool for decision makers to 
explicate and discuss their preferences and identify possible trade-offs, which helps avoiding 
emotional decision biases (Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997).  
MAUT has been applied to be the basis for development of many decision support systems. For 
example, PERSUADER system (Sycara, 1990; 1992) is an early system that used MAUT to 
resolve conflicts through negotiation in the domain of labor dispute. Other examples of early 
prototypes using MAUT approaches are PERSUADER (Sycara, 1990; 1992) and GENIE 
(Wilkenfeld et al., 1995).  Besides MAUT-based techniques, expert system approaches, such as 
CAP/DECISION MAKER (Fraser and Hipple, 1981) and NEGOTEX (Rangaswamy et al., 1989; 
Eliashberg et al., 1992), are also used to support activities in pre-negotiation strategy formation9.  
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 A more complete list of ENS prototypes studied in existing literature, according to their underlying design 
concepts and technologies under three categories, will be reviewed and summarized in Section 4.1. 
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In the early 1980s, researchers began developing Negotiation Support Systems, historically 
known as a special type of GSSs10 (Group Support Systems), intended to support negotiation 
parties (and possibly a human mediator) in reaching an agreement (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; 
Kersten, 1985; Jarke et al., 1987). NEGO (Kersten, 1985) is a typical prototype developed as non-
cooperative GSS used for negotiation support. 
The fundamental of NSSs is negotiation analysis. Different from decision analysis, negotiation 
analysis is aimed at bridging the gap between descriptive qualitative models and normative 
models of bargaining (refer to Section 3.2 for review and discussion on NSS theories). 
3.1.2 Late 1980s to 1990s: “Era” of Laboratory-Based NSS Studies 
More recently in the late 1980s to the 1990s, significant work has been undertaken to build 
interactive, session-oriented NSS which would support the entire negotiation process (e.g., 
Carmel and Herniter, 1989; Delaney et al., 1992). Subsequent experimental studies to actually use 
the systems to perform negotiation tasks are then conducted. The characteristics of this era of 
negotiation support research are the emphasis of supporting co-located negotiators with both 
decision and electronic communication support functionalities. 
Stark and Rangaswamy (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of eight empirical studies that 
could be located in the literature for the period. In the experiment by Jones (1988), dyads 
bargained face-to-face over a four-issue manufacturing negotiation problem. In the experimental 
condition, negotiators began bargaining face-to-face and, after 12 minutes, viewed together 
contract suggestions that could maximize their joint outcomes on a video screen. Jones also 
introduced the level of conflict as a second factor. The level of conflict between the buyer and the 
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 A GSS is an information system which combines electronic communications, computers, and decision 
technology to support group work. An NSS is a traditionally considered a subclass of GSS where the 
parties being supported are attempting to negotiate for bargain to reach an agreement (Dennis et al., 1988; 
DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987). 
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seller was manipulated by assigning importance indicators of weightage points to the four issues. 
Jones found that in the low conflict condition, computer suggestions led to higher joint outcomes, 
but negotiators took more time in reaching agreements. In high conflict situations, negotiators 
perceived the climate to be more collaborative with computer support than without.  
The laboratory experiments by Foroughi et al. (1995), Perkins et al. (1996) and Delaney et al. 
(1997) are a series of cumulative studies. All three studies use bargaining task that was previously 
studied by Jones (1988) and employ the same interactive NSS, except for the study by Perkins et 
al. (1996) using a DSS component only. These studies also investigate the level of conflict as an 
additional factor. The NSS consists of two components: a module for electronic communication 
(EC) between the parties, and a DSS to assist in the generation and evaluation of alternative 
contracts. Each negotiator provided his/her own interests to the decision tool as private data, as 
well as his/her guesses on the other party's preferences. The DSS then computed and displayed 
the three contract alternatives with the highest joint outcome. Foroughi et al. (1995) indicated that 
independent from the conflict level, NSS-supported dyads achieved significantly higher joint 
outcomes, greater contract balance, and greater satisfaction with lengthier time to reach 
agreement. No significant differences were found on the number of contracts proposed and 
collaborative climate perceived for negotiators in both conflict levels.  
Perkins et al. (1996) conducted another experiment involving managers instead of students, and 
used only a standalone DSS. By using 16 pairs of negotiators, they find that similar results were 
obtained for manager sample albeit DSS-supported managers used less negotiation time.  
To further sort out the separate effects caused by DSS and EC, Delaney et al. (1997) conducted a 
third experiment. Three levels of computer support were compared: a comprehensive NSS 
(DSS+EC), DSS only, and no computer support. The comparison between NSS and DSS was 
used to test the effect due to the EC component; the comparison between DSS and no-support 
situations was used to examine the effect due to the DSS component. Their study indicates the 
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following insights. 1) The results examining the effect of DSS showed that DSS-supported dyads 
achieved significantly higher joint outcomes (in both conflict levels), greater contract balances (in 
low but not high conflict level) and used more time to reach agreements (in both conflict levels). 
No significant impact was found for DSS component on perceived collaborative climate and 
satisfaction. The findings support Lim and Benbasat’s predictions that DSS support primarily 
improve economic outcomes such as efficiency and fairness, but do not provide evidence on the 
assertions that DSS will give negotiators more confidence on solution. 2) The results examining 
the effect of EC showed that independent from conflict level, NSS-supported and DSS-supported 
dyads achieved comparable joint outcomes, contract balances using similar amount of time; NSS 
and DSS also did not show effect on perceived collaborative climate. However, NSS dyads are 
significantly more satisfied than DSS dyads. In effect, the findings on effect of EC support Lim 
and Benbasat’s predictions (1993).  
Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) have developed another interactive NSS named NEGOTIATION 
ASSISTANT (NA) and conducted a one-way experimental study based on the system. The DSS 
component consists of MAUT-based techniques and conjoint analysis to facilitate preference 
elicitation, alternative evaluation, as well as optional functions for Pareto-optimization in the 
post-negotiation settlement stage. Negotiators can also communicate electronically such as 
sending messages and exchange offers. Subjects negotiated over a four-issue task on the purchase 
of some hospital equipment. The results are mainly focused on whether subjects reached 
integrative settlements, which served as a surrogate measure of joint utility value of the contract. 
Four conditions were manipulated: a) face-to-face, b) e-mail messaging system, c) DSS only 
featured by NA for using preparation (preference elicitation) support, followed by face-to-face for 
actual negotiation, and d) NSS featured by using NA for the entire negotiation process in both 
preparation and actual negotiation stages. In their design, the comparison between DSS only for 
preparation vs. face-to-face and emails was used to test the effects due to DSS tools for 
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preference elicitation. The comparison between the NSS and the DSS was used to test the effects 
of EC. Their study indicates the following insights. 1) The results examining the effect of DSS 
suggest that dyads using DSS for preparation (in the DSS and NSS treatment groups) achieved 
significantly higher number of integrative trades, and not surprisingly used more time, than those 
who were unsupported (in the face-to-face and emails treatment groups). However, DSS did not 
show effect on satisfaction as there were no significant differences in satisfaction levels among 
NSS, DSS and face-to-face conditions. 2) The results examining the effect of EC suggest that the 
addition of EC did not lead to better outcomes in terms of integrative settlements. Furthermore, 
comparison between NSS and email conditions was used to test their hypothesis that using email 
will not better the integrativeness of outcomes. The data supported this assertion. 
3.1.3 Late 1990s to Now: “Era” of E-Negotiations and Automated Negotiation 
With the growth of B2B e-commerce market from the late 1990s until now, web-based NSS have 
been implemented and studied in examining the negotiation support in e-commerce context (e.g., 
Goh et al. 2000). Already there are some publicly available web-based NSS prototypes (e.g. 
Carleton University’s INSPIRE www.business.carleton.ca/inspire) to provide users with the 
facility to specify preferences from which utility functions are constructed to evaluate offers, 
exchange messages, and view the negotiation progress graphically. Much research has focused on 
the roles and contribution of NSS in electronic marketplaces (e-Negotiations). For example, 
Kersten (2003) provides insights on the achievement of NSS research and implementation up to 
then and offers some new perspectives with regard to using NSS technology via digital channels. 
Bui and Ondrus (2003) propose a system analysis approach of mobile computing design to 
support real-time negotiation, using telemedicine as an illustration. Three major supporting 
functions, knowledge-based information processing, communication processes and transaction 
processing, are identified for NSS to possess in conducting e-Negotiations. Negotiation processes 
in the future, as envisioned, are to be conducted via a complex network of computer and 
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telecommunications allowing decision maker to perform decision and negotiation task in an 
anywhere-anytime mode.  
In computer science, researchers have paid increasing attention to the design and implementation 
issue of automated negotiation, where computational agents are engaged to find and prepare 
contracts on behalf of the real-world negotiation parties they represent (Beam and Segev, 1997). 
Ever since AI has been recognized as a reference discipline to DSS research (Goul et al., 1992), 
much more intelligent features are proposed to enhance agent-based negotiation with more 
capabilities to handle complex negotiations. 
More recently, advance in computing discipline has introduced a new paradigm that essentially 
views “IT as a service”. This paradigm of Service-Oriented Computing (SOC) (Papazoglou and 
Georgakopoulos, 2006) signifies automation of service delivery which is of great practical value 
in terms of capability enhancement and cost saving. Negotiation, as a key coordination 
mechanism for service providers and clients to interact and reach agreements, would be a 
“bottleneck” in the entire automated process, if otherwise manual. Increasing research effort has 
been devoted to negotiation technologies. For instance, Hung et al. (2004) proposed a framework 
to apply e-Negotiations to Web Services (WS), where the three components of WS-negotiation, 
namely negotiation message, negotiation protocol and negotiation decision making are discussed. 
They also present a service level agreement (SLA) template model illustrated with different 
domain specific vocabularies to support different types of business negotiation in the context of 
WS-negotiation.  
While some researchers regard automated negotiation is another step in the evolution of NSS 
(Oliver, 1997; Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000), others believe that agent-based negotiation study 
is in its infancy and it is only in relatively well-structured areas where the use of automated 
negotiation pays off (Yuan et al., 2003; Weigand et al., 2003). In summary, NSS without 
automated agents are still relevant in most business settings as the actual negotiations are 
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complex and less structured. Along with all the research effort over time, it is worthwhile to 
advance the diverse forms of e-Negotiation technologies so as to cater for a fuller spectrum of 
negotiators’ needs, in today’s complex business and technological contexts where negotiations 
take place. 
3.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR NSS/ENS  
3.2.1 Principled Negotiation 
3.2.1.1 Stumbling Blocks to Negotiations  
From an information-processing perspective, negotiations are viewed as complex, ill-structured, 
and evolving tasks requiring sophisticated decision support (Bui et al., 1992). Negotiation 
analysis suggests that differences between the parties regarding their priorities, risk preferences, 
and utilities, represent one of the richest sources of value to be mined in a negotiation situation 
(Lax and Sebenius, 1986). Nevertheless, it is sometimes difficult to identify and optimally trade 
on these differences due to limited information processing capacity and capability, socio-
emotional obstacles, cognitive biases, asymmetric knowledge about counterparts (Jelasi and 
Foroughi, 1990; Foroughi, 1995). These are collectively known as stumbling blocks to 
successful negotiations. In cognitive sciences and psychology, researchers study the following 
aspects of stumbling blocks to negotiations:  
1) cognitive limitations, which is referred to as human’s cognitive difficulty encountered in 
generating, evaluating the utility of alternative settlements and determining tradeoffs. 
“Cognitive difficulty”: The cognitive difficulty of evaluating the utility of alternative settlement 
for each party and determining tradeoffs often impedes successful conflict resolution (Lewicki 
and Litterer, 1985). 
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2) cognitive biases, such as the consideration of issues one at a time, negative framing of the 
negotiation, a win-lose/fixed-pie mentality, premature closure, and preference for salient, easily 
available solutions. 
 “Consideration of issues in isolation”: Negotiators tend to consider issues one at a time, in a 
stepwise fashion, instead of integrating multiple issues into a single package so that potential 
tradeoffs can be recognized (Erickson et al., 1974; Kelley, 1966; Froman and Cohen, 1970).  
“Negative framing of the negotiation”: Negotiators often “frame” the negotiation negatively by 
evaluating their potential losses instead of considering their potential gains. Negative framing can 
lead to risk-seeking behavior instead of the risk-avoiding behavior which is conducive to finding 
a cooperative agreement (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Neale and 
Bazerman, 1983, 1985b).  
“Fixed-Pie mentality”: Negotiators often assume that their interests are in direct conflict with 
the other party’s interests, that they are in competition for fixed-pie of resources, and that one side 
will win at the expense of the other. Negotiators may ignore the need to cooperate and use 
creative problem solving to find integrative solutions (Bazerman, 1983; Pruitt, 1983a and 1983b).  
“Premature closure and finalizing of positions”: Negotiators tend to prematurely finalize their 
positions, often before all possible solution alternatives have been recognized and considered 
(Kelley, 1966).  
“Preference for available, salient information or solutions”: Negotiators tend to recall and 
value those bits of information which are most salient or familiar to them (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). This may cause them to select either familiar or unusual alternative solutions 
because they are more salient, while rejecting or neglecting to consider other alternatives. 
3) socio-emotional aspects of negotiator behavior, including face-saving behavior, ineffective 
communication, overconfidence, and tendency towards non-rational escalation of conflict. 
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 “Face-Saving behavior”: Negotiators tend to avoid agreements in which they feel they are 
“giving-in”. This face-saving behavior may take precedence over reaching a viable agreement 
with the opposing side (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986; Brown, 1977; Hiltrop and Rubin, 1981; 
Bazerman, 1983).  
“Ineffective communication”: Barriers to effective communication such as distraction caused by 
attention to physical appearance of opposing parties, semantic differences, absence of feedback, 
and status and power differences can seriously hinder effective negotiation (Lewicki and Litterer, 
1985).  
“Negotiator overconfidence”: Negotiators are overly optimistic about the probability of their 
own judgments being correct (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Fishchhoff, 1981) and the probability 
that a neutral party will judge in their favor (Farber, 1981). The more difficult the task, the more 
overconfident they become (Clark, 1960; Pitz, 1974). They are also more overconfident of 
winning if they do not give in, which reduces the incentive to bargain and compromise (Neale 
and Bazerman, 1983; Bazerman and Neale, 1983).  
“Non-rational escalation of conflict”: Negotiators often escalate the level of conflict irrationally 
and unnecessarily (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985; Bazerman, 1983), “locking in” on opening moves 
and attitudes, which may be hostile, and continuing them through the negotiation process (Pilisuk 
and Skolnick, 1978). 
3.2.1.2 Guidelines and Principles  
According to Walton and McKersie’s (1965) behavioral theory of bargaining, the most 
important conditions leading to the achievement of integrative bargaining agreements are: 1) 
simultaneous consideration of issues so that mutual trade-offs can be made, 2) a problem-solving 
orientation, 3) free exchange of information about preferences and needs, and trust in the 
accuracy of these exchanges, 4) avoidance of distributive behavior, and 5) the maintenance of 
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high aspiration levels by the bargainers. The theory emphasizes the avoidance of distributive 
behavior and advocates the integrative approach to achieve win-win situation.  
In order to lessen the potential effects of the stumbling blocks, Fisher and Ury (1981) have 
proposed several general principles to structure the negotiation process. The Fisher and Ury’s 
principles include: 1) separate the people from the problem, 2) identify and focus on negotiators’ 
interests, 3) generate options for mutual gain, and 4) use objective criteria and data. Next, we will 
examine in further details on how the stumbling blocks and principles have motivated and guided 
the design and development of NSS. 
3.2.1.3 The IT Solution of Negotiation Problem 
NSS offer the IT solution to enhance the problem-solving process and to help alleviating the 
cognitive and socio-emotional stumbling blocks to successful negotiation (Foroughi and Jelassi, 
1990). For instance, NSS generate all possible alternatives based on the inputs of all parties, thus 
rectifying the tendency of finalizing prematurely on an agreement before considering all possible 
alternatives. In addition, NSS help to eliminate the cognitive difficulty of evaluating the 
attractiveness of various alternatives by supporting analytical processing of data (Jelassi and 
Foroughi, 1989). This not only brings about a sense of rationality, but negotiating parties will also 
be able to make more objective judgments and identify solutions beneficial to all parties. 
Moreover, NSS allow consideration of all issues as a package (Jelassi and Jones, 1988). The 
display of an entire contract enables “logrolling” among issues. Therefore, negotiating parties can 
focus on determining tradeoffs among the issues instead of discussing about single issues. A 
detailed table of major stumbling blocks to successful negotiation and possible NSS solutions is 
presented in Table 3-1, which is adapted based on Foroughi et al’s paper (1995).  
The design of NSS that foster as much integrative bargaining as possible in a given situation 
solutions essentially agrees with the principles suggested by negotiation experts (Fisher and Ury, 
1981; Walton and McKersie, 1965). Specifically, as articulated in Foroughi et al. (1995), the 
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Table 3-1. Major Stumbling Blocks to Successful Negotiations and NSS solutions (Adapted from Foroughi et al., 1995) 
The Negotiation 
Problem 
Descriptions NSS Solutions The NSS Component Measures 
I. Cognitive limitations 
A. cognitive 
difficulty 
The difficulty of evaluating the 
utility of alternative settlements and 
determining tradeoffs (Lewicki and 
Litterer, 1985) 
- Analytically process of subjective 
preference and/or external objective data 
- Identify high joint befit solutions or 
strategies (Jelassi and Foroughi, 1989) 
 
DSS (alternative generation 
and evaluation) 
- Joint Outcome 
- Contract 
Balance 
II. Cognitive biases 
B. Consideration of 
issues one at a time 
The failure to integrate single issues 
into a single package so that potential 
trade-offs can be recognized (Kelly, 
1966; Erickson et al., 1974). 
 
- Display entire contract for discussion to 
enable ”logrolling” among issues (Jelassi 
and Jones, 1988) 
DSS (alternative generation 
and evaluation encourage 
simultaneous issue 
consideration) 
- Joint Outcome 
 
C. Negative framing Evaluation of potential losses instead 
of potential gains, which can lead to 
risk-seeking behavior (Tversky and 
Kahnemen, 1981; Bazerman and 
Neale, 1983). 
 
- Establish interaction rules and use pre-
negotiation modules requiring parties to 
identify their interests (Anson and Jelassi, 
1990) 
DSS (give negotiators more 







The assumption that their interests 
are in direct conflict with the other 
party, and that one side will win at 
the expense of the other (Pruitt, 
1983). 
 
- Display conflicting views, paring of 
related items interests (Anson and Jelassi, 
1990) and  
- Analytical methods to identify alternative 
solutions  
DSS (alternative generation) 
and Structured integrative 
negotiation process 
(encourage negotiators to 





E. Premature closure Tendency to prematurely finalize 
positions before considering all 
possible solution alternatives (Kelly, 
1966). 
- Present a negotiation text (Fisher, 1978) 
of equivalent value to both sides as a 
starting point (Jelassi and Jones, 1988), 
- Provide rules requiring consideration of 
all issues (Jelassi and Jones, 1988) 
DSS (ensure that bargainers 
find a good, integrative 
solution before closure) 
- Joint Outcome 
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F. Preference for 
salient solutions 
Tendency to recall and value most 
that information which is most 
salient or familiar (Tversky and 
Kahnemen, 1981). 
- Provide rules requiring consideration of 
all issues (Jelassi and Jones, 1988) 
- Suggest possible concessions, solutions 
and tradeoffs (Jelassi and Foroughi, 1989) 
 
DSS (simplify alternative 
evaluation, and thus ensure 
considering of  multiple 
alternatives) 
- Joint Outcome 
 
III. Socio-emotional aspects of negotiator behavior 
G. Face-saving 
behavior 
Avoidance of agreements in which 
they feel they are giving in (Brown, 
1977; Hiltrop and Rubin, 1981). 
Suggest possible concessions to help 
achieve optimal joint outcomes and permit 
negotiators to compromise while still 
saving face (Anson and Jelassi, 1990) 
 
NSS (DSS+EC) (help 
negotiators find an 
agreement which is good for 







Distraction due to physical 
appearance of opposing parties, 
semantic differences, and status and 
power differences (Lewicki and 
Litterer, 1985). 
- Present participation rules  
- Display organized feedback (DeSanctis 
and Gallupe, 1987) 
- Non-verbal/written wording to focus 
group attention and encourage preciseness 
- Document the agreement (Jarke and 
Jelassi, 1986) 
EC (provide an extra channel 
of communication, 
encourage bargainers to 
clarify thoughts before 
inputting, reduce personality 
conflicts) 
 




Overrating of their own judgments 
(Einborn and Hogarth, 1978), belief 
that neutral parties will judge in their 
favor (Farber, 1981). 
- Bring sense of rationality by analytical 
processing of subjective preference and/or 
external objective data and the 
determination of possible solutions 
(DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987) 
DSS (support alternative 
evaluation that bring a sense 







escalation of conflict 
Tendency to escalate the level of 
conflict irrationally (Lewicki and 
Litterer, 1985), “locking in” on 
hostile opening moves (Pilisuk and 
Skolnick, 1978). 
- Focus attention away from personalities 
and on issues resulting from use of 
electronic communication (DeSanctis and 
Gallupe, 1987) 
- Provide participation rules (Anson and 
Jelassi, 1990) 
EC (depersonalize the 
atmosphere, focus 
bargainers’ attention on 
issues instead of personalities 
and deescalate conflict by 
increasing their confidence in 
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alternative evaluation and generation components of DSS explicitly require negotiators’ 
“simultaneous consideration of issues” in the form of contract alternative packages. The two 
components also provide alternative evaluation in terms of both a negotiator’s own utility and 
his/her opponent’s value functions, as well as encourage jointly beneficial solutions by alternative 
generations to maximize joint utility. These functions facilitate the “problem solving orientation” 
and discourage “distributive behavior”, which are underlined in principled negotiation models.  
The electronic communication channel reduces the impact of personality conflicts (DeSanctis and 
Gallup, 1987; Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Poole et al., 1991; Sheffied, 1992) by providing an extra 
channel of communication and encouraging negotiators to clarify their thoughts before inputting 
(Jarke and Jelasi, 1986). In addition, the presence of external support tool of NSS should give 
negotiators more confidence in their ability to reach an agreement with higher joint outcomes, 
thus helping them to maintain “high aspiration levels”. Therefore, NSSs are believed to have 
great potential for influencing the dynamics of negotiation by creating an atmosphere that 
emphasizes order, rationality, equality and empathy with the other party’s position (Bui, 1994). 
3.2.2 Theory of NSS 
3.2.2.1 Two Components of an NSS 
Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) articulate a theory which pertains directly to two-person, face-to-face 
negotiations in session-oriented, multiple-issue setting. Their theory of NSS emphasizes the 
importance of evaluating the impact of each of the two subcomponents of an NSS – the 
individual DSS for each party and the electronic communications (EC) channel between the 
parties – instead of evaluating NSS as a single entity.  
The theory hypothesizes that the DSS portion improves the human information-processing 
capacity and its effects can be best understood within the reference disciplines of game theory 
and economic theory. The electronic communication channel improves perceived commitment 
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and its effects can be best understood within the context of social-psychological theories of 
negotiation. For the theory’s configuration, the negotiators “are confined in a face-to-face setting, 
and verbal communication between them is available” (Lim and Benbasat, 1993, p. 33). 
According to the information processing perspective of negotiations, the reasons for not 
achieving optimal or near-optimal negotiation solutions lie in the very limitations of human as 
information process system (Bazerman and Neale, 1985). “When such processing capability and 
capacity are improved (by external memory and processor such as computer-based system), self 
need can be readily analyzed and the rival position can also be strategically examined” (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993, p. 37). Based on this position, the theory hypothesizes that the distance from the 
efficient frontier 11 (a measure of efficiency) and the distance from Nash solution12 (a measure of 
fairness) will be smaller for negotiators supported with DSS than for dyads not supported. At the 
same time, as the decision aid help negotiators to be capable of performing rational analyses, 
negotiators would gain “a sense of control” over the course and settlement of negotiation. As a 
result, it is also posited that dyads supported with DSS will achieve higher confidence with the 
solution than those not supported. 
The electronic communication channels are used to link up individual DSSs, so that common 
referents can be generated as reasoning of arguments. Lim and Benbast (1993) argue that 
compared to verbal communications, electronic communication offers “an ideal mechanism for 
transmitting task-oriented communication involving technical data and graphics” (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993, p. 40). The theory hypothesizes that the perceived commitment and the 
                                                     
11
 The efficient frontier is defined as the locus of achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are 
possible. It is also called Pareto (Optimal) Frontier after economist Vilfredo Pareto. See Section 4.2.1.1 for 
further discussions. 
12
 The Nash solution is one that maximized the payoffs of both parties on a basis of “fairness” (Nash, 1950). 
See Section 4.2.1.2 for further discussions. 
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satisfaction will be greater for negotiators supported with full communication and decision 
support than for dyads provided with DSS only. 
3.2.2.2 Scope of the Theory  
In their review article, Starke and Rangaswamy (2000) point out the following picture when 
applying existing empirical results to the DSS/electronic communication dichotomy of NSS (Lim 
and Benbasat, 1993): (1) The DSS component helps users develop better problem representations 
and eventually reach more integrative agreements, but access to a DSS does not make users more 
satisfied with their settlements. (2) The effectiveness of the electronic communication component 
can vary from situation to situation and, in certain circumstances, induce parties to negotiate in a 
more non-cooperative fashion, increasing the likelihood of impasses. 
Such observation, however, reveals certain misunderstandings over the scope of the theory. The 
original theory of NSS by Lim and Benbasat (1993) is laid out under the basic configuration in 
which negotiators are confined in a face-to-face setting, and verbal communication between them 
coexists. In a sense, one has to note that directly applying this theory to an e-commerce 
negotiation setting where negotiators are geographically disperse and mostly lacks face-to-face 
verbal communication is not feasible. Nevertheless, the theory of NSS has positive power which 
informed and guided a number of subsequent NSS empirical studies as well as this research work. 
3.2.2.3 Related Experimental Studies 
In this section, we shall further analyze results of related NSS experimental studies towards a 
clearer picture concerning a theory of NSS. In most NSS experiments (see Section 3.1.2), it is 
consistently shown that, under controlled experimental conditions, the use of NSS result in 
greater joint utility and more balanced contracts. In other words, the DSS element, from a 
seemingly objective point of view, accomplishes what it is setup to do. However, the empirical 
NSS literature has also suggested inconsistencies in terms of varying impacts of NSS on 
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negotiation process and outcomes. In the he following, we discuss four dimensions that should 
deserve further examination, as far as theoretical and empirical work is concerned.  
1) Effects of DSS on economic measures (efficiency, fairness and time) are widely supported 
in empirical work, which is also consistent with Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, it shall be noted that the levels of DSS technologies and their uses vary from one 
study to another. The varying technologies, while showing effects on economic outcome 
measures such as joint profits, may indeed impact negotiators’ psychological processes much 
differently. The more subtle differences in negotiators’ perceptions would be more useful to 
understand their intentions for future use. In this dissertation, we will propose a theoretical 
research framework that aims to further differentiate DSS technologies so as to understand the 
effect of each specific tool. Conceptual differentiation and careful examination of different tools 
allow better understanding on the effects of available technologies, and hence provide more 
insights for both theoretical advancement and practices on ENS. 
2) It appears that the effects of DSS on social-psychological measures have “not been 
supported” in empirical results. The studies by Delaney et al. (1997) and Rangaswamy and Shell 
(1997) suggest that DSSs did not lead to significant differences in satisfaction levels between 
treatment groups. Superficially, such results contradict with the theoretical hypothesis by Lim and 
Benbasat (1993). However, the original theoretical construct, confidence with solution, proposed 
by Lim and Benbasat (1993) is not a same concept compared to “satisfaction” measured in the 
empirical work. In fact, the “satisfaction” measures in Delaney et al. (1997) covered more 
meaning than “confidence with solution” that was intended in the theory of NSS. In effect, higher 
satisfaction with the settlement may have “coincided with favorable evaluations of the negotiation 
experience (i.e., perception of the match of negotiation experience and expectations), rather than 
the worth of the settlement in comparison to the negotiators’ interests” (Starke and Rangaswamy, 
2000, p. 18). Negotiators’ attitude towards the process is arguably a better determinant for 
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“confidence with solution” as proposed by Lim and Benbasat (1993). In other words, the 
measures of “satisfaction” as in Delaney et al. (1997) may have factored in negotiators’ 
perceptions of their own interests versus the actual settlement. Plausibly, subjects who have attain 
higher utility scores do not necessarily know they have done better or not, and hence reported that 
they were neither more, or less, satisfied with the settlement than those who indeed obtained 
lower scores. This implies that the effect of DSS might be of limited influence on negotiators’ 
satisfaction. It should be more appropriate to examine the effect of DSS on negotiators’ beliefs 
that they can do better with DSS support, i.e., their “confidence with solution”. 
3) Effects of EC on economic measures are not significant in empirical work, which is 
consistent with Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) theory. However, both existing theoretical and 
empirical studies examining the effects of EC are limited in the situations where negotiations 
taking place between homogenous parties. In turn, empirical literature ignores the possible impact 
of communication channels for negotiation parties who have unequal capabilities in terms of 
verbal/written communication. In this dissertation, we take note of this limitation and will 
examine the effects of EC in an appropriate negotiation scenario (negotiation between 
linguistically diverse negotiation dyads). 
4) The existing NSS experimental literature has suggested most inconsistent and even 
contradicting effects due to EC on social-psychological measures. For illustration, Delaney et al. 
(1997) conclude that the extra EC channel has led to significant higher “satisfaction” in 
supporting the theoretical assertion by Lim and Benbasat (1993). In contrast, Rangaswamy and 
Shell (1997) revealed no differences in “satisfaction with the agreement” across conditions, even 
though five out of 67 pairs communicating electronically failed to reach a settlement, while all 68 
pairs bargaining face-to-face reached a settlement. For perceptions towards “collaborative 
atmosphere”, likewise, electronic communication had shown no significant effect on the 
negotiators’ perceptions in Delaney et al. (1997), as subjects perceived the negotiation climate to 
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be similarly negative or collaborative regardless of the medium by which they communicated. In 
contrast, in Rangaswamy and Shell (1997), those bargaining pairs that used the electronic 
communication channels indicated that they considered the negotiation process to be less friendly.  
In summary, our analysis examining the inconsistent conclusions due to the EC component of an 
NSS show that although superficially, it is not clear how EC could affect negotiators’ perceptions, 
the very reason was due to different interpretation of EC from one study to another. Delaney et al. 
(1997) examine the effects of EC by comparing DSS and NSS supported dyads, where in both 
conditions face-to-face communications were allowed. This is in line with the original theory 
proposed by Lim and Benbasat (1993). In contrast, other studies (e.g., Rangaswamy and Shell, 
1997) have looked at a different setting in which the negotiating dyads who used “electronic 
communication channels” were not allowed to have face-to-face communications. Compared to 
face-to-face negotiation dyads and NSS dyads, the communication media for social purpose, 
instead of the task-focused mode of EC, may have attributed to the fact that negotiators perceived 
less the atmosphere friendly and reported indifferent levels of satisfaction. 
3.3 SUMMARY OF VARIABLES USED IN NSS/ENS LITERATURE  
Based on extensive review on generic negotiation theories as well as the conceptual and empirical 
development on e-Negotiations, we summarize variables used in ENS/NSS empirical research 
which focuses on computer technology, as an extension to Starke and Rangaswamy (2000) with 
enriched determinants of negotiation outcomes. ENS features are emphasized as the independent 
variable which has dominant impact on negotiation process and hence outcomes. Other important 
contextual factors on individual/party and task characteristics are viewed as situational variables 
which have moderating impact. Furthermore, the summary also includes system-related 
dependent variables. Figure 3-1 presents the summary. 
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- Category I DSS 
- Category II Automation 




- Individual differences (gender, personality, motivation, experience, negotiation skills) 




- Complexity (single/multiple issues) 
- Bargaining orientation (cooperative or individualistic) 
- Amount of conflict 
- Negotiation power (BATNAs) 





- Task-oriented communication 
- Degree of cooperation 
- Number of offers 




- Judgment Error 
 
System-Specific Variables 
- Perceived Usefulness 
- Ease of Use 
- Perceived Control 





- Individual outcome/value/utility 
- Joint outcome/value/utility 
- Fairness (contract balance, equality of 
outcome, distance from Nash solution) 





- Attitude towards the process 
(Process satisfaction; willingness to 
negotiate again; perceived collaborative 
and negative climate) 
 
System-Specific Outcomes 
- Adoption Intention 
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4 CHAPTER 4  THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In this chapter, a theoretical research framework is developed so as to guide subsequent empirical 
studies for this dissertation, based on the extensive review of existing literature and related 
theoretical and empirical work.  
This research framework investigates the effects of technological and situational factors on 
negotiation process and outcomes. It encompasses the independent variable in terms of three 
categories of ENSs that are based on different design objectives and functionalities, namely group 
decision support, multimedia communication support, and agent-based automation. The 
examination of the “quality of negotiation”, i.e. the dependent variables of our research 
framework are based on different perspectives. According to the Dual Concern model (Pruitt and 
Rubin, 1986), people view conflicts in terms of two concerns: their own concerns and those of 
others. Informed by this model, e-Negotiation technologies are accessed in terms of their efficacy 
in improving the settlement contracts arising from the concerns of two parties by means of the 
concepts of efficiency and fairness in economics. At the same time, to have a better insight on 
how negotiators would arrive at certain settlements, it is also important to understand the specific 
psychological and behavioral patterns during the negotiation process, using the lens of descriptive 
theories. Furthermore, we also consider the negotiators’ views on the system per se in order to 
gain insights that enable us to enhance the design and understand the effects of systems on other 
outcomes. In summary, we categorize our assessment of the “quality of negotiations” by 
examining the economic, social-psychological and system-specific aspects regarding perceptions 
towards e-Negotiation systems.  
We also choose to examine one particular task-related situation variable, i.e., the level of conflict 
as the moderating variable, to access the effects of some important e-Negotiation technologies 
under different degrees of negotiators’ conflict of interests. Other situational issues that are 
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known to affect negotiations are treated as control factors in this research framework. Figure 4-1 
depicts the guiding research framework in this dissertation. 
 
Figure 4-1. The Theoretical Framework 
4.1 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE – ENS FUNCTIONALITIES 
4.1.1 Classification of ENS Functionalities 
Existing literature demonstrates that ENS systems vary significantly in their design goals and 
their modeling approaches to negotiation. To understand the effects of e-Negotiations and their 
success, it is important to develop a classification of ENS functionalities that captures a fuller and 
richer spectrum of these systems.  
The various categorizations/classifications of NSSs can be traced in various previous works. An 
early attempt offers two methods of categorizing NSSs (Matwin et al., 1991). The first method 
classifies NSSs into analytically-based and knowledge-based categories according to the 
representation and model of the negotiation problems; the other classifies NSSs into mediator and 
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to the users. Lim and Benbasat (1993) propose two major components of NSSs in dyadic and 
multiple-issue settings: a decision support component and a communication support component. 
The decision support component enhances the information processing capabilities of negotiators, 
whereas the communication support component facilitates the exchange of offers and arguments. 
In a further development, Starke and Rangaswamy (2000) suggest a similar NSS classification, 
which is based on the fundamental differences in the design and functionality of NSSs. They 
classify NSSs into: 1) preparation and evaluation systems, which provide negotiation decision 
support before or during a negotiation; and 2) process support systems, which provide users with 
the means to communicate with each other, and are used as electronic “bargaining tables” which 
may additionally assume a more active role by providing mediation or arbitration mechanisms. 
Their effort share a common trait: they do not incorporate automated agents and the latest e-
commerce technologies for negotiation. This dissertation extends the scope of NSSs by 
highlighting the missing aspects which have become increasingly important and interesting. 
Yuan et al. (2003) view systems developed to support negotiations as process support, decision 
support, and agent-based NSSs. The objective of process-support NSSs is to facilitate a structured 
negotiation process through electronic media. Decision-support NSSs aim to help negotiating 
parties reach a better solution, in preparing for negotiation, in assessing their own positions and 
preferences as well as those of the other party, and in suggesting better alternative solutions 
(Kersten and Noronha, 1999). Agent-based-NSSs mainly focus on automating negotiation so that 
software agents can negotiate with each other autonomously in an environment governed by rules. 
Yuan et al. (2003) argue that from a communication perspective, the process-support NSS is less 
about how different media such as text, audio, and video can affect negotiation in the online 
setting. The results of their experiments show that video and audio negotiations were significantly 
preferred to text-only negotiation. Nevertheless, the addition of the video medium to audio and 
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text communication was not significant. This may be due to the fact that the technological 
capability of video is hindered by the underlying network bandwidth and resolution limitations.  
Thus our review suggests that employing computer-based technologies in negotiation activities 
has centered on addressing different types of problems encountered in human negotiations. The 
growing interest in NSS is largely rooted in the technology’s potential to overcome the limitations 
(and frustrations) of face-to-face negotiation. While there has been considerable theoretical 
reasoning behind the implementation of NSSs, the underlying concepts have to be examined with 
dedicated theories. This section pertains to the theoretical categorization of NSSs and e-
Negotiations. 
The first aspect of computer-based negotiation technologies addresses the cognitive limitations 
and biases of human negotiators. As human brains have limited information processing capacities 
and capabilities, dedicated decision support tools can be embedded to facilitate decision-making 
during negotiation. Traditionally regarded as a subtype of GDSS, this stream of e-Negotiation 
Systems aims to enhance face-to-face negotiations by incorporating group decision support tools. 
The first category of systems, labeled Category I Group Decision Support in this thesis, has also 
been regarded by various researchers as: a) decision support component (Lim and Benbasat, 
1993), b) analytically-based systems (Matwin et al., 1989), c) preparation and evaluation systems 
(Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000), and d) decision support NSSs (Yuan et al., 2003).  
The second aspect deals with the communication mode for conducting negotiations. There are 
two kinds of needs for negotiation communication: a) the social-oriented needs to build rapport 
and relationships, and b) the task-oriented needs for exchanging information and proposals. In 
this aspect, the e-Negotiation systems assume the role of communication channels or media to 
link up negotiating parties. Many communication functionalities, such as text-based information 
exchange, multilingual support, videoconferencing and emotional icons can be incorporated for 
this purpose. This system is labeled Category II Multimedia Communication, corresponding to 
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earlier researchers’ recognition of it as both a communication support component of NSS (Lim 
and Benbasat, 1993) and a process support NSS (Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000; Yuan et al., 
2003) . 
The third aspect focuses on providing autonomous agents to automate the negotiation process. 
As negotiation is tedious and often routine and repetitive, dedicated autonomous agents can be 
designed to negotiate on behalf of their human principals. This stream of e-Negotiation Systems 
is labeled Category III Negotiation Agents, or agent-based NSSs as in Starke and Rangaswamy 
(2000) and Yuan et al. (2003). 
This classification scheme distinguishes the different aspects that IT contributes to facilitate 
negotiation needs in order to clearly understand different e-Negotiation technologies based on the 
roles they assume to fulfill design goals. Going beyond existing classifications covering NSS 
designs, we also classify system designs under each broad category. In Category I, we further 
examine decision support tools for different stages of negotiation; while in Category II, two 
purposes of communication needs for negotiation are distinguished; and in Category III, agent-
based systems with differing levels of intelligence and automation are proposed and differentiated. 
Three common assumptions are made which are specific to this classification scheme: 1) the 
computer element is essential and is involved to different extents in different types of e-
Negotiation technologies; 2) It is assumed that both negotiation parties enjoy the same source of 
negotiation support technologies; i.e., the unit of analysis is the dyad. 3) The classification 
scheme takes a “tight” definition of negotiations that differ from the “problem-solving” process 
or “group decision making” process. As conflict of interests is an inevitable part of negotiation, 
the interests of the parties are considered as private information and negotiators refrain from 
publicizing them as joint problem representation (Jelassi and Foroughi, 1989).  
This view of NSS (Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000) customarily 
excludes “cooperative GDSSs” that are designed to aggregate objectives and preferences of 
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individual decision-makers into a group representation, e.g., as a joint utility function (see Jarke 
et al., 1987), and as “arbitrating agents” that assume agents can gather all players’ objectives and 
preferences to reach negotiation agreement (see Espinasse et al., 1997)13. Each of the different 
streams is analyzed in detail and the role of the systems in each category is further classified in 
the following sections. 
4.1.2 Category I: Group Decision Support 
The decision support component of an NSS has been studied extensively in DSS literature and its 
effectiveness is proven to be relatively consistent in supporting individuals and groups to 
obtaining better decision outcomes. Significant work has been conducted to develop decision aid 
tools to facilitate negotiation in face-to-face settings. Figure 4-2 illustrates the basic 
architecture/setting under this research realm.  
 
Figure 4-2. ENS Architecture Focused on Group Decision Support 
                                                     
13
 The issue lies in the heart of “what one means by negotiation support” (see Starke and Rangaswamy, 
2000). It is necessary to define a clear boundary for “negotiation support” by comparing a negotiation 
process to a group problem-solving process. The group decision making approach to negotiation support 
presumes all players are in consensus in the tradeoffs of different alternatives (Kersten, 1985). However, 
such assumption may not be applicable or make sense to real-life business negotiations. This dissertation 
echoes the classification by Starke and Rangaswamy that systems which assume the pre-existence of group 
utility functions should be precluded from NSS and ENS taxonomy, which is different from some previous 
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4.1.2.1 Overview of Category I System Prototypes 
To date, a number of web-based negotiation support prototypes can be named: Inspire (Kersten 
and Noronha, 1999; Vetschera et al., 2006), WebNS (Yuan et al. 1998; Yuan et al. 2003), 
SmartSettle (Thiessen and Soberg, 2003), DOC.COM (Schoop and Quix, 2001a, 2001b), 
Negoisst (Schoop et al., 2003; Kohne et al., 2005), as well as CAKES-NEGO (Lee et al., 2007).  
One of the most recognized examples is the Internet Negotiation Support System (INSS) 
developed at Carleton University, Canada. The system contains a facility for specification and 
assessment of preferences, internal messaging system, and graphical displays of the negotiation 
progress. This system can be categorized as a solution-driven NSS. It provides a method to 
construct a negotiator’s utility functions for evaluating proposals. It also provides suggestions or 
solution alternatives in the sense of Pareto optimization. 
Among all, decision support tradition in negotiation research has shown significant influences to 
the design of these prototypes.  Specifically, Negotiation Assistant (Rangaswamy and Shell, 
1997), Inspire (Kersten and Noronha, 1999; Vetschera et al., 2006) and SmartSettle (Thiessen and 
Soberg, 2003) have applied decision-theoretic approaches dominated by MAUT. MAUT is used 
in different phases and aspects of negotiation support. In pre-negotiation preparation phase, 
MAUT is used in its original sense to facilitate preference elicitation from individual decision 
makers. After the preference information such as rankings and point structure are constructed, 
alternative evaluation and generation can be facilitated during the negotiation. MAUT is also used 
to identify Pareto-optimal solutions in post-settlement phase.  
Other systems primarily support strategy formation in pre-negotiation preparation and can be 
further classified as expert systems. Examples include DECISION MAKER (Fraser and Hipple, 
1981), NEGO (Kersten, 1985) and NEGOTEX (Rangaswamy et al., 1989; Eliashberg et al., 
1992). These systems focus on supporting individual negotiators as decision makers in providing 
negotiation knowledge such as effective communication and facilitating strategy formulation. 
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Table 4-1 summarizes the existing e-Negotiations research prototypes that emphasize on 
Category I technologies, sorted by the years of publication. It is noted that the examples shown in 
this category do not exclude other functions to support negotiations such as communication 
channel. The primary focus of this table is on the illustration of these systems on the decision 
support component. 
Table 4-1. Illustrative Prototypes for Category I Systems  
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4.1.2.2 Design Objectives 
This broad category of ENS systems aims to address negotiators’ cognitive limitation and biases 
by provision group decision support tools. DSS tools as the fundamental component of early NSS 
research are designed and developed to overcome the stumbling blocks encountered in face-to-
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face negotiations14. Decision support software available in NSSs include modeling capabilities 
such as decision trees, risk analysis, forecasting methods, and multi-attribute utility functions, as 
well as structured group methods like electronic brainstorming, and Nominal Group and Delphi 
techniques. Among all, MAUT is most often used in decision support tools for negotiations. This 
feature is present in most of the NSS prototypes.  
4.1.2.3 Sub-Classification of DSS Support 
Several researchers who have studied the flow of negotiations have confirmed that negotiation, 
like communication in problem-solving groups and in other forms of ritualistic social interaction, 
proceeds through distinct phases or stages (Douglas, 1962; Greenhalgh, 2001; Morley and 
Stephenson, 1977). The phase or stage view takes the dimension of time into the negotiation 
modeling.  
Based on the concept of integrative bargaining, Mumpower et al. (1988) proposed the use of 
analytical mediation, or computer-assisted conflict resolution techniques, to achieve mutually 
satisfactory agreements. The analytical mediation methodology focuses on asymmetries of 
interests between negotiating parties, awarding each party more on those issues that are more 
important to it. For example, if the delivery date is of higher priority to a buyer than the price, 
whereas the seller holds the opposite view, then both will be more satisfied if they settle on an 
earlier date and a higher price. This approach entails four important steps. First, negotiation issues 
and their ranges are defined. Second, importance weightings, for the construction of utility curves, 
are elicited from each negotiator. Third, optimal proposals, or solutions that maximize the utility 
for both parties, are computed. Fourth, proposals are presented to negotiators for deliberation. 
Activities of step one correspond to pre-negotiation planning, while those of the remaining steps 
correspond to actual negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Jelassi and Jones, 1988).  
                                                     
14
 Their guiding principles and theories are examined in Section 3.2.1. 
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At the basic, negotiations evolve from pre-negotiation preparation, negotiation to post-negotiation 
settlement stages (see Figure 3-2). Many NSS studies follow the basic model of staged-based 
negotiation (e.g. Lim, 1999; Kersten and Noronha, 1999). Next, the basic three stages are 
distinguished to guide our systematic examinations of DSS technologies used for each stage. 
 
Figure 4-3. The Three Stages of Negotiation 
4.1.2.3.1 DSS for Pre-Negotiation Stage 
Pre-Negotiation planning (i.e., issue identification and preference elicitation) is fundamental to 
conducting useful analysis of negotiation (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991). The activities in this phase 
are designed to help negotiators understand what the other party is thinking about: each side 
develops and discusses its position, the issues which it thinks are significant, and the concessions 
it is willing to make towards consensus (Jelassi and Jones, 1988). Examples of NSS prototypes 
incorporating pre-negotiation support include NEGOTEX which is a rule-based standalone expert 
system model focused on international negotiation (Eliashberg et al., 1992), and INSPIRE which 
is a web-based NSS developed in Carleton University (Kersten and Noronha, 1999). 
DSS tools for problem definition could enhance defining a negotiating party’s initial position by 
supporting the following group processes: (1) issue generation, (2) issue selection, and (3) range 
limit setting (options definition). The purpose of the issue generation tool is to generate, 
simultaneously and anonymously, a large number of creative issues pertaining to the negotiation 
task. Issue selection allows negotiators to create a concise list of issues that they think are most 
important to the negotiation. Selected issues may also be ranked or rated to reflect their relative 
priority. Finally, range limit setting allows negotiators to define the ranges of values they prefer 
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4.1.2.3.2 DSS for Negotiation Stage 
DSS tools for preference elicitation provide for, among other things, the quantifying of a 
negotiator’s importance weightings for each issue. The following processes are supported: (4) 
preference elicitation (to elicit the relative preferences among issues) and (5) utility specification 
(to elicit the relative preferences for the options for each issue)15. Through these activities, the 
system can help the parties disaggregate their own preferences and priorities in order to better 
understand them (see Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). Preference assessment is based on 
combination of simple additive utility functions recommended by Keeney and Raiffa (1991), and 
conjoint analysis techniques that have found wide application in psychology and marketing 
research (Green and Srinivasan, 1978; Green and Krieger, 1993). Keeney and Raiffa (1991) 
suggested that quantification of issue preferences not only illustrates the preferable alternative 
agreements, it also helps to focus negotiators’ effort in a negotiation. These activities ensure that, 
prior to the negotiation session, the negotiator’s position is well defined and that he or she 
understands the importance of the various issues (Jelassi and Jones, 1988). In addition, 
negotiators’ positions on and preferences over issues are revealed to the opponent through the 
series of pre-negotiation activities. Thus, negotiators will be able to identify the issues that matter 
more to them, as well as to their opponents (Jelassi and Jones, 1988; Keeney and Raiffa, 1991). 
Self need can then be readily analyzed, and the rival’s position, strategically examined. 
Subsequently, asymmetrical interests, and hence the opportunity to cooperate and score 
outstanding joint outcomes, can be readily distinguished. 
Negotiation commences when negotiators can officially send proposals and counter-proposals. 
DSS tools for alternative evaluation and generation include (6) alternative evaluation function 
that can be readily done using the utility structure obtained from previous activities, and (7) 
                                                     
15
 Activities (4) and (5) have also been classified as “Prepare” and “Ratings” stages (Rangaswamy and 
Shell, 1997). 
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alternative generation function based on Pareto and maximization of joint utilities. The high 
computation power offered by NSS can help to compute optimal individual solutions for each 
negotiator effortlessly, thus relieving negotiators of having to resort to satisfising strategies 
(March and Simon, 1958) to reach an agreement. In addition, based on the negotiator’s estimation 
of his/her opponent’s utility functions, a “simulated” joint outcome can be generated to help the 
negotiator better identify optimal solutions.  
4.1.2.3.3 DSS for Post-Negotiation Stage 
DSS tools for post-negotiation stage can help parties to identify Pareto-superior settlements. 
After the parties have reached an agreement, the system (8) analyzes the settlement and identifies 
possible superior settlements in terms of Pareto-efficiency. Because Pareto-optimal solutions are 
the better solutions that can let at least one party gain without the other party worse off, changing 
settlement on the Pareto-optimal solutions in the post-negotiation stage is possible. In this way, 
the system assumes the role of a mediator which provide support for minimizing “value left on 
the table” after parties have reached a settlement by themselves (Raiffa, 1985). Examples of 
prototypes using post-settlement optimization techniques are NEGOTIATION ASSISTANT 
(Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997) and INSPIRE (Kersten and Noronha, 1997). 
For post-settlement optimization functions to be invoked, a third party, being human mediator or 
the system, must be trusted by the negotiating parties as access to both party’s private preferences 
is a pre-condition in suggesting Pareto-optimal solutions16.  
4.1.3 Category II: Multimedia Communication Support 
From the economic and analytical negotiation perspectives, negotiation is a special form of 
decision and NSS is a special kind of decision support systems (Kersten et al., 1991). However, 
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 This pre-condition or assumption of post-negotiation settlement techniques naturally involves trust issues 
and problems that may inhibit negotiators’ acceptance in real-life settings.  
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decision support models and techniques often face realistic challenges when applied to real-life 
negotiation settings, and are even more difficult to fully operationalize in Internet-based 
electronic systems (Kohne et al., 2004). Another stream of research proposes to look at computer-
supported negotiation from a communication perspective (Weigand et al., 2003; Yuan et al., 2003; 
Schoop et al. 2003; Kohne et al. 2005).  
In a broader sense, the communication medium or channel can be employed alone or in 
configuration with other technologies to support negotiations. When employed alone, electronic 
communication channels for negotiation share most of the common characteristics of multimedia 
tools for general communication purpose. The effectiveness of the various channels has been 
extensively studied in the Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) literature. When linked to 
decision support technologies, the integrated provision of electronic communication and decision 
support functions forms the central piece for NSS research. NSS prototypes are typically designed 
to facilitate face-to-face negotiations by connecting negotiators’ standalone DSSs via networks. 
 
Figure 4-4. ENS Architecture Focused on Multimedia Communication Support 
4.1.3.1 Overview of Category II System Prototypes 
Negotiators primarily communicate for two purposes: obtaining mutual understanding (the social- 
and relational-oriented purpose) and achieving an agreement by exchanges of proposals (the task- 
and outcome-oriented purpose for negotiation). Correspondingly, communication system for 
negotiation should cater for these two intrinsic needs. For example, the Web-based Negotiation 
Support system (WebNS) provides full process structuring support as well as multimedia 
channels (such as audio, video and text) for online negotiation and mediation (Yuan et al., 2003). 
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Table 4-2 summarizes the existing e-Negotiation system prototypes that emphasize on the 
Category II functionalities. 
Table 4-2. Illustrative Prototypes for Category II Systems  
System Package Background Functions Role of System 
EC for Task-Oriented Communication (Focus attention away from people on task per se; however, by 
focus on task, an element of trust can be lost – this is a negative side effect that need to considerate; 
arguably only useful in face-to-face setting) 
TOPIC COMMENTER as 
in the “Interactive NSS” 
(Foroughi et al., 1995; 
Delaney et al., 1997) 
Software created at the 
University of Arizona; 
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4.1.3.2 Design Objectives 
This category of ENS system aims to address communication needs for negotiations. In e-
Negotiations where face-to-face meeting may not be feasible, the communication support can 
further include functions such as the multimedia channels, the exchange of structured offers with 
accompanying arguments, free-text messages and automatic email notification of the partner’s 
activity (e.g. Kersten and Lo, 2001). Multimedia communication may include audio, video 
communication and emotional icons and file transfer features, as we often see in popular instant 
messaging software such as MSN and Yahoo! Messenger. Although the Internet now enables 
audio and video communications, most ENS prototypes such as Inspire (Vetschera et al., 2006) 
and Negoisst (Kohne et al., 2005) are still based on text messages. The presence of visual and 
audio channels enables the participants to make use of social clues, such as eye-contact, facial 
expression and gesture, to support their social interaction (Bordia, 1997). In addition, 
videoconferencing may lead to both a reduction in transportation costs and a commensurate 
improvement in time taken to reach decision (Sniezek and Crede, 2002). Recent research (e.g, 
Yuan et al., 2003) advocates the importance of communication channels for negotiations and calls 
for empirical research on the effects of multimedia on negotiation process and outcomes. 
4.1.3.3 Sub-Classification of Communication Support 
4.1.3.3.1 EC for Social-Oriented Communication 
Internet-based communication technologies can provide inexpensive electronic channels to 
conduct negotiation activities. Given the various forms of multimedia channels, a primary issue to 
ask is the choice of the appropriate channels for the task of negotiation. 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of different electronic communication channels may be 
better understood from the CMC literature. Media richness theory (Daft and Lengel, 1984, 1986) 
proposed that leaner media will be less effective for performing ambiguous tasks, but will be 
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more effective for tasks requiring uncertainty reduction such as making a formal agreement. Daft 
and Lengel (1986) created a hierarchy of media richness with face-to-face communication at the 
top, followed by telephone, electronic mail and print communications (e.g., personal documents 
such as letters and memos, impersonal written documents and numeric documents). Newer media 
(computer-mediated communication) were not directly considered in the original theory. Past 
research on videoconferencing suggests richness of videoconference medium shall be below face-
to-face (Kydd and Ferry, 1994; Nahl, 1993; Webster and Hackley, 1997).  
In general, we may expect that richer media will result in better performance. Empirical tests 
however, did not provide strong support for this assertion. Tasks which primarily involve 
information exchange or simple problem solving have generally not shown benefits of video over 
audio-only communication technologies (Anderson et al., 2000). However, task involving 
bargaining and negotiations have been reported to show such benefits (Short et al. 1976; 
Whittaker, 1995; Williams, 1997). McGrath and Hollingshead (1993, 1994) suggested that user 
performance is affected not only by the richness of the media used, but also by the fitness 
between the media and the task. This is known as task-media fit theory. They hypothesized that if 
a task utilizes a leaner medium than is required, the medium may act as a “constraint”. 
Alternatively, if a task utilizes a richer medium than is required, the media may act as a 
“distraction”. These communication constraints or distractions are likely to negatively affect task 
performance. Evidence was found that decisions made in "less rich" communication media were 
of higher quality than those reached in face-to-face meetings (Walther, 1996), presumably due to 
an enhanced ability to focus more on the task-related matters and less on the interpersonal matters.  
In their task-media fit hypothesis table (McGrath and Hollingshead, 1993), the task of negotiating 
conflict of interests was best fit with face-to-face communication. This was followed by video 
systems (marginal fit), audio systems (poor fit) and text-based computer systems (poorest fit). As 
indicated as “less rich” compared to face-to-face communication, the reasoning is that video-
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based systems usually transmit the image of the person's upper body and the quality depends on 
the communication bandwidth.  
For most Internet-based trading activities, face-to-face interaction is not economically preferred 
compared to means through electronic communication. Hence it is necessary to investigate 
alternative communication technologies that combines text/graphics, audio and video channels in 
real-time communication, such as videoconferencing and instant messaging, would contribute to 
a more task-oriented negotiation of requirements (Damian, 2003). 
4.1.3.3.2 EC for Task-Oriented Communication 
The electronic communication channel, as one of the two major components in Lim and 
Benbasat’s NSS theory (1993), has focused on task-oriented mode of additional electronic 
medium to enhance negotiators’ performance. Compared to verbal communication, computer can 
provide mechanisms for transmitting task-oriented communication involving technical data and 
graphics, as well as text-based offer exchanges. These activities require a certain level of 
negotiators’ keyboarding skills as well as literacy in reading and writing.  
Negotiators’ inaccurate perceptions of the other party often lead to cognitive biases and, 
subsequently, sub-optimal negotiation outcomes (Bazerman and Carroll, 1987). The facilitation 
of information exchange between negotiators can significantly reduce these judgment errors, such 
that accuracy of information exchanges or “information clarity” (Yuan et al., 2003) can be 
improved. In existing NSS literature, there are inconclusive findings concerning effects of the 
availability of electronic communication channel (Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000). While 
Delaney et al.’s (1997) study confirmed Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) prediction that the addition of 
electronic communication channel to DSS support would increase negotiators’ satisfaction 
compared to those provided only with individual DSS, Rangaswamy and Shell’s (1997) 
experiment suggested no significant differences across conditions between EC only, DSS, and 
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NSS (DSS+EC) supported dyads. Furthermore, those dyads used electronic communication 
channels indicated that they considered the negotiation process to be less friendly.  
The seemingly contradictive findings make at least two points pertinent for examinations. First, 
when applying or testing the theory of NSS (Lim and Benbasat, 1993), one has to note that an 
important precondition is that the theory assumes a setting where negotiators meet face-to-face 
and direct verbal communications are available. The addition of EC to DSS can hence contribute 
to the overall satisfaction by increased commitment to the problem-solving process. Comparing 
situations where the conditions are not met deserves further theoretical underpinnings. Second, 
the degree of EC or the richness of communication media is not made explicit in the theory. For 
example, Email as used in study by Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) represents the asynchronous 
mode of communication and hence is not comparable with the concurrent mode of electronic 
communication i.e., instant chatting facility, as is implied in the theory. This also calls for an 
enhanced theory on the effects of electronic communication media on negotiation outcomes. 
4.1.4 Category III: Agent-Based Automation  
The issue of the design and implementation of automated negotiation - where computational 
agents find and prepare contracts on behalf of the real-world parties they represent - has attracted 
great interest in recent years (Beam and Segev, 1997).  An agent is an encapsulated computer 
system that is situated in a certain environment and that is capable of flexible, autonomous action 
in that environment, in order to meet its design objectives (Jennings et al. 2001). Figure 4-5 
illustrates the pattern of agent-based negotiations. The agents for negotiators A and B 
communicate via LAN or the Internet and are autonomously governed by protocols and decision 
making rules.  
 Chapter 4 The Theoretical Framework 
71 
 
Figure 4-5. ENS Architecture Focused on Agent-Based Automation 
4.1.4.1 Overview of Category III System Prototypes 
Table 4-3 summarizes the existing ENS research prototypes that emphasize Category II system 
functionalities. Following the decision analysis tradition, MAUT-based approaches are also used 
in some agent-based negotiation systems such as Tete-a-Tete (Maes et al., 1999). 
Table 4-3. Illustrative Prototypes for Category III Systems  
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4.1.4.2 Design Objectives 
Multiple-issue negotiations are commonplace in real-world business transactions. With multiple 







Agents Communicate via LAN or Internet 
Negotiator A  Negotiator B 
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on), there are opportunities for the use of computer support tools (known as NSSs) to help 
structure and facilitate negotiations between buyers and sellers. Some online business transactions, 
while by their nature routine and repetitive, however have varying contract terms with each 
transaction. Rather than being performed by human negotiators, it is also likely that such routine 
transactions would be automated through autonomous agents that negotiate on behalf of their 
human "clients". In such situations, negotiation agents have significant benefits such as time-
saving for human negotiators in monitoring market change, avoiding unnecessary cognitive 
conflict such as "face-saving behavior", and lowering transaction costs (Oliver, 1997; Starke and 
Rangaswamy, 2000). While automation and agent-based software themselves are distinct research 
topics in the areas of Computer Science and AI, in the context of Information Systems research, 
fully automated negotiation is conceived as another step in the evolution of NSS. 
Put it simply, this category of ENS systems aims to automate the negotiation process by using 
intelligent agents. Starke and Rangaswamy (2000) posit that negotiation agents can offer a 
number of potential benefits. 1) The use of autonomous agents decreases the opportunity costs of 
transactions. For humans, time is synonymous with opportunity costs.  Software agents have near 
zero opportunity costs (they can replicate themselves at zero marginal costs if needed). Even 
complex agents with machine-learning technologies impose only modest computational costs 
with today’s high-speed computers. 2) A system of autonomous agent-based negotiations could 
increase the efficiency of settlements even for semi-structured, multi-issue business bargaining 
problems (Oliver, 1997). 3) Face-to-face encounters can be avoided for some individuals who are 
uncomfortable about “haggling with another person” by using an autonomous negotiating agent 
on their behalf. 4) Finally, autonomous agents offer new commercial possibilities offered. Lower 
costs associated with bargaining through agents might provide the means for new types of 
transactions by turning conventional multi-issue business transactions into negotiation-based 
transactions (Oliver, 1997). 
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Besides possessing a known advantage like achieving improved outcome efficiency with NSS 
support, automated negotiation can distinctly help to reduce negotiation time (by making large 
volumes of transactions possible in a very short period) and also remove some of the reticence of 
human negotiators to engage in embarrassing situations (Lomusico et al., 2003).  
Using agents to conduct negotiations autonomously is fundamentally a different process 
compared to the previous two forms in engaging ICTs (decision support and communication 
support). According to Lomusico et al. (2003), there are two important aspects for the design of 
negotiation agents: the negotiation protocol and negotiation strategy. The protocol specifies the 
public rules of agents’ interaction, e.g., the structure of offers that agents can make or the 
sequence of offers and counter-offers that are allowed (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). In 
general, agents must first agree on the negotiation protocol before negotiation proper begins. The 
strategy determines the way the agent behaves in an interaction as regulated by protocol; the 
strategies are agents’ private decision-making models. There may be many possible strategies for 
an agreed protocol. Designers can program various strategies (see Section 2.3.1.1 for negotiation 
strategies) into the negotiation agents. Examples include rule-based strategies of a deterministic 
nature, hard-coded strategies of concession in multiple-issue negotiations (e.g., Matwin et al., 
1991), case-based reasoning for planning and support of negotiations (e.g., Sycara, 1990), and 
strategies that incorporate machine-learning methodologies such as artificial adaptive agents 
using genetic algorithm-based learning techniques (e.g., Oliver, 1997). It should be noted that in 
general, one strategy that works well in a certain scenario may not work as well in others. 
Furthermore, in automated negotiation where protocol may vary, the choice of strategy is a 
function of not just of the specifics of the negotiation scenario, but also of the protocol in use 
(Lomusico et al., 2003). 
A key problem of agent-based negotiation research is how to design agents in order to 
strategically negotiate with their counterparts. Agents without learning capabilities are inevitably 
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limited in capabilities. Nascent negotiation agents may have inherent risks when they adopt a 
single negotiation strategy throughout the negotiation process (Sierra et al., 1997). In other words, 
negotiation agents with very limited knowledge of their opponents will have greater difficulty in 
making trade-offs during negotiations. For instance, if the agent is too strict or rigid, it may lose 
the chance to earn more profits by making a deal with its opponent; on the other hand, if the agent 
is too easy-going or generous, it would probably just earn marginal profits even when it gets a 
deal with its opponent (Huang and Sycara, 2002). Furthermore, agent-based systems are 
associated with such barriers as the need for ontology and the strategy problem (Beam and Segev, 
1997), as well as other uncertainty, risks and challenges due to their built-in negotiation protocols, 
strategies or tactics (Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000).  
In an attempt to overcome the problem of agents’ limited information about their opponents, 
recent AI research advocates a focus on the learning capabilities of negotiation agents. This 
means that agents can learn their opponents’ preferences from previous encounters, thereby 
applying the acquired information to make better offers/counter-offers or trade-offs (Coehoorn 
and Jennings, 2004; Faratin et al., 2000; Soo and Hung, 2002; Zeng and Sycara, 1998). Huang 
and Sycara (2002) propose the implementation of personality features of negotiation agents. 
According to their model, the negotiation process is driven by the internal beliefs of participating 
agents. To realize different “personalities”, one needs only to plug in suitable “subjective beliefs” 
to one’s agents. With the personalized internal beliefs, the heterogeneous, self-interested agents 
can interact and negotiate with each other, so as to make deals with their opponents. 
4.1.4.3 Sub-Classification of Agent-Based Automation 
For both conceptual and empirical purposes, it is useful to further categorize negotiation agents 
based on the different design concepts used to automate negotiation process. The following 
section elaborates on the three alternate designs of e-Negotiation systems that have differing 
design features and advantages, which can be characterized with increasing system intelligence 
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levels, i.e., the extent to which the computerized negotiation support tool can imitate human 
negotiation behaviors with three system intelligence levels ranging from levels 1 to 3. It is not 
assumed nor argued in this definition that the difference in intelligence between Level-1 and 2 is 
comparable to that of Level-2 and 3. The Level-1 system is incorporated into this formulation in 
order to serve as a baseline system that represents traditional decision support tool for 
negotiations17. 
4.1.4.3.1 Level-1: Traditional NSS with Decision-Support Focus  
The Level-1 system provides technical functions aimed at improving negotiators’ decision-
making quality18. According to Lim and Benbasat (1993), an NSS which pertains directly to a 
two-person, session-oriented, and multiple-issue setting, can be conceptualized as a combination 
of two major components – the individual Decision Support System (DSS) for each party and the 
electronic communications channel. The DSS portion improves the human information-
processing capacity and its effects can be best understood within the reference disciplines of 
game theory and economic theory. The electronic communication channel improves perceived 
commitment and its effects can be best understood within the context of social-psychological 
theories of negotiation. Examples of such NSS prototypes can be found in greater detail in a 
series of cumulative studies (see Delaney et al., 1997; Foroughi et al., 1995; Goh et al., 2000; 
Jones, 1988). The NSS prototype specified in these studies consists of two important components: 
a module for electronic communication between the parties, and a DSS to assist in the generation 
and evaluation of alternative contracts. Each negotiator inputs his/her own interests to the 
decision tool as private data, as well as his/her estimates of the other party's preferences. The DSS 
                                                     
17
 Kersten and Lo (2003) and Chen et al. (2004) look at the systems from a slightly different yet 
theoretically valid angle. To them, Level-3 system can be considered an integrated system that incorporates 
both decision support “agents” and automation “agents”. The integrated system will have its well-defined 
roles based on their protocols and be used in different contexts and users. 
18
 This type of system represents “traditional” functions of NSSs that focus decision support, also as 
classified as Category I system in our framework.  
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then computes and displays the three contract alternatives with the highest joint outcomes. The 
Level-1 system has relatively lowest level of system “intelligence” among the three, with the key 
functions to evaluate alternatives and suggest optimal solutions, where the human users perform 
the core processes involved in negotiations. 
4.1.4.3.2 Level-2: Fully Automated Negotiation Agents 
The Level-2 system aims to fully automate the negotiation process by implementing self-
interested electronic agents. By specifying issue preferences and the bottom line based on 
negotiator’s BATNA in the pre-negotiation preparation phase, an agent can then negotiate with 
the opponent to reach an agreement on behalf of its human master. A practical negotiation tactics 
that can be adopted by this system is the concession-based negotiation tactic (Lopes et al., 2001). 
Agents can make small concessions in each proposal without losing patience as human beings do. 
For negotiators as users, the design can be easily understood and used, and in addition, greatly 
eases negotiators’ effort and reduces time spent in the negotiation process. However, when an 
agent adopts a pre-specified negotiation tactic in all scenarios, it has limited ability to reflect a 
negotiator’s personal negotiation style. Furthermore, as the agent has very limited preference 
information about the opponent due to a lack of learning capability, it is only interested in 
maximizing its own utility without considering the concerns of the opponent’s utility. Obviously, 
a poor algorithm can render Level-2 useless; while it needs to be assumed here that there are no 
inadequacies in relation to design and the system is in no way compromised by the design.  
4.1.4.3.3 Level-3: Automated Negotiation Agents with Personality Features and Learning 
Capability   
The Level-3 system is characterized by a sophisticated intelligent agent with personality features 
and the capability of adjusting negotiation strategies by learning the opponents’ preferences. Due 
to the personality features (Huang and Sycara, 2002), human negotiators are able to inform the 
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agents to change negotiation tactics throughout the negotiation process and update their agents’ 
beliefs about the opponents. A combination of different tactics can be built into the system such 
as the time-dependent tactic, resource-dependent tactic, behavior-dependent or imitative tactic 
(Sierra et al., 1997; Faratin et al., 1998), as well as different opening or concession tactics (Lopes 
et al., 2001). To “plug in” different beliefs into the agent, a human negotiator only needs to 
change his/her estimations of their opponent’s issue-preference ratings.  
At the same time, based on previous encounters with the opponent and some domain knowledge 
(Zeng and Sycara, 1997), the agent can automatically estimate the opponent’s preference 
information. According to Faratin et al. (2000), the preference information can be either in the 
form of perfect information (i.e., the opponent’s actual issue ratings), or partial information (i.e., 
the opponent’s issue priorities). Possible learning mechanisms are the Bayesian learning 
mechanism (Li and Cao, 2004; Zeng and Sycara, 1998), the neural network learning algorithm 
(Soo and Hung 2002), kernel density estimation (Coehoorn and Jennings, 2004) and so on. In 
addition, similarity criteria (Faratin et al., 2000) can be used and coupled with concession tactics, 
to generate offers that could yield comparable utilities to the negotiator but may benefit his/her 
opponent; i.e., to increase the opponent’s utility without leaving its own utility at a disadvantage. 
This approach would increase the overall joint outcomes. With the personality features and the 
learning capabilities, the proposed Level-3 system will have the highest potential to imitate 
human negotiation behaviors among the three design alternatives. At the same time, it is 
worthwhile to note that the Level-3 agent requires more human involvement and cognitive effort 
than the Level-2 agent does. 
4.2 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES - NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND OUTCOMES 
Reflecting the interdisciplinary nature centered on negotiation research, a number of theoretical 
models of negotiation have been developed in attempts to understand negotiation and each 
 Chapter 4 The Theoretical Framework 
78 
suggests different measures of negotiation performance. Descriptive negotiation theories have 
mostly emphasized the contextual characteristics of negotiation and negotiators’ cognition and 
interaction processes (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). Thus measurement 
of negotiation outcomes typically includes elements of social perception such as negotiators’ 
perceptions of the bargaining situation, the bargaining opponent, and of themselves (Thompson 
and Hastie, 1990). From the normative/game-theoretic perspective (e.g., Nash, 1950, 1953; 
Rubenstein, 1982), negotiation outcome is formulated with economic measures of negotiation 
performance in terms of the efficiency and fairness of the negotiated agreement. Most of the 
empirical studies on NSS/Negotiation Agents incorporate joint utility and contract balance as 
primary dependent variables to reflect outcome of negotiation, showing the significant impact of 
the analytical approach on negotiation. The following sections detail the dependent variables for 
each perspective19. 
4.2.1 Economic Perspectives 
Negotiation outcome is the product of a bargaining situation, which may be an impasse or a 
mutual agreement. In terms of an agreement, economists analyze the two-person bargaining 
problem in terms of utility received by each bargainer from any settlement. Developed from 
game-theoretic models (Nash, 1950, 1953; Rubenstein, 1982), negotiation outcome is assessed in 
terms of efficiency and fairness. Typical measures of negotiation outcome used in most general 
negotiation studies comprise joint profit/utility/value, contract balance (also known as equality of 
outcome), the number of contracts/offers proposed, and so on. (e.g., Delaney et al., 1997; 
                                                     
19
 Although culture is not manipulated in our research framework, it is recognized that efficiency, fairness 
and time are culturally dependent concepts. While there is no established theory that pertains directly to the 
effects of ENS per se to culture-specific negotiation outcomes, we hold the position that insights are 
warranted in understanding the dynamics of different system features using a culture-sensitive perspective. 
As ENS studies have attracted worldwide research interest, such insights are particularly useful when 
empirical results are compared to those in the literature where experiments are conducted in different 
countries and cultures without explicitly stating the possible impacts of cultural influences. We will 
illustrate this effort catering the sense of cultural complications in the first experimental study. 
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Foroughi et al., 1995; Jones, 1988; Lim, 2000). Some researchers have also proposed measuring 
negotiation outcomes in terms of the Pareto-efficiency concepts (Lax and Sebenius, 1987; Tripp 
and Sondak, 1992; Milter et al., 1996; Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Goh et al., 2000).  
4.2.1.1 Efficiency  
It has been widely recognized that not all negotiators are able to achieve efficient agreement, i.e., 
to reach situations in which neither negotiator could do better without the other doing worse (Lax 
and Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). Failure to achieve efficient agreement is also 
described as “leaving money on the table” (Raiffa, 1982) or failure to find an “integrative” 
solution (Walton and McKersie, 1965).  This perspective has tended to measure the quality of 
negotiations in terms of the extent to which the agreed utilities deviate from predicted outcomes.  
4.2.1.1.1 The Concepts Related to Efficiency 
Negotiators’ performance can be assessed at both the individual and the dyadic levels. At the 
individual level, individual efficiency reflects the extent to which an individual negotiator’s 
utility payoffs approach the maximum value, which is 100% in extreme cases. The 
operationalized terms are also called individual outcomes and individual values and so on. At the 
dyadic level, joint efficiency reflects the extent to which a negotiation dyad’s utility payoffs 
approach a frontier. From the system point of view, people are primarily interested in the dyadic 
level of negotiators’ performances. To understand dyadic performance or more generally the 
distribution of resources, we will next look at the concept of Pareto efficiency. 
The basic theory underlying the optimization algorithms of negotiation support systems can be 
effectively illustrated using the Pareto-efficiency concept. Generally speaking, a goal of 
negotiations is to be as “Pareto Efficient” as possible. A Pareto efficient outcome is one in which 
there is no other agreement that would result in both parties being better off (Nash, 1950), 
assuming the utility function is convex or quasi-convex. An efficient frontier refers to the locus of 
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achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are possible, i.e., the set of Pareto optimal 
agreements (Raiffa, 1982). Pareto efficiency is the extent to which an agreement approaches the 
frontier.  
Geometrically, an efficient frontier is reflected as a finite set of points (such as M or N) or a line 
(see Figure 4-6). All other possible agreement points in the shaded area (such as point A) are non-
Pareto optimal outcomes. There is potential for improving non-Pareto optimal outcomes to 
become optimal. 
 
Figure 4-6. Pareto Efficiency 
4.2.1.1.2 The Efficiency Concept for Measuring Dyadic Negotiation Outcomes 
In existing literature, there are two ways of measuring dyadic or joint negotiation outcomes: by 
using the Pareto-efficiency concept and by using joint profit. The following sub-sections 
elaborate on measurement issues of negotiation outcomes so as to provide a better understanding 
of their different underlying concepts. 
In terms of the total utility of a negotiated settlement, joint utility (also known as joint profit, 
joint value) is presumably the most common dependent variable to assess dyadic negotiation 
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utility scores of the buyer and the seller for the final agreement; and the higher the value of the 
joint points, the higher the joint utility. Tripp and Sondak (1992) identify three major reasons 
underlying the popularity of using joint utility: the ease of calculation; the simplicity of 
underlying concepts without need for referencing economic models; and its reflection of 
subjective measures in negotiation contexts which are adopted in the social psychological 
traditions of studying cooperation (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986).  
Some researchers argue that joint utility is not a “sensitive” measure of negotiation efficiency 
(Lax and Sebenius, 1987). Individuals are believed to entertain different aspirations or 
expectations of negotiation outcomes (Oliver et al., 1994) and measuring final outcome without 
taking into account each negotiator’s initial expectations (prior to the negotiation activity) 
neglects such a difference. Gain reflects the disparity of one’s initial expected utility and the 
actual outcome achieved with the final agreement. Joint gain is hence calculated as the sum of 
individual gains obtained by both buyer and seller. 
4.2.1.1.3 Pareto Efficiency and Joint Utility 
In their examination of the relationship between Pareto Efficiency and Maximum Joint Utility, 
Tripp and Sondak (1992) postulated that while all agreements that maximize joint profit are 
Pareto optimal, but for any given function measuring joint utilities, not all Pareto optimal 
agreements necessarily maximize joint outcomes. Hence, measuring joint performance by means 
of join outcome may result in different conclusions compared to measuring by means of Pareto 
Efficiency, as far as experimental studies are concerned.  
Geometrically, when Point M represents a Pareto optimal agreement that maximizes joint utility, 
Point N represents another Pareto optimal solution with a lower joint utility. Certainly a rational 
negotiator (in this case, the seller) would not be willing to move from N to M as this will result in 
a lower individual utility to him/her, and hence measures of dyadic performance should not 
imply that he or she should make the move (see Figure 4-7). 




Figure 4-7. Pareto Efficiency and Joint Utility 
In comparing the two measurements of joint outcome, it has been suggested that the quality of 
negotiated agreements can be better measured by Pareto efficiency rather than by joint utility 
because “Pareto efficiency better incorporates theoretical models of individual rationality” (Tripp 
and Sondak, 1992, p. 292). When joint utility is used as an efficiency measure, an implicit 
assumption is that negotiators should sometimes act against their individual interests for the sake 
of joint profit. In those situations where only a subset of possible Pareto optimal agreements 
maximize joint profit, negotiation researchers who use joint utility as a measure of dyadic 
performance may “confound distributive norms with rational choice by negotiators” (Tripp and 
Sondak, 1992, p. 282).  
There are different formulas for measuring negotiation outcome using Pareto-efficiency concepts, 
such as the integrative quotient (Lax and Sebenius, 1987), the improved integrative quotient 
which is an adjusted formula in consideration of inefficient frontiers (Tripp and Sondak, 1992), 
the constant ratio distance (Milter et al., 1996), and the distance to the efficient frontier (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993; Goh et al., 2000). Clyman (1995) examines the two integrativeness-based 
Efficient Frontier 
Seller’s Utility Value 
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Value M: an efficient optimal settlement that         
maximizes joint utility (happens to be 
the Nash solution in this illustration) 
N: an efficient optimal settlement that 
     does not maximize joint utility; 
     individually rational Seller would NOT 
     move from N to M 
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measures proposed by Lax and Sebenius (1987) and Tripp and Sondak (1992), and concludes that 
the measures do not always work well.  
Tripp and Sondak (1992) further suggest three criteria to operationalize Pareto efficiency: 1) it 
should be comparable across studies, 2) it should not include irrelevant comparisons among 
possible agreements, and 3) it should reflect the difficulty of the bargaining task.  
All ratio-based operationalizations (as in Lax and Sebenius, 1987; Tripp and Sondak, 1992; 
Milter et al., 1996) satisfy the first criterion. By removing solutions in inefficient portions, 
operationalizations such as those of Tripp and Sondak (1992) and Milter et al. (1996) further 
satisfy the second criterion. The formula devised by Tripp and Sondak (1992) also satisfies the 
third criterion by reflecting task complexity.  
Goh et al. (2000, p. 110) have provided a way of operationalizing the distance to the efficient 
frontier. All efficient solutions on the efficient frontier must be determined before the distance 
can be calculated. The distance to the efficient frontier, D1, is hence calculated by the minimum 
distance among all lines linking a settlement to all efficient solutions (Goh et al., 2000, p. 110): 
where Fb, Fs and Ebi, Esi denote the buyer’s and 
seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for efficient solution i,  respectively. Here i is 
the sequential index into efficient solutions, and n is the total number of efficient solutions. 
Indeed, measuring dyadic performance in mixed-motive negotiation can be a challenging task. 
Given the inconsistent views and mechanisms, it perhaps deserves further discussion to 
differentiate the situations: 1) when joint utility is appropriate as a measure of efficiency, and 
2) when the Pareto-efficiency concept is appropriate as a measure of efficiency of 
negotiation outcomes. There is so far no universally accepted measure that can be considered 
appropriate in all settings. While examples have shown that joint profit may not reflect individual 
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rationality (Lax and Sebenius, 1987; Tripp and Sondak, 1992; Milter et al., 1996; Goh et al., 
2000), measures using Pareto-efficiency concepts are also not appropriate for some negotiation 
settings (Clayman, 1995). Measures should be used by researchers fitting to the questions they 
ask and reflecting their theoretical assumptions. This dissertation holds a view similar to the 
impossibility theorem which states that it is impossible to construct a single measure that works 
in all negotiating settings: the choice of measures “must be examined for appropriateness to the 
particular experimental setting” (Clayman, 1995, p. 40). 
For the first situation, by engaging joint utility, one implicitly assumes that negotiation parties are 
motivated to pursue efficient solutions maximizing the joint-level performance, and neither 
individual efficiency nor equality of individual efficiencies is implied. In an experimental setup 
that institutionally motivates and technically facilitates negotiation parties to pursue the highest 
joint performance, joint utility should be arguably chosen as a dependent measure to reflect 
outcome efficiency. An alternative generator (a component of decision support tools for 
negotiation) is one typical system artifact (see Foroughi et al, 1995; Delaney et al., 1997) that 
aims to promote highest joint outcome. Therein researchers consider it appropriate to engage joint 
utility to reflect outcome efficiency.  
For the second situation, in contrast, by using the distance to efficient frontier, one implicitly 
assumes negotiators are rational, self-motivated decision makers. The idea is that there is no 
reason to reject moving to a point where at least one party’s utility improves, while the other’s is 
either unchanged or also improved. This measure does not concern equality of individual 
efficiencies. In an experiment setup that institutionally motivates and technically facilitates 
negotiators to purse individual efficiency (such as Pareto-optimization functions as illustrated in 
SmartSettle), Distance to Efficient Frontier can be arguably chosen as a dependent measure to 
reflect efficiency. 
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4.2.1.2 Fairness  
In integrative negotiations or more generally in cooperative games, fairness is often one of the 
most important criteria for parties to deciding on particular settlements or solutions (Albin, 1993). 
The major problem for using efficiency measures to assess the quality of negotiation outcome is 
the lack of the notion of fairness. The fairness or equality concern 20  connotes the second 
fundamental aspect of settlement quality.  
4.2.1.2.1 The Concepts Related to Fairness  
The concepts related to fairness, such as equality, equity, justice and impartiality, have been the 
subjects of discourse by scholars dating as far back as Aristotle of Ancient Greece. It is 
acknowledged that equality differs from equity in that absolute equality implies that each party 
receives the same outcome whereas absolute equity implies parties in a relationship receive 
outcomes in relationship to their input. Younge (1991) provides several examples showing why 
sometimes an equal share of the final agreement cannot be regarded as fair solutions. Younge 
(1991) further suggests that measuring fairness using the Nash solution is a more defensible 
approach as far as equity is concerned. The Nash solution establishes a form of parity between 
negotiators by considering their relative rates of utility gain. 
In his widely adopted bargaining theory, Nash (1950, 1953) integrated the Pareto standard with a 
set of fairness principles to define what came to be known as the Nash bargaining solution. The 
Nash bargaining theory strives to maximize the joint gains of two negotiation parties while taking 
into consideration the notion of fairness in a formal, scientific manner. Nash imposes three 
axioms: independence of irrelevant alternatives, efficiency and symmetry. The Nash bargaining 
solution is a single point that satisfies all the three axioms. Simply, this solution is a fair 
                                                     
20
 In fact, fairness is sometimes used interchangeably with equality in negotiation studies. 
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settlement that maximizes joint utility21. In informal terms, it is a solution point from which no 
party has incentives to deviate.  
Geometrically, the Nash solution can be derived by drawing the largest rectangle that will fit 
inside the bargaining space S, i.e. one with the southwest vertex on the disagreement point/origin, 
and the northeast vertex on the Pareto-frontier. Since the area of this rectangle is the product of its 
length and height, the largest rectangle will be the one that maximizes the product of the two 
players' utility. The bargaining solution will be the northeast vertex of this rectangle (see Figure 
4-8).  
 
Figure 4-8. Nash Bargaining Solution  
4.2.1.2.2 The Fairness Concept for Measuring Dyadic Negotiation Outcomes 
The simplest and most often used tool to measure fairness is known as contract balance or 
alternatively equality of outcome.  The contract balance is computed by the absolute value of the 
                                                     
21
 Nevertheless, it is to be pointed out that Nash solution is “fair” assuming parties are rational, and in that 
sense the solution still does not take into account the distribution of what socially or individually 
considered just, right, or fair.  
Efficient Frontier 
Seller’s Utility Value 
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Value M: the Nash solution that is one of the Pareto 
efficient solutions that maximizes product of 
both parties’ utility and is fair 
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difference between the total utility scores achieved by each negotiator. It is zero for a balanced 
contract and a higher number for one that is unbalanced.  
Contract balance is criticized as a non-standardized measure of negotiation fairness (Lax and 
Sebenius, 1987). Some researchers have proposed measuring outcome fairness in terms of the 
distance to the Nash bargaining solution (Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Goh et al., 2000). In fact, 
Goh et al. (2000, p. 110) have provided a way of operationalizing the distance to the Nash 
bargaining solution. Thus the Nash solution is identified before the distance can be calculated. 
The distance to the Nash bargaining solution, D2, is hence calculated by the distance of the line 
linking from a settlement point to the Nash solution: 
where Fb, Fs and Nb, Ns denote the buyer’s and 
seller’s utility scores for the final agreement and for the Nash bargaining solution, respectively. 
4.2.1.2.3 Nash Solution and Contract Balance 
The Nash solution specifies the maximum score of the two parties’ utility gains, and is regarded 
as fair because it gives each party exactly half of the maximum payoff it can rationally expect. 
One should note the difference between such a settlement and a settlement that gives the two 
parties the same payoff. In Figure 4-9, Point B that splits two parties with the same utility values 
(and hence minimizes contract balance to zero) does not maximize joint utilities.  
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Figure 4-9. Nash Solution and Contract Balance 
The following attempts to distinguish the situations: 1) when contract balance is appropriate as 
a measure of fairness, and 2) when the Distance to Nash’s Solution is appropriate as a 
measure of fairness of negotiation outcomes, based on its underlying logic.  
For the first situation, it should be noted that contract balance is an absolute equality concept. 
Based on this criterion solely, the best or most balanced solution is the one that equalizes both 
parties’ profits. Therefore, solely using this measure is risky as one party would need to 
irrationally drag down the other’s profits to match a low level of his/her own profit, in order to 
attain “equality” of the settlement. Although this behavior has been observed in descriptive 
studies, it contradicts an assumption of economic theories that people are rational decision 
makers. This is plausibly why so far no system artifacts have been designed to simply equalize 
negotiators’ payoffs.  
According to Nash’s bargaining theory, we generally aim at a single best outcome that maximizes 
production and equalizes distribution. In the opinion of this dissertation, contract balance is only 
meaningful for comparing two settlements with the same joint profits, in which the more 
balanced one should be regarded as a “better” outcome. In other words, contract balance, as an 
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absolute measure of fairness, should be used as a complementary measure to assess the quality of 
negotiation outcomes. 
For the second situation, Figure 4-10 is depicted to facilitate sorting out the situations when the 
distance to Nash solution shall be used to measure the fairness of negotiated settlement. Based on 
the formula of Goh et al. (2000), settlements on Points C and D will result in the same “distances” 
to the Nash Solution (Point M). This does not tally with the basic idea of “fairness” because Point 
D obviously represents a more unequal settlement than Point C. In view of this analysis, the 
distance to the Nash bargaining solution is not absolutely a sensitive measure of fairness per se, 
because the Nash solution includes both of fairness as well as the Pareto-efficiency concept, 
while the latter corresponds to the individual efficiency of a negotiated settlement. 
 
Figure 4-10. Using Distance to Nash Solution as Fairness Measure 
4.2.1.3 Time to Settlement 
Time can be considered as an efficiency measure for the negotiation process. Negotiation time is 
the total time taken for negotiation parties to reach a final agreement, if there is one. As the 
complexity of a negotiation task increases, negotiation often becomes a prolonged and tedious 
process. Generally speaking, other outcomes being equal, it is more desirable for negotiators to 
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shorten the time to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, the reduction of negotiation time should not 
be achieved at the expense of obtaining non-integrative negotiation outcomes. 
In experimental studies, when time to reach settlement is used as a dependent variable, all parties 
are to be given sufficient time to reach an agreement. This is different from manipulating time as 
an independent factor, such as exerting time pressure in examining deadline effects (see Section 
2.3.1.5 for more details on time as a factor). 
4.2.2 Social-Psychological Perspectives 
Descriptive negotiation theories have mostly emphasized the contextual characteristics of 
negotiation and negotiators’ cognition and interaction processes (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; 
Pruitt and Rubin, 1986). Measurement of negotiation outcome in descriptive studies includes 
elements of social perception such as negotiators’ perceptions of the bargaining situation, of the 
bargaining opponent, and of themselves (Thompson and Hastie, 1990). In this section, important 
social-psychological measures for negotiation settlement, the negotiation process as well as e-
Negotiation Systems are discussed separately. 
4.2.2.1 Attitudes towards the Negotiation Settlement 
Negotiators’ attitudes towards the negotiated settlement are important beliefs contributing to the 
success of negotiations from both self-interested and relationship concerns. While economists 
measure the notions of efficiency and fairness by means of utility values, it is rarely true that in 
real-world negotiations, an actual utility structure can be readily constructed and negotiators’ 
performances in terms of utility points can be revealed to both parties. Psychologists believe that 
what matters most is the efficiency and fairness perceived by the negotiators. Negotiators often 
leave the bargaining table with two feelings, that of being either a “winner” or a “loser” (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993). Perceived Efficiency reflects the subjective belief that a negotiator has 
achieved efficient solutions in terms of individual performance. It corresponds to the negotiators’ 
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self-concerns. Lim and Benbasat (1993) also refer to this belief as “confidence with solution”. 
Perceived Fairness (Rubin and Brown, 1975) reflects the subjective perceptions concerning the 
equality and equity of the negotiated settlement; and that it corresponds to the negotiators’ 
concern-for-others. The Equity Theory (Adams, 1963; 1965; Walster et al., 1978) defines equity 
as the evaluation result of the discrepancy between one’s input and rewards in comparison to the 
other party’s input and rewards.  In negotiations, parties might evaluate the fairness of the 
settlement in terms of equal shares between themselves and their opponents, as well as in terms 
of the equitable returns, compared to their input such as time and costs devoted to negotiations.  
It is generally believed that negotiators who have are satisfied with negotiation process and 
outcomes in the past will approach future negotiations with positive attitudes, thus improving 
their performance in the long run (Delaney et al., 1997). “Satisfaction” is a multi-faceted variable 
studied by many disciplines, including organizational behavior, marketing, human decision and 
psychology. McLone (1990) suggests that satisfaction comes from perceptions of both output-
oriented and affect-oriented outcomes. Oliver et al. (1994) specify that in evaluation of 
satisfaction in negotiations, the output-oriented outcomes concern the objective allocations of 
negotiated resources resulted from the bargaining encounter, whereas the affect-oriented 
outcomes refer to the subjective social perceptions held by negotiating parties following the 
encounter. In our research framework, we are primarily interested in the impact of alternate 
system designs in improving negotiation process and outcomes. Therefore, we choose to focus on 
the output-oriented dimensions such as negotiators’ satisfaction towards the negotiated 
settlement, instead of user satisfaction towards system use.  Satisfaction with the Settlement22 
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 In Information System research, user satisfaction is defined as a “multidimensional attitude towards 
various aspects of MIS…and various user constructs such as feelings of participation and understanding” 
(Raymond, 1985). Negotiators using an ENS and performing dual roles as negotiators to obtain agreement 
and end-users of the system will attribute their overall satisfaction based on their own performance, their 
perceptions of their opponents, as well as interactions with the system artifacts. Future research may look 
into the overall evaluation and examination of ENS-user satisfaction from multiple dimensions. 
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reflects the subjective feeling towards the negotiated agreement contract. This dimension of 
negotiators’ subjective beliefs towards the outcome per se is also termed “satisfaction with the 
outcome of the negotiation” (Eliashberg et al., 1992) and “satisfaction” (Lim and Benbasat, 1993; 
Foroughi et al., 1995; Perkins et al., 1996). Foroughi et al. (1995) argue that rational negotiators 
would feel satisfied with the contract if they believed that efficient and/or fair agreements have 
been reached, if negotiators can achieve a higher joint outcome (a reflection of efficiency) and 
better contract balance (a reflection of fairness) resulting from the computer decision support, 
then they are likely to be more satisfied with the negotiated settlement.  
4.2.2.2 Attitudes towards the Negotiation Process 
Besides being concerned with output-related satisfaction, an NSS should ideally help smooth the 
negotiation process and foster good future business relationships. Negotiators’ feelings and 
beliefs towards the negotiation process need not be directly related to the utilities gained for the 
final contract as those who are not satisfied with the negotiation process dealing with their 
opponents are not very likely to cooperate again in the future. The Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere is a process-related measure that we define as the extent to which a negotiation 
party perceives his/her opponent to have behaved cooperatively during the negotiation process. It 
positively reflects the level at which the negotiator’s opponent has cooperated in reaching final 
agreement, which may in turn lead to future business relationships. This notion is also termed 
“perceived collaborative/negative climate” (see Foroughi et al., 1995), or “satisfaction with the 
general atmosphere” (Eliashberg et al., 1992). 
4.2.2.3 Attitudes towards the System 
4.2.2.3.1 Perceived Control  
The notions of perceived control and system anxiety are introduced herein to study the effects of 
agent-based negotiation support tools. The construct “perceived control” comes from social 
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psychology research. An individual’s perception of the control that he can exert has been found to 
be a very strong predictor of both behaviors and emotional outcomes, and therefore has 
stimulated a great deal of research in disciplines such as psychology, marketing, and 
organizational behavior (Fox et al., 1993; Lacey, 1979; Sargent and Terry, 1998). It is viewed as 
the degree to which a person feels that he/she can impact outcomes in his/her environment 
through voluntary actions (Lacey, 1979). On his part, Averill (1973) views perceived control as a 
multi-dimensional construct which includes cognitive control, behavioral control, and decisional 
control. Cognitive control addresses the interpretation of an event into a cognitive model or plan. 
Decisional control addresses the ability to choose among different courses of action. Behavioral 
control deals with the existence of some means of exerting influence over an event. The last 
dimension has been extensively researched in the IS iterature involving Azjen’s (1991) theory of 
planned behavior.  
In IS research, the notion of perceived control is adopted to understand human’s perception 
towards system use. However, the control construct is not examined using multiple dimensions. 
For instance, Sengupta and Te’eni (1993) studied the effects of cognitive feedback on cognitive 
control and strategy convergence in a group decision support system. Control is investigated as 
the “extent to which the decision maker controls the execution of his or her decision strategy” 
(Sengupta and Te’eni 1993, p. 90). It is also recognized that as the execution of decision strategy 
is only a part of control dimension, the “control” lacks other dimensions such as the internal, 
cognitive aspects (Morris and Marshall, 2004).  
The first remarkable attempt integrating the various aspects of control into the IS domain was 
made by Frese (1987). It provides a conceptual discourse on the aspects of control from the 
perspective of information systems. Based on this concept, Morris and Marshall (2004) developed 
and tested 55 items concerning user’s experiences working with an interactive information system. 
The factor analysis produced five key factors that represent perceived control: feedback signal, 
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feedback duration, strategy, metaphor knowledge, and timeframe. The metaphor knowledge 
factor directly accesses the ability of the user to conceptualize the functioning of the system and 
integrates those functions within their mental model of the system. This factor corresponds to 
cognitive control (Averill, 1973; Frese, 1987). The strategy factor supports decision control 
(Karasek, 1979), which deals with the decision latitude of the user as regards his/her ability to 
decide on a strategy for attempting to achieve the goals. It appears that the ability to make 
decisions about the actions to perform (decisional control) and the ability to take those actions 
(behavioral control) are intertwined; both are related to the timeframe factor. As this factor deals 
with the issue of having sufficient time to make decisions and then attempting to enact those 
decisions, the revealed relationship is not surprising. Dealing with feedback that the user receives 
from the system, the factors feedback signal and feedback duration do not correspond to a 
particular dimension of control. However, feedback is an integral component of any form of 
control (Frese, 1987). Figure 4-11 shows the comparison between the two approaches.  
 
Figure 4-11. An Exploration of the Concept of Perceived Control in IS 
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Our framework adopts the three-dimensional concept of perceived control to assess the degree to 
which negotiators are able to voluntarily utilize ENS systems to achieve their expected outcomes. 
4.2.2.3.2 System Anxiety  
The term anxiety is most often used to describe an unpleasant emotional state or condition which 
is characterized by subjective feelings of tension, apprehension, and worry (Spielberger, 1972). In 
IS research, a widely studied aspect is computer anxiety, which can be defined in terms of a 
psychological response such as computer phobia (Ramalingam and Weidenbeck, 1998) or in 
terms of a cognitive reaction such as apprehension of computer technology (Joncour et al., 1994). 
In turn, Brown et al. (2004) argue that given the wide array of technological applications that are 
included under the umbrella of ‘computer’, it seems reasonable to expect that different anxieties 
would be associated with different uses of a computer. In their view, an application-specific 
measure of computer anxiety serves two purposes. First, it focuses on the particular computer 
application of interest, rather than on technology or computers in general. Second, it represents a 
more proximal representation of the context in an individual’s recognition of that context, thus 
providing greater explanation and prediction.  
Since the locus of control has been regarded as one salient correlate of computer anxiety in 
literature (e.g., Crable et al., 1994), perceived control is conceivable to be relevant to users’ 
anxiety towards a particular system. In our framework, system anxiety refers to the anxiety 
towards an ENS. When agent-based technologies are applied to business negotiations, there 
would be a great change in the degree of control from humans to computer agents and thus may 
consequently result in users experiencing higher system anxiety. In turn, system anxiety may 
cause some negative behavior like the avoidance of ENS usage, and negative comments about the 
system, which may further influence the final outcome of negotiation in an undesired way. 
4.2.2.3.3 Other System-related Perceptions and Intentions to Use the System 
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Users’ intentions to use a particular information system can be attributed by a number of factors. 
Through numerous empirical tests, the technology acceptance model (TAM) has proved to be a 
parsimonious model of individuals’ acceptance behavior towards new technology. It has been 
validated in a wide variety of information technologies in the workplace (e.g., Karahanna et al., 
1999; Taylor and Todd, 1995) as well as in B2C contexts (e.g. Gefen and Straub, 2000). 
According to the TAM, the use of a new IT is determined by two concepts: the perceived 
usefulness of and the perceived ease in using the technology (Davis, 1989; 1993). External 
variables will affect perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use which will in turn affect 
attitudes towards using the system. The attitudes towards using a system will have an impact on 
the behavioral intention to use it, which will ultimately affect the actual use of the system. In fact, 
TAM studies have also analyzed the impact of technological attributes on technological 
acceptance. Overall, TAM constructs have been found to mediate the effects of system design 
features on use behavior, accounting for about 40% of the variance in predicting a system’s use 
(Legris et al., 2003).  
Nevertheless, TAM and its consequent insights are not helpful in understanding the reasons why 
users may reject an information system. As system anxiety may cause some negative behavior 
like avoidance of NSS usage and negative comments about the system, the concept of system 
anxiety is used in the framework to examine the negative impacts associated with ENS. We are 
primarily interested in the “control” perspective to evaluate alternate system designs, and choose 
not to put formal propositions to test the effects of ENSs using other system-related constructs. 
4.3 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
4.3.1 Main Effects of ENS Functionalities 
In our research framework, e-Negotiation systems are referred to as a collective set of system 
tools that can be used to support dyadic negotiation activities over the Internet. Our framework 
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can also be seen as an extension of NSS theory (Lim and Benbasat, 1993) which has focused on 
two technological features in a face-to-face setting.  
In Section 4.1, we defined three general categories of ENSs, each differing in their design 
motivations and functionalities in supporting negotiations. The technological aspects related to 
the categories are: decision support, electronic communication media, and autonomous 
negotiation agents. Next, effects of the different technologies on negotiation process and 
outcomes will be posited separately. 
4.3.1.1 Effects of Decision Support Tools  
4.3.1.1.1 Effect of DSS on Efficiency and Fairness23 
In Section 4.1.2.3, DSS technologies are further classified in terms of specific tools for different 
stages of the negotiation process. In summary, these tools include DSS tools for problem 
definition for issue generation, issue selection, and range limit setting; DSS tools for preference 
elicitation for eliciting negotiators’ preferences and specifying utilities; DSS tools for 
alternative evaluation and generation for evaluating and generating negotiation alternatives; 
and DSS tools for post-settlements such as suggestions of Pareto-optimization solutions.  
By and large, the effects of decision support tools on individual payoffs are in accord with the 
following theoretical angles. From the information processing perspective, the very limitation for 
human negotiators to reach efficient solutions lie in the very limitation of human’s cognitive 
capability (Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Bazerman et al., 1985). The availability of decision 
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 In this proposition, it is to be noted that subsequent operationalizations of efficiency should be used in 
appropriate to the design goals of different DSS features. In particular, pre-negotiation support such as 
MAUT-based task structuring techniques and negotiation support such as alternative generator and 
evaluator will lead to greater efficiency as joint payoffs, whereas post-negotiation support such as Pareto-
optimization suggestions will lead to greater outcome efficiency in terms of smaller distance to the Pareto-
efficient frontier. We will not examine the effects of post-negotiation settlement on negotiation process and 
outcomes. 
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support tools improves human’s decision-making quality by increasing their information 
processing capacities and capabilities (Lim and Benbasat, 1993) and by removing stumbling 
blocks to negotiation (Anson and Jellassi, 1990; Jelassi and Jones, 1988), and hence enhancing 
the efficiency of negotiated outcomes. 
Specifically, we argue that DSS technologies for different stages of negotiation support will affect 
negotiation process and outcomes through different mechanisms. It is conceptually and 
practically more important to understand the specific manner in which the various DSS tools 
affect negotiation dynamics, instead of evaluating them as a whole. 
1) DSS tools for problem definition allow the negotiating parties to be aware of the needs and 
concerns that are important to each other (i.e., deciding issues which are to be negotiated), and 
create opportunities for them to agree on the issues and the options to be negotiated in the next 
phase. These tools together with electronic brainstorming facilities can also encourage negotiators 
to express their preferences and opinions prior to the actual negotiation phase.  
Negotiators tend to “frame” negotiations in a negative light, concentrating on potential losses 
instead of potential gains. Such perception may lead to risk-seeking behavior where cooperation 
aspect can be ignored (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As a result, 
each negotiator may expect to achieve an individual utility that is much less than the optimal 
possible. However, NSSs help to refine negotiators’ objectives and relay them tactfully to the 
opponent (Bui, 1992). By embedding electronic brainstorming facilities, an NSS will encourage 
negotiators to express their preferences and opinions during the pre-negotiation phase. The 
integration of conflicting views during problem definition and issue definition by public display 
further deepens negotiators’ understanding of each other’s needs and expectations. Thus, 
negotiators will realize that there is room for cooperation, and hence they will strive collectively 
towards a settlement on or closer to the efficient frontier. Correspondingly, with an NSS, each 
negotiator will be able to achieve a higher individual outcome. In other words, an NSS will 
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enable negotiators to achieve an improvement (i.e., a gain) in their individual outcomes, 
compared to their initial expectations. 
The effects of decision support tools on contract balance are realized by the techniques that 
promote “a sense of mutuality” by creating awareness of negotiation opponents’ payoffs. In fact, 
GSS studies have shown that electronic brainstorming systems (EBSs) can eliminate production 
blocking and reduce free riding (Nunamaker et al., 1991)24. Accordingly, the EBS approach 
encourages equal participation and provides a forum for shy people to express their opinions. 
Group process structuring techniques can be used to establish rules to govern interaction and to 
create a sense of agreement, trust and fairness. According to the theory of strategic choice (Pruitt 
and Rubin, 1986), trust is a precondition for information sharing, which is helpful towards 
achieving highly satisfactory joint outcomes. Moreover, through sharing information by means of 
issue generation and selection modules, negotiators are at the same time seeking an understanding 
of each other’s needs and expectations, and are therefore more likely to be conscious of the 
notion of fairness as they strive towards an integrative outcome. Moreover, pre-negotiation 
modules can require negotiating parties to identify their interests in undertaking negotiations, 
thereby emphasizing the mutual benefits (Anson and Jelassi, 1990). Such a formalized way of 
exploring common interests jointly provided by pre-negotiation support is likely to foster a sense 
of mutuality in terms of integrative settlement (Raiffa, 1982; Walton and McKersie, 1965); and it 
is in turn expected to produce a fairer solution. Better contract balances are thus expected for 
negotiation dyads supported by DSS tools for problem definition than those without. 
The problem definition processes are very realistic and meaningful for real-life negotiations 
where tasks are largely unstructured or semi-structured. Allowing negotiators to know each other, 
and establish a form of relationship and trust will have significant consequences for negotiation 
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 Differing views exist, such as the work of Pinsonneault et al. (1999). 
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processes and outcomes. Nevertheless, support functions related to the above activities are largely 
limited in use for existing experimental studies (Jones, 1988; Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 
1997; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997; Goh et al., 2000) as pre-defined issues are imposed as part 
of the negotiation task, assuming that “all inventing and creating of issues has occurred” (Keeney 
and Raiffa, 1991, p. 132). Recognizing the significant potential impact of issue determination 
activities on negotiation process and outcomes, we will investigate the effects of these functions 
empirically. (See Chapter 5) 
2) DSS tools for preference elicitation are designed to guide negotiators in disaggregating their 
own preferences and priorities in order to better understand them (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991; 
Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). This task-focused mode brings a sense of rationality and “a 
problem-solving orientation” that are recognized as facilitating situations to integrative 
negotiations in the bargaining theory of Walton and McKersie (1965). Negotiators tend to 
“frame” negotiations in a negative light, concentrating on potential losses instead of potential 
gains. Such a perception leads to risk-seeking behavior that ignores the cooperation aspect 
(Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). As a result, each negotiator may 
expect to achieve an individual utility that is much less than the optimal possible. However, pre-
negotiation preparation tools help to refine negotiators’ objectives and relay them tactfully to the 
opponent (Bui, 1992). By displaying entire contracts for discussion, NSSs encourage negotiators 
to “consider issues as a package”, known as “logrolling”, thus highlighting the potential trade-
offs among issues. Through logrolling instead of “considering one issue at a time”, mutual trade-
offs can be made (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Kelly, 1966; Erickson et al., 1974). Negotiators 
are hence better prepared for subsequent cooperation and compromise in the negotiation phase, 
and will be able to arrive at an agreement closer to the efficient frontier, and achieve better results 
in regard to those issues that are important (Lim and Benbasat, 1993).  By focusing on the issues 
that are more important (of a higher rating), negotiators can hence obtain higher individual 
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payoffs than when they are unsupported. When both parties are supported by preference 
elicitation tools, both of them will strive for higher payoffs. If the underlying task is featured with 
low conflict of interests between the two parties, both being able to achieve higher individual 
payoffs, then higher joint payoffs and lower contract balances are thus expected for negotiation 
dyads supported with DSS tools for preference elicitation than those that are unsupported. 
3) DSS tools for alternative generation and evaluation are designed to compute the best 
alternatives which are Pareto-efficient and/or maximize both parties’ joint payoffs, and also to 
evaluate contract packages proposed by their opponents. As the support tools simplify the process 
of evaluating and generating better solutions, negotiators would continue to explore the 
possibilities of clinching the deal instead of prematurely settling on salient, familiar solutions. In 
unsupported cases, preference for salient solutions may cause negotiators to accept non-optimal 
settlements. Thus it has been indicated in earlier empirical research (Anson and Jelassi, 1990, 
Jelassi and Jones, 1988) that computerized decision support helps subjects to overcome the 
cognitive difficulty of these tasks, the tendency towards premature closure, and the preference for 
more available and more salient solutions, thus helping them achieve better outcomes, compared 
to negotiators without DSS support (Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997). Higher 
individual profits are thus expected for negotiation dyads supported with DSS tools for 
alternative evaluation and generation than those that are unsupported. 
The alternative generator and evaluator tools are also designed to make the opponents’ payoffs on 
every contract alternative explicit to the negotiators. This increases the amount of information that 
a negotiator can get with regard to the estimated utility points his/her opponent may possibly 
obtain from an alternative. The increased knowledge and awareness about each others’ utilities 
enables negotiating parties to improve their mutual welfare (Fouraker and Siegel, 1963). The 
alternative generator (such as in Foroughi et al., 1995) can also be designed to generate three best 
outcomes that maximize joint payoffs. By making the generation process less cognitively difficult, 
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DSS-supported dyads can minimize the tendency for premature solution and preference for 
salient solution, and achieve more mutually beneficial outcomes than if unsupported. Higher joint 
profits are thus expected for negotiation dyads supported with DSS tools for alternative 
evaluation and generation than those that are not supported. 
Negotiation support, such as analytical processing of subjective preference as well as the 
determination of possible solutions, will bring a sense of “rationality” to the negotiation and will 
help negotiators to make more objective, realistic judgments (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987). Lim 
and Benbasat (1993) suggest that as computer support improves the information-processing 
capacity and capability of negotiators, hence a fairer solution will then be generated. By making 
each party explicitly aware of the opponent’s payoffs on every contract alternative, the alternative 
generator and evaluator tools are designed to foster integrative negotiations. Such awareness will 
help each negotiator find a contract alternative which he/she feels is fair for both parties so that 
both parties are willing to come to an agreement without “losing face” (Foroughi et al., 1995). 
Therefore, dyads which are otherwise unsupported will only achieve higher contract balances 
than those supported with such decision support tools.  
4.3.1.1.2 Effect of DSS on Time to Settlement 
In terms of time to reach settlement, we posit that negotiators using more sophisticated features 
of e-Negotiation technologies will take a longer time to reach agreement. This position is 
supported by general GSS research which confirms that the use of technology tends to extend 
decision time (Dennis et al., 1988; Gallupe, 1985; George et al., 1990). This assertion is 
consistent with previous NSS studies (Foroughi et al., 1995; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). As 
far as negotiation agreement is concerned, the extended decision time does not necessarily imply 
poorer performance. There are cases in which the party may fail to achieve a solution at all 
without a DSS, e.g., complex tasks such as international trade negotiations, joint venture, 
cooperate merging.  
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4.3.1.1.3 Effect of DSS on Attitudes towards Settlement, Process and Systems 
The decision support functions help to address the problems associated with cognitive limitation 
and socio-emotional effects of human negotiations (refer to the summary in Table 3-1). The 
“cognitive difficulty” of evaluating the utility of an alternative settlement for each party and 
determining tradeoffs often impedes successful conflict resolution (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). 
DSS essentially serves as an external information processor and memory that helps negotiators to 
overcome cognitive difficulties so as to simplify the processes of alternative evaluation and 
generation. Compared to unsupported cases, negotiators will feel more positive that they are able 
to obtain better, more efficient solutions. In a similar vein, Lim and Benbasat (1993) analyzed an 
efficiency-related perception construct known as “confidence with solution” in negotiation setting. 
Thus decision aid, through helping negotiators to be capable of performing rational analyses, was 
attributed to a large degree to an increase in confidence of the solution perceived by negotiators. 
Higher perceived efficiency or confidence with solution is thus expected for negotiation dyads 
supported with DSS tools than those without. 
Negotiators tend to avoid agreements in which they feel they are “giving-in”, thus manifesting 
“face-saving” behaviors (Hiltrop and Rubin, 1981). In other words, when walking away from the 
negotiation table, negotiators would feel they are losing if they think that they have compromised 
or have been taken advantage of by the opponents. NSS Decision aids can help to alleviate the 
“face saving” effects by suggesting possible concessions to facilitate the achievement of optimal 
joint outcomes and permit negotiators to compromise while still saving face (Anson and Jelassi, 
1990). Higher perceived fairness is thus expected for dyads supported with DSS tools than those 
that are unsupported. 
According to our summary in Section 3.1, the decision support functions help to address the 
problems associated with the cognitive biases and socio-emotional effects of negotiators when 
collaborating with each other. Negotiators often “negatively frame” the negotiation by evaluating 
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their potential losses instead of considering their potential gains. Negative framing can lead to 
risk-seeking behavior instead of the risk-avoiding behavior which is conducive to finding a 
cooperative agreement (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Neale and 
Bazerman, 1983, 1985b). This effect will be alleviated by the establishment of interaction rules 
and the use of pre-negotiation modules requiring parties to identify their interests (Anson and 
Jelassi, 1990). By explicitly understanding that the opponent may have given potential gains as a 
favor, negotiators would better appreciate the cooperative signals that may not be otherwise 
noticed without decision support. Furthermore, DSSs also encourage negotiators to seek a 
mutually beneficial solution by displaying conflicting views and pairing of related items interests 
(Anson and Jelassi, 1990), instead of assuming a “fixed-pie” on which their interests are always 
in direct conflict with the other party and in which one party will win at the expense of the other 
(Pruitt, 1983).  A higher perceived collaborative atmosphere is thus expected for negotiation 
dyads supported with DSS tools than those that are unsupported.  
Summarizing the above theoretical arguments in Section 4.3.1.1, we posit the first proposition: 
Proposition 125: The dyads supported with DSS technologies will achieve better settlement 
contracts in terms of economic and social-psychological outcomes, while taking a longer time to 
reach settlements compared to non-DSS-supported dyads. 
4.3.1.2 Effects of Communication Media 
4.3.1.2.1 Effects of Social-Oriented Communication Media  
According to task-technology fit theory (McGrath and Hollingshead, 1993; 1994), the effects of 
social-oriented communication offered by video/audio channels can be both positive and negative. 
While the presence of video and audio media facilitates the social communication needs for 
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mutual understanding, personal identity and trust building, they can at the same time “distract” 
negotiators from focusing on the negotiation task (Yuan et al., 2003). In their study, Yuan et al. 
(2003) examined the impacts of different multimedia combinations (text only; text with audio; 
text with audio and video) on communication efficiency and effectiveness. Results indicate that 
media combing both text with audio as well as text with audio and video communication were 
significantly preferred to a medium using text alone. However, the addition of a video medium to 
text and audio communication was not found to significantly improve communication efficiency 
and effectiveness. This observation follows the task-media fit theory which posits that if a task 
utilizes richer media than is required, the media may act as a “distraction” (McGrath and 
Hollingshead, 1993, 1994).  
On the other hand, text-based communication as a common form of computer-based 
communication is in fact an impersonal mode of communication, which might promote more 
non-cooperative behavior than face-to-face negotiation (Wichman, 1970; Arunachalam and Dilla, 
1995). For instance, in their study, Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) observed that those bargaining 
pairs that used the electronic communication channels (where no face-to-face interaction was 
allowed) indicated that they considered the negotiation process to be less friendly. They were also 
more likely to “drive a hard bargain”, perceive themselves to be “in control during the 
negotiation”, and feel that they were being “rushed into reaching an agreement”.  
When multimedia (video, audio and text-based channels) communication is compared to the lean 
medium offered by communication that is only text-based, negotiators can choose to balance the 
use of different channels to maximize positive social communication needs. In general, we 
believe that richer media should be provided to negotiators for effective and efficient social 
communication purposes. 
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Proposition 2a26: For homogeneous dyads, the availability of extra communication channels in 
terms of richer media (e.g., audio and video) will be more efficient in fulfilling social-oriented 
communication needs for negotiations,  compared to leaner media only (e.g., text-based email, 
instant messaging, and  fax). 
In contrast, when negotiating dyads are heterogeneous in terms of communication capabilities, 
there are significant opportunities to utilize special forms of support to improving communication 
efficiency. Prescriptive theories suggest that one of the stumbling blocks to successful negotiation 
is “ineffective communications” (Jelasi and Foroughi, 1990). Barriers to effective communication 
such as distraction caused by attention to the physical appearance of opposing parties, semantic 
differences, absence of feedback, and status and power differences can seriously hinder effective 
negotiation (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985). 
In intercultural negotiations, one of the main obstacles to effective communication is the 
linguistic and communication barriers, including semantic and syntactic differences. Computer 
support tools can be designed in order to overcome such difficulties to achieve effective 
communication. For instance, the multilingual support 27  function of NSSs (including a 
multilingual system interface as well as translation of text-based messages to the negotiator’s 
native language) provides languages that are native to negotiators in order to alleviate language-
related communication problems. Thus the enhanced communication support will enable the 
‘weaker’ party to utilize his/her own language to carry out the negotiation process. When 
linguistic communication inefficiency is minimized, compared to the unsupported negotiators, 
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 In this dissertation, we will not manipulate conditions to examine Proposition 2a per se, but use it as 
conceptual rationales for investigating different communication settings where negotiation tasks are 
performed (see chapters 5 to 8).  
27
 The term “multilingual support” is used in this dissertation to denote the provision of different language 
interfaces and environment that are local to different users. It may also be referred to as “localization” to 
different language locales in adaptive software. 
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those who are assisted by multilingual support are able to attain higher individual utility, which in 
turn results in greater joint outcomes and fairer equality of outcomes. 
Enriched communication media that are designed to overcome communication inefficiency, such 
as multilingual support for lingual heterogeneous dyads, will help to overcome linguistic barriers 
to achieve communication efficiency. Conversely, dyads may face communication breakdown 
which hinder them from achieving win-win solutions, and thus negotiators tend to benefit less 
from the negotiation process. We posit that the inclusion of multilingual support will enhance 
negotiators’ positive beliefs towards being able to communicate more efficiently for better 
solutions and thus lead to greater satisfaction towards settlement. 
The sophistication of richer media and associated functions to alleviate ineffective 
communications introduce an additional layer of complexity to the use of computer-based 
systems. For instance, there will be time associated with typing non-English characters using 
editor software (Aiken et al. 1995) as well as the bidirectional translations into each party’s native 
language. It is believed that the additional use of a richer media feature will result in a longer time 
for reaching an agreement. We posit the effects of richer communication media for heterogeneous 
dyads in terms of language proficiency as follows: 
Proposition 2b28: For heterogeneous dyads, richer communication media that are designed to 
overcome communication inefficiency (such as in the form of multilingual support) will lead to 
better settlement contracts in terms of economic and social-psychological outcomes, while taking 
a longer time to reach agreement, compared to leaner media. 
4.3.1.2.2 Effects of Task-Oriented Communication Media on Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 
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This proposition extends the hypothesis posited by Lim and Benbasat (1993) which only deals 
with the availability of electronic communication channels. While other empirical studies show 
that NSS support (DSS+EC) leads to higher joint payoffs and more balanced contracts than face-
to-face negotiations without NSS support (Foroughi et al., 1995), Delaney et al. (1997) further 
found that DSS on its own, rather than the combined effects of the two components of NSS, 
contribute to the effects of NSS on efficiency and fairness measures. In line with Lim and 
Benbasat (1993), we also hold that the (task-focused) communication channels have no direct 
influences on efficiency and fairness outcomes. However, the task-focused communication 
channels will affect the negotiators’ perceptions of the level of collaboration with their opponents.  
Negotiators often escalate the level of conflict irrationally and unnecessarily (Lewicki and 
Litterer, 1985; Bazerman, 1983), “locking in” on opening moves and attitudes, which may be 
hostile, and continuing them through the negotiation process, manifesting “non-rational escalation 
of conflict” (Pilisuk and Skolnick, 1978). The task-focused mode of an electronic communication 
channel can depersonalize the atmosphere, focus negotiators’ attention away from personalities 
and emotional conflicts that are often caused by verbal communication (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 
1987). By deescalating the conflict between parties, negotiators would feel less negative, 
competitive tensions from their opponents.  
Lim and Benbasat (1993) analyzed another process-related construct, i.e., “perceived 
commitment” in negotiation setting. Compared to verbal communication, the addition of 
electronic communication that links decision aids can provide common referents for the reasoning 
of arguments between negotiating parties. To the extent that such reasoning is used to back one’s 
argument, the opposing party can be led to perceive the commitment of the first party. The 
increase in “perceived commitment” of the opponents can also help to explicate greater 
cooperation perceived in their opponents by negotiators. 
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Proposition 2c29: The dyads supported by extra task-focused communication media (such as 
facilities for exchanges of proposals, public whiteboard and file transfer of technical data and 
graphics) will perceive more conducive collaborative atmosphere for the negotiation process 
than those that are unsupported (communicating through audio/video channels only). 
4.3.1.3 Effects of System Intelligence Levels 
While there is some evidence suggesting that e-Negotiation technologies can help to achieve 
better negotiation outcomes for ENS-supported negotiators than those unsupported, a more 
interesting and relevant question is which design alternative can be superior; in other words, we 
seek to critically examine the effects of alternative designs on negotiation process and outcomes. 
To systematically investigate the effects of agent-based negotiation support tools, we define the 
notion of the level of intelligence of e-Negotiation systems involving agent technologies (see 
Section 4.1.4.3). According to this conceptualization, intelligent agents with advanced personality 
and learning functions will have more powerful decision support capabilities and will result in 
greater efficiency. Furthermore, due to the learning capability and personality features, the 
preference information of the opponent is taken into account in the design of advanced agent-
based systems. Thus more intelligent agents (Level-3 system) are expected to result in the fairest 
agreement among the three levels. Based on the studies of Dennis et al. (1988) and Foroughi et al. 
(1995), the use of technology generally tends to extend decision time. Since the Level-1 system 
adopts less sophisticated technology than the other two, which employ artificial intelligence 
techniques, it is expected to result in the shortest negotiation time. Moreover, incremental 
learning from other agent’s proposals can speed up the negotiation process (Soo and Hung, 2002). 
Hence, the Level-3 system is expected to result in a shorter negotiation time than the Level-2 
system. 
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In terms of social-psychological impact, compared to fully automated agents, more intelligent 
agents incorporate features that allow negotiators “plug in” their preferences on negotiation styles 
and strategies, thus exert a greater sense of control to ENS users. Such agent design allows 
negotiators to adjust negotiation strategy at any time during the negotiation process, and thus 
increases behavioral control perceived by negotiators. Because agents perform proposal and 
counter-proposal exchanges, there will be minimal level of personal interaction between human 
negotiators, by which non-rational escalation of conflict will be minimized (Lewicki and Litterer, 
1985). Negotiators supported by agents will experience a higher level of Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere compared to those supported by DSS only (in line with Proposition 2c).  
Proposition 330: Dyads supported by negotiation agents with higher system intelligence levels 
will achieve better settlement contracts in terms of economic and social-psychological outcomes. 
4.3.2 Moderating Effects of Levels of Conflict 
Task characteristics have been shown to have a significant influence on the effects of 
management support systems (Benbasat et al., 1993). A conflict level is regarded as one of the 
fundamental variables pertaining to the task characteristics of negotiation that shape bargaining 
orientation and strategies, and the literature has revealed that it affects negotiator behaviors as 
well as negotiation outcomes to a certain extent (Starke and Rangaswamy, 2000). Previous 
studies on NSS (Jones, 1988; Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997; Goh et al., 2000) also 
adopt the notion of conflict level, and treat conflict as belonging on a continuum ranging from 
“low” to “high”. 
Our research framework incorporates the factor of conflict level to examine the effects of e-
Negotiation technologies under different levels of conflict of interests. In a low conflict situation, 
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negotiators may have different preferences for the negotiation issues and thus mutual benefits are 
potentially available. In such circumstances, there is room for e-Negotiation technologies to assist 
negotiators in exploring more economic outcomes. However, in high conflict situations where 
negotiators share similar preferences for the issues that are pitted directly against each other, there 
is little room for e-Negotiation technologies to be effective. 
In a low conflict situation, there will be minimum levels of non-rational escalation of conflict and 
negative framing. However, in a high-conflict situation, negotiators’ preferences for the issues are 
weighted similarly, and thus one party’s gain is nearly equal to the other one party’s loss. The 
presence of e-Negotiation technologies may have the potential to improve the situation by 
providing a task-oriented mode of negotiations which in turn, reduce the negative effects of 
socio-emotional biases. Hence in a high-conflict situation, e-Negotiation technologies will reduce 
the amount of negative social-psychological perceptions. 
Proposition 431: The level of conflict will moderate the effects of e-Negotiation technologies on 
negotiation outcomes. 
4.4 OUTLINE OF ENS EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
This chapter presents a high level framework comprising three categories of ENS functionalities 
which potentially compose a “full” ENS system, and proposes the effects of different functions 
on negotiation process and outcomes. As empirical examination of the propositions, the 
subsequent chapters present four experimental studies that are conducted to find the specific 
manners in which different ENS design features will affect negotiations, and in turn to advance 
theoretical understanding concerning negotiation support technologies. 
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The first two experiments were conducted at an earlier phase of our ENS research program. 
Chapter 5 presents an experimental study that examines how pre-negotiation preparation tools 
and negotiation support tools (as decision support functions of an ENS) can contribute to 
negotiation outcomes. With the primary interest on the Category I system, lower-level hypotheses 
are derived based on Proposition 1. Chapter 6 further examines both Categories I and II NSSs and 
explores the potential effects of multilingual support features. The experimental study is designed 
to address Propositions 1 and 2b. 
The third and fourth experimental studies extend our research further by incorporating level of 
conflict as a moderating variable with the effects predicted in Proposition 4, to investigate the 
interplay of task characteristics and ENS design. The third experiment was designed to examine 
Proposition 1 in a new social-oriented communication channel. In Chapter 7, the effects of 
specific decision support tools (alternative evaluator and generator) were investigated at both low 
and high levels of conflict, with negotiating parties communicating via videoconferencing. In 
Chapter 8, the most comprehensive experiment (Experiment 4) was carried out in an attempt to 
examine the effects of three levels of agent-based ENSs and at two different conflict levels. Three 
system prototypes were designed and implemented for experimental investigation. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 EFFECTS OF PRE-NEGOTIATION AND 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT FOR UNSTRUCTURED 
NEGOTIATION TASK32 (CATEGORY I SYSTEM) 
Previous NSS laboratory studies (e.g., Jones, 1998; Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997; 
Goh et al., 2000) have generally shown that the potential benefits of using NSS support for 
negotiations have been encouraging: NSS-supported groups achieve higher and more balanced 
outcomes and greater satisfaction. However, one common limitation of these studies is the use of 
highly structured negotiation task assuming negotiation issues and negotiators’ utilities have been 
pre-determined. However, an essential activity in real-life business negotiations is for negotiating 
parties to jointly explore and identify critical issues to be negotiated prior to the actual negotiation 
phase. For international transactions, the preparatory phase is even lengthier and more tedious 
than for domestic ones due to the difficulty in gathering all necessary preliminary information 
(Cellich and Jain, 2004). Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following research question:  
How will NSS support for different negotiation stages (i.e., pre-negotiation preparation tool and 
negotiation support tool) improve the negotiation outcomes for unstructured tasks? 
5.1 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
5.1.1 The Research Model 
A few empirical studies exist which have attempted to distinguish the system effects due to DSS 
alone or the combination of both DSS and electronic communication channels based on Lim and 
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 This experiment was completed at an earlier phase of our ENS research program as a joint work with 
other contributors. The published paper can be found at Journal of Global Information Management, 15(1), 
January-March 2007, pp. 18-42 (Lim and Yang, 2007a).  
The study is presented briefly here that helps to address part of the guiding research framework. 
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Benbasat’s (1993) theoretical work (e.g., Delaney et al., 1997; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). In 
a similar vein, the current research, rather than studying the negotiation activities as a single 
entity, distinguishes between the effect of pre-negotiation support tools and negotiation support 
tools on negotiation outcomes.  We study two independent variables, NSS support for pre-
negotiation and NSS support for negotiation, and three dependent variables, gain (individual 
outcome achieved by a negotiator with respect to his/her initial expected outcome), contract 
balance (the difference of the utility scores between the two parties), and negotiation time. Figure 
5-1 depicts the research model.  
 
Figure 5-1. The Research Model  
The research model is examined at face-to-face negotiation settings where direct verbal 
communications between negotiation parties are allowed.  
5.1.2 Hypotheses 
This model adopts “gain” and “contract balance” to reflect the two basic measures of negotiation 
performance in terms of efficiency and fairness respectively. Although used widely, joint utility is 
not considered a sensitive measure of negotiation efficiency (Lax and Sebenius, 1987). One of the 
rationales is that individuals are believed to entertain different aspirations or expectations of 
negotiation outcomes (Oliver et al., 1994) and measuring final outcome without taking into 
account of each negotiator’s initial expectation (prior to the negotiation activity) neglects such 
difference. In the context of ambiguous and unstructured tasks (in the case of salary negotiations), 




2. Contract Balance 
3. Time to Settlement 
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actual outcome achieved with the final agreement. We use contract balance to reflect the equality 
of the outcome where a more equal outcome connotes with a lower value of contract balance. 
5.1.2.1 Gain 
Negotiators often negatively “frame” negotiations in evaluation of potential losses instead of 
potential gains (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Consequently, 
negotiators may expect to achieve an individual utility that is much less than the optimal possible. 
In line with Proposition 1, pre-negotiation support tools for problem definition allow negotiation 
parties to understand each others’ concern and work out issues and values for each issue of a 
specific negotiation task. Thus, negotiators will realize that there is room for cooperation, and 
hence they will together strive towards a settlement that is closer to efficient frontier. We suggest 
that NSS can help to enable negotiators to achieve an improvement (i.e., a gain) in their 
individual outcomes, compared to their initial expectations33. 
Hypothesis 5-1a: Gain will be higher for dyads supported with pre-negotiation tools than for 
dyads not supported with these tools. 
In line with Proposition 1, support tools for preference elicitation and alternative 
evaluation/generation can enhance negotiation outcomes by effectively removing stumbling 
blocks for negotiations (i.e., cognitive limitations and bias are addressed by the task-focused 
mode of decision support). Hence, with NSS support for the negotiation phase, we hypothesize 
that NSS help each negotiator to achieve a higher individual outcome than their expectation. 
Hypothesis 5-1b: Gain will be higher for dyads supported with negotiation tools than for dyads 
not supported with these tools. 
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 In this research model, we are interested in negotiation tasks where issues and negotiators’ initial 
expectations are not pre-assigned. It is appropriate to use “gain” to measure the efficiency of negotiation 
outcome as “gain” can capture the initial expectations that may vary across individual negotiators (refer to 
section 4.2.1.1.2). This is to differentiate from subsequent three experiments where negotiators initial 
expectations are pre-assigned and controlled by specifying a BATNA in the negotiation task. 
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5.1.2.2 Contract Balance 
In line with Proposition 1, group process structuring techniques including pre-negotiation 
problem definition tools can be used to establish rules to govern interaction and to create a sense 
of agreement, trust and fairness. Furthermore, through sharing information, such as defining and 
ranking issues, negotiators are at the same time seeking an understanding of each other’s needs 
and expectations, and therefore are more likely to be conscious about the notion of fairness as 
they strive towards an integrative outcome. Moreover, pre-negotiation modules can require 
negotiating parties to identify their interests in undertaking negotiations, thereby emphasizing the 
mutual benefits of negotiations (Anson and Jelassi, 1990). Such formalized way of exploring 
common interests jointly provided by pre-negotiation support is likely to foster a sense of 
mutuality in terms of integrative settlement (Raiffa, 1982; Walton and McKersie, 1965); in turn, 
it is expected to produce a fairer solution.  
Hypothesis 5-2a: There will be more equal settlements (in terms of smaller contract balances) 
for dyads supported with pre-negotiation tools than for dyads not supported with these tools. 
In line with Proposition 1, existing literature suggests that negotiation support tools, such as 
analytical processing of subjective preference as well as the determination of possible solutions, 
can enable negotiators to achieve more equal final contract as the NSS provides a systematic and 
unbiased support for both negotiating parties (DeSanctis and Gallupe, 1987; Lim and Benbasat, 
1993; Foroughi et al., 1995). The focus of this “scientific” or analytical approach is on optimizing 
the outcomes for both parties and achieving a win-win solution rather than on specific strategies, 
tactics, and maneuvers, which will allow one side to “beat” the other (Raiffa, 1982). We therefore 
expect to see more equal outcomes for NSS-supported dyads. 
Hypothesis 5-2b: There will be more equal settlements (in terms of smaller contract balances) 
for dyads supported with negotiation tools than for dyads not supported with these tools. 
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5.1.2.3 Time to Settlement  
Consistent with findings of GSS research (e.g., Dennis et al., 1988; Gallupe, 1985), the computer 
technology is expected to bring about lengthier sessions, because the support tool introduces an 
additional layer of complexity into the negotiation process. NSS empirical studies also indicated a 
marked increase in time for NSS-supported dyads to reach agreement (e.g., Foroughi et al., 1995; 
Delaney et al., 1997). For pre-negotiation, there will be time involved in electronic brainstorming, 
keying in issues and comments, and coordinating with each other, which together contribute 
towards increased total time required. During the negotiation phase, the technology incurs 
additional time with events including assigning of utilities, proposing of agreements, and waiting 
for the other party’s response to contract proposals. In line with Proposition 1, we posit that 
Hypothesis 5-3a: Time to settlement will be longer for dyads supported with pre-negotiation 
tools than for dyads not supported with these tools. 
Hypothesis 5-3b: Time to settlement will be longer for dyads supported with negotiation tools 
than for dyads not supported with these tools. 
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A laboratory experiment with 2x2 factorial designs was conducted. The four experimental 
conditions are: “full” negotiation support, NSS support for negotiation only, NSS support for pre-
negotiation only, and no support (baseline). Figure 5-2 presents the experimental design. “Pre-
Negotiation Support” refers to support tools made available to participants in the pre-negotiation 
phase. “Negotiation Support” indicates that support tools are available to participants in the 
negotiation phase. The digit in each cell denotes the number of dyads in each treatment.  










Figure 5-2. Experimental Design (Experiment 1) 
Ninety-six undergraduates from a large university participated in the experiment. A total of 48 
dyads were formed, with 12 in each treatment group. The two subjects in each negotiation session 
were randomly assigned to the role of “employer” or “employee”. The remaining sections detail 
the support tools, dependent variables, negotiation task and experimental procedures. 
5.2.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables are manipulated by the availabilities of pre-negotiation support and 
negotiation for the negotiation support system. Comparisons between dyads supported by pre-
negotiation support and those with no support indicate the effects of pre-negotiation tools 
(featuring a specific DSS support technique) on negotiation outcomes. Comparisons between 
NSS-supported and non-supported dyads indicate the effects of NSS (featuring both DSS and task-
oriented communication support) on negotiation outcomes. 
The system was developed based on the concept of assigning relative weightages to the individual 
issues and seeking trade-off values among the different issues. The pre-negotiation modules 
provided are issue generation, issue selection (rating), and range-limit setting. The negotiation 
modules are utility specifications and proposal generation. These modules are further described in 
the following. 
Pre-Negotiation Support: The issue generation module is used to brainstorm issues that are 
relevant to the negotiation. The issues entered were available to both parties for viewing. This 
12 12 
12 12 
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will enhance “piggy-backing” of ideas, which may in turn help to produce better decisions 
(Osborn, 1957). The issue selection module allows users to select the issues that they want to 
negotiate. Users then rate the selected issues on a scale of one to ten, with one being the least 
important, and ten being the most important. The rating inputs are then merged and presented to 
both parties. Rating was selected over ranking because some issues may be equally important to 
the negotiator. With the range-limit setting module, users specify the ranges they prefer for each 
of the selected issues. Information solicited includes minimum and maximum values for each 
issue, and the number of different values users would like to have within each range. The ranges 
input from both parties are then combined and a new range (encompassing both parties’ ranges) 
will be generated.  
Negotiation Support: With the utility specifications module, users first distribute 100 points 
among the issues according to the relative important of each issue to the rest of the issues. Then, 
for each value of each issue, users will enter their utility values based on their discretion. A user 
may simulate the opponent’s values for analysis purpose. Upon completion, the various outcomes 
(e.g. individual outcome, joint outcome, simulated outcome, fairness) are combined and presented 
to the user for analysis. For obvious reasons, utilities and outcomes of one party are not revealed 
to the other party. The proposal generation module facilitates the presentation of the various 
issues and their respective values to users for generating proposals. Users select from each issue 
the value they would like to propose, and the entire contract (comprising all issues) is sent to the 
other party. Users can then view all the proposals submitted by everyone. 
5.2.2 Dependent Variables  
The following deliberations aim to explain the first two dependent variables at operationalization 
level. According to Keeney and Raiffa (1991), each party assigns weightage points to reflect the 
degree of importance or preference he places on the range of values for a particular issue. These 
weightage points also reflect the trade-off values between the various issues, as well as between 
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the various values of each issue. The negotiators’ efficient frontier can then be computed by 
summing up their weightage points (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991). Suppose the negotiating parties, A 
and B, have reached an agreement on three issues, X, Y and Z, which they have been negotiating. 
Based on the agreement, A derives the following utilities, or weightage points: Uxa for X, Uya for 
Y, and Uza for Z. Similarly, B derives the following utilities, or weightage points: Uxb for X, Uyb 
for Y, and Uzb for Z. Thus, the absolute individual outcomes of A and B are (Uxa + Uya + Uza) and 
(Uxb + Uyb + Uzb) respectively. For instance, A’s utility score is 70, and B’s utility score is 60.  
However, these scores do not offer much insight into the nature of the negotiation outcome. 
Individuals are believed to entertain aspirations or expectations of negotiation outcomes (Oliver 
et al., 1994). Suppose A has an initial expectation (formed prior to the negotiation session) of 80, 
while B has an initial expectation of 50. Compared to their individual final outcomes, A has 
actually obtained a lower outcome than he has desired, whereas B a better outcome than desired. 
Accordingly, it is more appropriate to measure the Gain in outcome. 
The expected individual outcome for each negotiating party is measured as the total weightage 
points of the particular party, derived from his initial expectation: Ixa for X, Iya for Y, and Iza for Z. 
Likewise, B’s utility values for his initial expectation could be: Ixb for X, Iyb for Y, and Izb for Z. 
Therefore, the expected individual outcome of A is the sum (Ixa + Iya + Iza), and the expected 
individual outcome of B is the sum (Ixb + Iyb + Izb). The final individual outcome for each 
negotiating party is measured as the total weightage points of the particular party, derived from 
the final agreement. That is, the final individual outcome of A is the sum (Uxa + Uya + Uza). 
Therefore, A’s gain is the difference of the above two sums to reflect disparity of his initial 
expected and actual outcome, i.e., ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) - (Ixa + Iya + Iza)). Contract balance34, or 
equality of outcome, is measured as the absolute difference between the two parties’ weightage 
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 It is noted that the boss-subordinate negotiation context connotes an element of power imbalance and 
may thus impose a limitation on the use of equality concepts. 
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points for the final agreement. In our example, the contract balance is the absolute value of ((Uxa 
+ Uya + Uza) - (Uxb + Uyb + Uzb)).  
Negotiation time was measured in minutes as the time taken from the beginning of the task to the 
point reaching of an agreement. 
5.2.3 Negotiation Task 
The negotiation task used in this study involves multiple issues in an employer-employee case, 
adapted from Lax and Sebenius (1986). The employer, John, is a partner in a multinational 
company, and heads one of the divisions in the company. An accountant by profession, he has 
risen into senior management ranks seven years ago. Throughout these seven years, he has 
cautiously but steadily improved his division’s results. Currently, he is setting up a new IT 
department in his division, and has offered Lisa (the employee) the position of project leader. At 
present, Lisa is a senior analyst who has worked in an IT department of another division of the 
company for five years. The focus of this negotiation is on the terms and conditions for Lisa’s 
new position as a project leader. The following aspects of employment terms were presented to 
both parties: annual salary, working hours, annual leave, medical benefits (i.e., amount of medical 
subsidies) and medical leave. In addition to these issues, subjects were asked to consider new 
issues pertaining to the project leader position, for example, staff strength and departmental 
budget. Preferences for the issues were up to each negotiator. Based on the information given, 
John and Lisa will then negotiate on issues vital to their negotiation. 
5.2.4 Experiment Procedure 
Upon arriving for the study, the two subjects were seated opposite each other. Where applicable, 
subjects underwent a brief hands-on training session on how to use the system. The experimenter 
then handed out the problem description, accompanied by the instruction sheet for the appropriate 
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experimental condition. Having read through the problem, the dyad then proceeded with the 
negotiation. In all conditions, negotiation time was measured. 
A full-NSS-support condition proceeded as follows. For the pre-negotiation phase, subjects first 
brainstormed as many issues as they felt were relevant to their negotiation using the Issue 
Generation module. Next they discussed verbally all the issues generated, and decided on three to 
five issues to negotiate. The Issue Selection module, using a rating mechanism, aided the 
selection of issues. After they had agreed on the issues, subjects wrote down their expected 
outcome for each of the agreed issues. Subjects then went on to set the ranges (minimum and 
maximum values, and the number of different values within each range) for each of the issues 
using the Range Limit Setting module. Both parties’ ranges were combined and a new range was 
generated.  
For the negotiation phase, subjects first used the Utility Assignment feature in the Evaluation 
module to enter the weightages for the various issues (divide 100 points among the issues). Next, 
for each of the issues, they assigned utility values to each of the issue values. Upon completion, 
subjects viewed the various outcomes.  From there, they proceeded to submit proposals to each 
other using the Proposal Generation feature in the Evaluation module. During this stage, subjects 
also discussed verbally what they thought of the proposals. Based on the discussions, new 
proposals were made. This cycle continued until subjects reached an agreement. 
The no-support condition proceeded as follows. After reading the task, subjects first discussed 
the issues they were going to negotiate on. After they had decided on the issues, they wrote down 
their expected outcomes for each of the agreed issues. Next, subjects wrote down the weightages 
for each of the issues. Then, subjects wrote down the different values they prefer for each issue, 
as well as the utility values for each of these values. After they had done this, subjects proceeded 
to negotiate freely with each other. They recorded any values proposed on a form. Negotiation 
ended when an agreement had been reached. 
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The pre-negotiation-support-only condition proceeded as follows. Subjects went through the 
pre-negotiation phase as the full-NSS-supported dyads. Then, subjects wrote down the different 
values they prefer for each issue, as well as the utility values for each of these values. After they 
had done this, subjects proceeded to negotiate freely with each other. They recorded any values 
proposed on a form. When the subjects had reached an agreement, the negotiation ended. 
The negotiation-support-only condition proceeded as follows. After reading the task, subjects 
first discussed the issues they were going to negotiate on. After they had decided on the issues, 
they wrote down their expected outcomes for each of the agreed issues. Next, subjects wrote 
down the range of values they prefer for each issue, as well as the number of different values for 
that issue. The experimenter then input these data for each party into the system, which calculated 
the final range. Based on the new range, subjects went through the negotiation phase as the full-
NSS-supported dyads did. 
5.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
ANOVA tests were conducted on the dependent variables. Significant main effects were found on 
NSS Support for pre-negotiation on all dependent variables35 . NSS Support for negotiation 
showed significant impact on gain and negotiation time, but not contract balance. No interaction 
effects were observed. Table 5-1 summarizes the ANOVA results. We elaborate the results of 
statistical analysis and discussion for each of the dependent variables in the subsections.  
Table 5-1. Summary of ANOVA Results 
Main Effects Dependent Variables Interaction  
Effect NSS for Pre-Negotiation NSS for Negotiation 
1. Joint Gain NO (F=0.83, P=0.36) F=2.72, P=0.10* F=3.16, P=0.08* 
                                                     
35
 Note that a marginally significant P-value of 0.10 is adopted here, as the study is preliminary and 
exploratory. 
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3. Contact Balance NO (F0.01, P=0.93) F=8.89, P=0.00** F=1.46, P=0.23 
3. Time to Settlement NO (F=0.07, P =0.79) F=10.59, P=0.00** F=3.01, P=0.09* 
(* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.01) 
 
Summary of propositions testing is presented in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2. Summary of Results on Hypotheses Testing (Experiment 1) 
Hypotheses Mean 
Support         No support 
P-Value Hypotheses 
Supported? 
1. Joint Gain 
5-1a. With pre-negotiation support > Without 








P = 0.10* 




2. Contract Balance 
5-2a. With pre-negotiation support < Without 








P = 0.00** 




3. Time to Settlement***  
5-3a. With pre-negotiation support > Without 








P = 0.00** 




(* denotes p<.10, ** denotes p<.01; *** Time to Settlement is measured in minutes for all studies in this 
dissertation) 
5.4 DISCUSSION 
5.4.1 Gain  
The results show that NSS tools for pre-negotiation can help to improve individual gains. 
ANOVA test indicated a main effect due to pre-negotiation support for at p = 0.10 level. Dyads 
provided with NSS support during the pre-negotiation phase obtained higher gain (mean = -2.18; 
s.d. = 27.29) than dyads with no NSS support (mean = -10.89; s.d. = 24.93). Negotiation 
outcomes are often affected by power imbalances, as well as the tactics and maneuvers employed 
by negotiators. Prior to actual negotiation, a negotiator may have an aspiration list ready for the 
joint resolution of issues. However, during the course of negotiation, the other negotiator may 
force him to make some tough value trade-offs (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991). So in preparing for 
negotiations, the negotiator should sort out his preferences. The various NSS tools for pre-
negotiation, such as issue generation and rating modules, help each negotiator to quantify 
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preferences, which in turn may help him to be clear about trade-offs during the negotiation stage. 
Hence, negotiators may be able to meet their expectations better (Proposition 1). 36 
Experimental results support the propositions that NSS would improve the individual outcome 
during the negotiation phase. NSS dyads provided with negotiation support experienced 
improvements (i.e., gains) in their individual outcomes. A main effect was observed due to NSS 
support for negotiation. Dyads provided with NSS support during the negotiation phase obtained 
higher gain (mean = -1.84; s.d. = 24.49) than dyads without NSS support (mean = -11.23; s.d. = 
27.57). This contrasted sharply with dyads not provided with NSS negotiation support. In fact, the 
latter group saw a substantial decrease in individual outcomes at the end of the negotiation. This 
suggests that NSS may play a crucial role towards enhancing negotiations. Negative framing of 
negotiations causes negotiators to be risk seeking (Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983; Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979) - a behavior which often connotes with distributive bargaining. NSS help by 
means of its utility specifications and proposal generation facilities; functionally, they allow the 
manipulation and organization of numerous complex issues, thus presenting a more manageable 
scope to negotiators, and at the same time, discouraging distributive negotiations. High 
individual-outcome solutions are easily computed and identified; moreover, the presentation of 
solutions as an entire contract promotes logrolling, encouraging negotiators to focus on trade-offs 
among issues, instead of arguing about single issues. NSS also help to ensure that all pertinent 
information and alternatives are given due deliberation. This in turn helps the negotiators make 
                                                     
36
 Some cultural-sensitive thoughts are applied to understanding the results. We suggest that for other 
cultural groups, stronger effects due to the pre-negotiation support may be observed. The experimental 
study was conducted in Singapore, whose culture demonstrates a low level of uncertainty avoidance which 
is characterized to be relatively more comfortable in unstructured situations. Insofar as the “uncertainty 
avoidance” dimension of culture (Hofstede, 1991) is concerned, pre-negotiating support tool may be more 
helpful for people with high uncertainty avoidance to prepare for a more structured task on hand and stable 
rules to follow. Correspondingly, the environment becomes less ambiguous as the pre-negotiation support 
has facilitated the negotiators to specify issues and weightages, prior to the actual negotiation. It is 
conceivable that negotiators from a higher uncertainty-avoidance culture will spend more time and effort in 
the preparation process with the help of pre-negotiation support tool since they might have developed a 
lower limit for risk perception. 
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objective and realistic judgments, thus achieving higher individual outcomes as well as gains 
(Proposition 1).  
5.4.2 Contract Balance 
Experimental results confirm our conjecture that the negotiation settlements for dyads with pre-
negotiation support would be more equal than dyads without such support. ANOVA indicated a 
strong main effect on contract balance due to pre-negotiation support (F=8.89, p = 0.00). Dyads 
provided with NSS support for the pre-negotiation phase obtained more equal outcomes (mean = 
15.69; s.d. = 11.36) than dyads without these tools (mean = 30.19; s.d. = 20.79). From a design 
perspective, NSS revolve around the concept of integrative bargaining and enable negotiators to 
attain mutually beneficial agreements. With group process structuring, NSS guide the negotiators 
through a series of negotiation stages, creating a sense of agreement, trust and fairness (Anson 
and Jelassi, 1990). By appealing to standards of fairness, the negotiators increase the probability 
of an agreement by narrowing the range of possible disagreement. It converts what might 
otherwise degenerate into an arbitrary contest of wills into a justifiable principled or objective 
solution (Fisher and Ury, 1981). Therefore, negotiators provided with NSS pre-negotiation 
support tend to be less aggressive in their negotiations. Correspondingly, negotiators are more 
cooperative and less competitive, and are better placed for a more equal outcome. In our study, 
the issue selection facility of pre-negotiation support tools elicits negotiators’ preferences for the 
issues, and with the range setting tool, negotiators define the acceptable range of values for the 
issues to be negotiated. These sets of values are later merged and presented to negotiators. These 
tools together promote information sharing, which helps a negotiator to gain an understanding of 
his position, as well as knowledge of his opponent’s expectations. This awareness of the existence 
and extent of asymmetrical interests gives negotiators a sense of room for cooperation to achieve 
mutually satisfactory settlements. As negotiators participate in integrative bargaining, each seeks 
to find an agreeable proposal that he perceives would meet the expectations of both parties. 
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Ultimately, such perception of balance could be translated to real balance, resulting in a more 
equal negotiation outcome. 
However, the role of NSS support during the negotiation phase was not manifested in this 
experiment. Interestingly, while contract balance has been theorized and found improved by the 
help of NSS in some studies (Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Foroughi et al., 1995), others suggest no 
significance (Jones, 1998; Goh et al., 2000; Lim, 2000). A first reason for this result may lie in 
the lack of exact knowledge of the other party’s utility values. The complex nature of negotiations 
often leads to ambiguity concerning negotiators’ valuations of the issues involved (Thompson and 
Loewenstein, 1992). Typically, negotiators are more informed about their own positions than that 
of the other party’s (Raiffa, 1982). During the negotiation stage, one’s utility values were not 
presented to the opponent. Thus, other than their own outcomes, negotiators had no idea of the 
utilities of the other party, much less the joint outcomes and fairness of alternative contracts. Such 
ambiguity, in turn, caused multiple and different interpretations of “fair” or equitable settlements 
(Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992). Subsequently, negotiators proposed agreements that were 
more in their favors. In other words, a bargainer often accepted a settlement in which the partner 
had many more points than he did, since he did not know exactly the points the opponent achieve 
(Jones, 1998). As a result, the high outcomes achieved by NSS dyads might be biased towards the 
more dominant party. Secondly, inconsistent empirical findings on contract balance in the NSS 
literature are plausibly attributable to the perception aspect; it is of research interest that actual 
contract balance could in some way be affected by how fair the players perceive the contract is to 
them, or “perceived fairness” (the social psychological measure of the relevant aspect of the 
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quality of negotiated outcome) (Rubin and Brown, 1975). Such perception would be affected by   
many dynamics including personality, experiences, social value orientation and cultural norms. 37 
5.4.3 Time to Settlement 
As hypothesized, negotiation time was longer for NSS dyads provided with pre-negotiation 
support than for dyads without these tools. The analysis showed a strong main effect due to NSS 
support for pre-negotiation (F=10.59, p = 0.00). NSS-supported dyads took more time (measured 
in minutes) to reach a settlement (mean = 32.65; s.d. = 6.59) compared to no-pre-negotiation-
support dyads (mean = 25.41; s.d. = 8.84). Negotiation time was also longer for NSS dyads 
provided with negotiation support than for dyads without these tools. ANOVA showed a main 
effect due to NSS support for negotiation (F=3.01, p = 0.09). Dyads provided with NSS support 
for the negotiation phase (mean = 30.96; s.d. = 8.25) took longer to reach an agreement than 
dyads not provided with NSS negotiation tools (mean = 27.10; s.d. = 8.55). 
These results are consistent with both NSS and GSS research, which confirms that the use of 
electronic meeting technology tends to extend decision time (Jones, 1988; Jones and Jelassi, 
1988). This can be explained by relative unfamiliarity of the subjects with the computer support 
system (Foroughi et al., 1995; Delaney et al., 1997). The time involved in inputting issues and 
ranges, as well as coordinating with the opponent, contributes to the increase of (total) negotiation 
                                                     
37
 Some cultural-sensitive thoughts are applied to understanding the results. It is conceivable that the aspect 
of fairness can be better appreciated when a cultural lens is applied, in particular along with the notion of 
Confucian Dynamism which manifests the diversity between the Eastern and the Western value systems 
(Hofstede, 1991). As suggested earlier, Asian business negotiators implicitly regard long-term relationship, 
maintaining harmony, and concern for face-saving as important and relevant for social and business 
activities. They tend to avoid open and direct conflicts, accomplished by the search for sufficiently 
favorable – versus optimal – outcome.  
In managing conflict and negotiating, parties would tend to work towards compromising (Tung and 
Quaddus, 2002). The Asian mindset described may also lead negotiators to compromise and be content 
with a sufficiently favorable agreement, without striving for the optimal outcome. Hence, contract balance 
was not significantly different across different treatment groups. The above observation calls for more 
rigorous, in-depth, and dedicated investigation of the joint impact of technological and cultural dynamics 
on negotiation. 
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time. The significant increase in time also suggests that in situations where NSS support was 
available, negotiating parties considered their options more thoroughly with strengthened belief 
that more efficient and fairer settlements can be achieved (Goh et al., 2000). NSS, in this case, 
increase subjects’ confidence in achieving better outcomes and thus willingness to explore further 
negotiation with their opponents. Conceivably, ongoing use of the NSS should tend to reduce 
negotiation time (Delaney et al., 1997). In the long run, NSS are expected to improve negotiators’ 
performance by reducing time needed to reach an agreement (Lim and Benbasat, 1993). Such 
effects are to be empirically assessed by future studies involving the comparison between 
experienced NSS users and novel NSS users.38 
5.5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
It is widely recognized that systematic planning and preparation are critical elements of 
successful business negotiations. Experienced executives often devote substantial time to these 
functions before sitting down at the negotiating table. Computer technology is believed to enable 
superior negotiation outcomes. In this study, computer-based pre-negotiation and negotiation 
support tools are developed and examined in terms their effects in enhancing negotiation 
outcomes. The findings of this experiment show the usefulness of NSS in enhancing the quality 
of differing stages of negotiation. We advocate the incorporation of pre-negotiation support in 
ENS design, and empirically tested its effectiveness and efficacy in improving negotiators’ 
performance. 
                                                     
38
 Some cultural-sensitive thoughts are applied to understanding the results. Culture largely determines 
what time means and how it affects negotiations (Hofstede, 1991). Behavioral negotiation studies suggest 
that while people in the United States generally hold that “faster” is better than “slower” because it 
symbolizes high productivity, other cultures have quite different views about time (Lewicki et al., 1999). In 
more traditional societies, especially those in hot climates, the pace is slower than in the United States. 
They tend to reduce the focus on time, at least in the short term. In some other cultures, such as China, time 
per se is not important. The focus of negotiations is on the task and relationship building, regardless of the 
amount of time that is takes. From this perceptive, the results that technologies did not shorten the 
settlement time may be confounded by the subjects’ time perception. 
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The study is recognized to have several limitations, which also point to possible future research 
opportunities. First, due to the early state of research on pre-negotiation support, student subjects 
are used in a controlled laboratory setting, under the assumption that their bargaining behavior 
with and without computer support would provide insights into the effectiveness of NSS in actual 
organizational settings. Although students have been found to be acceptable surrogates for 
organizational decision makers (Gallupe, 1985) and earlier negotiation research suggested strong 
similarities between the bargaining behavior and outcomes of industrial sales personnel and 
college students (Siegel and Harnett, 1964), the research methodology of laboratory 
experimentation and use of student subjects may connote with reduced realism vis-à-vis real-
world negotiations.  
Second, the sample size was small and the experiment focused on dyads, or two-party 
negotiations. However, there is a major difference between conflicts involving two parties and 
those involving more than two parties. The dyadic setting is appropriate for a buyer-seller (e.g., 
employer-employee) setting, a basic yet important negotiation context; NSS can be particularly 
useful for dyads involved in distant or distributed negotiations. Multiple-party negotiations 
involve further intricacies, including coalition formation and audience effects. Future research 
should attend to the latter setting, but only in a systematic and progressive manner.  
Another extension is to open up the black box and perform content analysis to better understand 
the process related variables. It is not known in this study, for example, whether trust and 
collaborative atmosphere have been developed in the pre-negotiation stage which might bring 
about a positive influence on the actual negotiation stage. Qualitative approaches may be utilized 
as an alternative mode of research (Gopal and Prasad, 2000). More advanced design features of 
NSS, such as intelligence and explanations (Gregor and Benbasat, 1999), should be incorporated 
and studied for their impact on negotiation outcomes. 
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6 CHAPTER 6  EFFECTS OF NSS AND MULTILINGUAL 
SUPPORT FOR ENGLISH-CHINESE NEGOTIATORS39 
(CATEGORY I AND II SYSTEMS) 
In e-Negotiation contexts where users typically communicate through text-based exchanges, there 
is substantive room to make use of unbiased and synchronous mode of computer translations. 
However, despite the growing attention in using multilingual tools to alleviating communication 
barriers, little empirical examination has been done to understand the effect and efficacy of 
multilingual negotiating support. The study consists of the development of a bilingual English-
Chinese NSS, as well as an experiment that aims to understand the effectiveness of multilingual 
negotiation support systems on negotiation performance across different linguistic groups. We 
attempt to differentiate the effects caused by the NSS and the multilingual support function by 
invoking 2X2 factorial design in an experiment, in addressing the following research question:  
How do negotiation support (NSS) and multilingual support, separately and in conjunction, make 
differences over negotiators’ performance between lingual-heterogeneous dyads? 
6.1 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
6.1.1 The Research Model 
This study represents an exploratory effort in understanding the effect of multilingual negotiation 
support on negotiation outcomes; rather than studying a single entity, we choose to examine two 
                                                     
39
 This experiment was completed at an earlier phase of our ENS research program as a joint work with 
other contributors. It was accepted for publication at a forthcoming issue of Behaviour & Information 
Technology (Lim and Yang, 2008).  A preliminary version of this study was presented at the 38th Annual 
Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences: HICSS38, Hawaii, United States, 3-6 January 2005 
(Lim and Yang, 2005). 
The study is presented briefly here that helps to address part of the guiding research framework. 
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independent variables: NSS support and multilingual support, so as to better discern between 
these two components and to see what added-value (to NSS) might be provided by the 
multilingual support. In this study, the dependent variables assessing negotiation outcomes 
involve individual outcome, joint outcome, contract balance, time to settlement, and satisfaction 




Figure 6-1. The Research Model 
To simulate Internet-based negotiations, the research model is examined at electronic negotiation 
settings where all communications between negotiation parties go through a default CHAT 
facility, assuming no face-to-face communication is available. 
6.1.2 Hypotheses 
6.1.2.1 Individual Outcome, Joint Outcome and Contract Balance 
Individual outcome and joint outcome reflect the efficiency of the negotiation outcome at 
individual and group levels respectively, and contract balance reflects the fairness of a negotiated 
contract; the three measures demonstrate the economic negotiation outcomes concerning the final 
agreement. Earlier empirical research (Anson and Jelassi 1990, Jelassi and Jones 1988) suggests 
that computerized decision support helps subjects overcome the cognitive difficulty of these tasks, 
the tendency towards premature closure, and the preference for more available and more salient 
solutions, thus helping them achieve better outcomes, compared to negotiators without NSS 
support. Such effects have also been confirmed in more recent studies (Jones 1988, Foroughi et al. 
1995, Delaney et al. 1997). As suggested by Lim and Benbasat (1993), the decision support 
a. NSS support 
b. Multilingual support 
1. Individual outcome 
2. Joint outcome 
3. Contract balance 
4. Time to settlement 
5. Satisfaction with Settlement 
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portion of the NSS, instead of the (task-oriented) electronic communication channel, provides the 
greatest contribution to the contract balance. Moreover, Delaney et al. (1997) show that the DSS 
component alone leads to higher joint outcomes and more balanced contracts. In line with 
Proposition 1, we posit that full NSS will lead to higher individual/joint outcomes as well as 
better equality than electronic communication channel alone (CHAT facility).  
Hypothesis 6-1a: Dyads 40  with NSS support (DSS+CHAT) will achieve higher individual 
outcome than those with CHAT facility only. 
Hypothesis 6-2a: Dyads with NSS support (DSS+CHAT) will achieve higher joint outcome than 
those with CHAT facility only. 
Hypothesis 6-3a: Dyads with NSS support (DSS+CHAT) will achieve lower contract balance 
(better equality of outcome) than those with CHAT facility only. 
Lewicki and Litterer (1985) suggest that distraction due to semantic differences lead to 
ineffective communication that prevents negotiators achieve successful negotiations. One of the 
main obstacles to successful international business is the linguistic and communication barriers, 
including semantic and syntactic differences. Negotiators communicating in a language other than 
their mother tongue should rely to a great extent on visual aids, printed materials, samples and 
references to fact and figures (Cellich and Jain 2004). For a negotiator who does not speak the 
common language in a proficient manner, the ability for him/her to effectively communicate and 
negotiate for desirable deals can be severely limited. Furthermore, dyads with language barriers 
will find it difficult to communicate and understand each others’ needs in accomplishing mutual 
benefits. The multilingual features of NSS (including multilingual system interface as well as 
translation of text-based messages to the negotiator’s native language) provide languages native 
                                                     
40
 In this chapter, dyads refer the two lingual-heterogeneous negotiating parties who have different native 
languages. 
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to negotiators to alleviate language-related communication problems, in which the enhanced 
communication support will enable the ‘weaker’ party to utilize his/her native language to 
carrying out the negotiation process. It is conceivable that compared to the unsupported 
negotiators, those who are assisted by multilingual support are able to minimize linguistic barriers 
and negotiate more efficiently, so as to attain higher individual utility, greater joint outcome and 
more balanced contracts. Hence in line with Proposition 2b, we posit that 
Hypothesis 6-1b: Dyads with multilingual support will achieve higher individual outcome than 
those without multilingual support. 
Hypothesis 6-2b: Dyads with multilingual support will achieve higher joint outcome than those 
without multilingual support. 
Hypothesis 6-3b: Dyads with multilingual support will achieve more equal settlements (in terms 
of smaller contract balances) than those without multilingual support. 
6.1.2.2 Time to Settlement 
Negotiation time refers to the time taken to reach an agreement in negotiation process. Findings 
of GSS research (e.g., Dennis et al. 1988, Gallupe 1985) suggest that the technology is expected 
to bring about lengthened sessions, because the computer support introduces an additional layer 
of complexity into the negotiation process. NSS empirical studies also indicated a marked 
increase in time for NSS-supported dyads to reach an agreement (e.g., Foroughi et al. 1995; 
Delaney et al, 1997). For the multilingual support, there will be time associated with typing non-
English characters using editor software (Aiken et al., 1995) as well as the bidirectional 
translations into each party’s native language. Corresponding to Proposition 1 and Proposition 
2b, it is believed that the additional use of NSS and multilingual feature will result in a lengthier 
negotiation for reaching an agreement.  
 Chapter 6   Effects of NSS and Multilingual Support 
135 
Hypothesis 6-4a: Dyads with NSS support (DSS+CHAT) will take more time in reaching 
agreement than those with CHAT facility only. 
Hypothesis 6-4b: Dyads with multilingual support will take more time in reaching agreement 
than those without multilingual support. 
6.1.2.3 Satisfaction with Settlement 
As argued in Proposition 1, DSS support can help to overcome cognitive difficulty and alleviate 
face-saving emotions, which in turn enable negotiators to achieve more efficient and fairer 
agreements. If negotiators achieve a higher joint outcome and better contract balance, they are 
likely to be more satisfied (Foroughi et al., 1995). It is hence believed that negotiators with NSS 
support can achieve greater satisfaction towards the contract than those without support (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993; Foroughi et al., 1995).  
Hypothesis 6-5a: Negotiators with NSS support (DSS+CHAT) will be more satisfied with the 
negotiated settlement than those with CHAT facility only. 
Multilingual support essentially removes linguistics barriers in its effect to equip lingual-
heterogeneous negotiating parties with more efficient communication mechanisms. Conversely, 
dyads may face communication breakdown which hinder them from achieving win-win solutions, 
and thus tend to have less enjoyment from the negotiation process. As argued in Proposition 2b, 
we posit that the inclusion of multilingual support will lead to greater satisfaction towards the 
negotiated contract. 
Hypothesis 6-5b: Dyads with multilingual support will be more satisfied with the negotiated 
settlement than those without multilingual support. 
6.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
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A laboratory experiment, employing a 2x2 factorial design (see Figure 6-2), was conducted. The 
two independent variables are the availability of NSS support (yes versus no) and the availability 
of multilingual support (yes versus no). Dyads provided with NSS support used the negotiation 
support system (with a CHAT facility), while dyads without NSS support used only the CHAT 
facility for communication. For the multilingual negotiations, negotiating parties negotiated in 
their first languages (English or Chinese). For monolingual sessions, negotiating parties 
negotiated in English, which is a foreign language for one of the parties. 
 
Figure 6-2. Experimental Design (Experiment 2) 
Ninety undergraduates were recruited as subjects from a large university in a multi-racial country 
with English as working language. Each negotiating group consisted of two subjects, one whose 
first language is Chinese, and the other whose first language is English. Thus, there were a total 
of 45 linguistic-heterogeneous dyads. The subjects were paired randomly. However, three dyads 
ended up in deadlocks and were disqualified. The final set of data came from 42 dyads. 
6.2.1 Independent Variables 
The independent variables were manipulated by the availabilities of multilingual support and 
negotiation support of a bilingual English-Chinese negotiation support system. It provides a 
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Four modules of the NSS used in this experiment are 1) Set Range, 2) Assign Utilities, 3) 
Analyze Outcomes, and 4) Propose Agreements. In the set range module, each party decides on 
the range of possible values for each of the issues. The system combines these ranges when both 
parties have entered the values. In the assign utilities module, negotiating parties assign 
weightages to the issues based on the issues’ relative importance. Their utilities for each 
individual value are also assigned. These utilities indicate the acceptability of the values to the 
negotiating party, and are used in computing individual outcome, joint outcome, and contract 
balance. The analyze outcomes module makes use of utility values inputted in the earlier module; 
the system generates all possible solutions and calculates the utility score for each. This is where 
both parties can analyze the various alternatives and strive towards a higher joint outcome and 
better contract balance, keeping in mind that their individual outcomes are not revealed to the 
other party. The propose agreements module is intended for formal propositions to be presented 
by either party, after analyzing the various alternatives. Figure 6-3 shows the interfaces. 
  
Figure 6-3. The Bilingual User Interface 
The four modules together with the CHAT facility make up the negotiation support system for 
this study. In conditions where NSS support is not provided, only the CHAT facility is used. In 
conditions where multilingual support is not provided, only English interfaces are presented to 
both negotiating parties, otherwise each party receives the interface corresponding to his/her 
native language. Comparisons on negotiation outcomes between NSS-supported and non-
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supported dyads indicate the effects of NSS (featuring both DSS and task-oriented EC support). 
Comparisons between dyads supported by multilingual support and those without multilingual 
support indicate the effects of multilingual support (featuring social-oriented EC support 
technique for heterogeneous users). 
6.2.2 Dependent Variables  
The MAUT (Keeney and Raiffa 1991) provides a widely adopted tool to specifying negotiators’ 
preferences using multi-attribute utility values (see an illustration in Section 5.2.2). The 
individual outcome for each negotiating party is measured as the total weightage points of the 
particular party. Therefore, the individual outcomes of A and B are (Uxa + Uya + Uza) and (Uxb + 
Uyb + Uzb) respectively. The joint outcome of the negotiating parties provides a measure for the 
total utility of the negotiated agreement, which is the sum of their individual outcomes. With 
respect to the above example, the joint outcome of A and B is the sum of ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) + (Uxb 
+ Uyb + Uzb)). Equality, synonymous with contract balance, is a fairness measure on how well the 
negotiated settlement reflects the balance of each negotiation party. It is measured using the 
absolute difference between the two parties’ weightage points for the final agreement. In our 
example, the contract balance is the absolute value of ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) - (Uxb + Uyb + Uzb)). The 
higher this value is, the less equal the contact means between the dyads. It is zero for a balanced 
contract and a positive value for any unbalanced ones. Negotiation time is measured in minutes 
as the time spent for dyads in reach agreements. Perceptual variable - satisfaction with 
settlement - is measured using a post-negotiation questionnaire. 
6.2.3 Negotiation Task 
The task specifies negotiation scenario between two business partners of several years – a buyer 
(Wellco Enterprise, Inc.) and a seller (New Dragon Parts Distributor), over four issues of a three-
year purchase agreement for turbochargers, an engine sub-component (adapted from Jones 1988). 
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The issues are unit price, purchase quantity, warranty period and the date of first delivery. 
Representatives from both companies are to resolve existing conflicts over the four issues through 
negotiation. Both representatives have a set of guidelines on the four issues acceptable for their 
companies. Each company has an attractive alternative purchase/sales contract with other 
companies. Hence, each may take up the alternative should the negotiation fail. However, due to 
the good working relationship between the two companies, they would like, as far as possible, to 
close a deal with each other. 
Background information of the two companies was made available to both subjects who were 
randomly assigned as buyers and sellers; as well, each subject received confidential information 
pertaining to the company he represented. 
6.2.4 Experiment Procedure 
Each session involved two subjects, forming a dyad. In pre-negotiation phase, subjects first filled 
in a background questionnaire. This was followed by two activities: (1) training on how to use the 
system and (2) an English language proficiency test. Training was carried out in English for both 
subjects in monolingual conditions and for local subjects whose first language is English in 
multilingual conditions. For Chinese subjects in multilingual conditions, training was conducted 
in Mandarin. The English language proficiency test was a 30-minute test. Beforehand, the test 
had been administered to two facilitators to ensure that the duration was reasonable for its length. 
The format of the test was similar to the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) as test questions 
were consolidated from past GRE sample tests.  
After both subjects had completed both the test and the training separately, they were randomly 
assigned as the role of buyer or seller and hence their sitting locations. They then took seats at the 
negotiation table, separated by a partition. The partition was meant to prevent verbal 
communication as well as nonverbal communication involving body language. Subjects were 
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then given the instruction sheet and the task sheet with given sufficient time. An expected 
outcome form was filled up, in which subjects wrote down the exact values that they expected to 
obtain at the end of the negotiation 
After completing the expected outcome form, subjects started the actual negotiation phase. ‘NSS 
support’ dyads would log in to the system and timing of the negotiation process would begin. 
The subjects went through all four modules of the system and negotiated via the CHAT facility. 
For ‘CHAT support’ subjects, a ‘utility form’ where given in which they filled the weightages 
for each of the issues based on the relative importance. They wrote down values they most 
desired and values they would not accept for each of the issues. These values would be used to 
calculate their utilities during data analysis. The form was then returned to the experimenter. At 
this point, negotiation (and timing of its process) began. Subjects negotiated via the CHAT 
facility without a structured negotiation procedure. 
Chinese subjects in multilingual conditions entered their messages using software Chinese Star 
2.0. In monolingual sessions, all subjects entered their messages in English. A log file was used 
to capture all interactions. Timing stopped when an agreement was reached. The agreement was 
recorded and subjects completed a feedback questionnaire. The post-negotiation phase was ended 
with asking the subjects not to reveal any information regarding the experiment. 
6.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Altogether, 45 sessions were conducted. However, three sessions ended in deadlocks and were 
discarded, leaving 42 groups for analysis. ANOVA was performed on the scores of the English 
language proficiency test for a manipulation check, and showed a significant main effect of 
member (local or Chinese) on the English test scores (F-ratio = 20.16; p = 0.00). Local subjects 
(i.e., subjects with English as their first language) obtained significantly higher test scores (mean 
= 18.19; s.d. = 4.84) than Chinese subjects (i.e., subjects with Chinese as their first language) 
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(mean = 13.79; s.d. = 3.91). This shows that our assumption is appropriate that the Chinese 
subjects would not be as comfortable with the English language as the local subjects. 
ANOVA tests were conducted on the dependent variables (see Table 6-1). No significant results 
were obtained for satisfaction with outcome and hence not presented. Summary of hypotheses 
testing is presented in Table 6-2. We elaborate the results of statistical analysis and discussion for 
each of the dependent variables in the next section. 
Table 6-1. Summary of ANOVA results 
Main Effects Dependent Variables Interaction Effect 
NSS Support Multilingual Support 
1. Individual Outcome NO (F=2.91, P=0.09) F=9.36, P=0.00** F=1.37, P=0.25 
2. Joint Outcome NO (F=2.59, P=0.12) F=8.31, P=0.01* F=1.22, P=.28 
3. Contract Balance YES (F=8.46, P=0.01*) F=0.45, P=0.51 F=2.56, P=0.12 
4. Time to Settlement NO (F=0.01, P=0.94) F=3.22, P=0.08 F=4.75, P=0.04* 
(* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01) 
Table 6-2. Summary of Results on Hypotheses Testing (Experiment 2) 
Hypotheses Mean 
Support         No support 
P-Value Hypotheses 
Supported? 
1. Individual Outcome 
6-1a. NSS > No NSS 








P = 0.00** 




2. Joint Outcome 
6-2a. NSS > No NSS 








P = 0.01* 




3. Contract Balance 
6-3a. NSS < No NSS 








P = 0.51 




NSS: Multilingual > No Multilingual 






P = 0.00** 
Interaction 
Effect 
4. Time to Settlement 
6-4a. NSS > No NSS 








P = 0.08 




5. Satisfaction with Settlement 
6-5a. NSS > No NSS 








P > 0.05 




(* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01) 
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6.4 DISCUSSION 
6.4.1 Individual Outcome  
It was hypothesized that individual outcome would increase if NSS support was provided (H6-
1a). This is supported by our results that show significant difference between NSS-supported 
groups and groups without NSS support (i.e., CHAT support conditions). Such result can be 
explained by the fact that NSS display the utility scores for all the possible alternatives (Lim and 
Benbasat, 1993). Hence, negotiating parties can work towards an outcome that is favorable for 
them, i.e., increase the efficiency of negotiated agreement at the individual level (Proposition 1). 
Individual outcome appears to be not significantly improved for subjects provided with 
multilingual support. This refutes our hypothesis of H6-1b (Proposition 2b). Sheffield (1992) 
indicates that media efficiency has a marked impact on negotiation outcomes. An efficient 
communication medium is required to closely examine negotiation issues and to reduce 
uncertainty in the negotiation task itself. The ineffectiveness occurred here may be due to the fact 
that Chinese subjects in multilingual conditions typed in Chinese characters using Chinese Star 
2.0, a Chinese editor. Unfamiliarity with the editor often causes problems for some Asian users in 
using multilingual support software. For instance, Malaysian students rated the multilingual GSS 
higher than Koreans, Chinese and Japanese, because the former used the Roman alphabet – thus, 
no keyboard mapping was needed (Aiken, 2002). When compared to their counterparts, 
communication process for Chinese subjects using the Chinese editor is much slower and hence 
ineffective. The inefficiency using the inputting software may have confounded the effects of 
multilingual support in improving individual outcomes. Future study should take care of this 
aspect by engaging more experienced users in using editor software. 
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6.4.2 Joint Outcome 
Results support the hypothesis that joint outcome will be higher for NSS-supported dyads than 
dyads provided with CHAT facility (H6-2a). This is consistent with the results obtained by Jones 
(1988), Foroughi et al. (1995), and Delaney et al. (1997). Foroughi et al. (1995) offer some 
explanations for the higher joint outcome (Proposition 1). Firstly, NSS allow simultaneous 
consideration of all issues. Subjects could consider the entire alternative instead of just one issue 
at a time. Therefore, they can have a better assessment of the tradeoffs. Secondly, subjects have 
increased knowledge about their opponent’s simulated utilities (Lim and Benbasat, 1993). With 
this increased knowledge, they are able to work towards the efficient frontier and hence, improve 
their joint outcomes. Another explanation is that the NSS tools generate all possible alternatives 
for the subjects. In this way, the system helps the subjects overcome tendency towards premature 
closure, and the preference for more available and more salient solutions (Jelassi and Jones, 1988). 
In contrast, without NSS support, subjects tend to satisfise rather than optimize (March and 
Simon, 1958) – they stop negotiating for the best possible outcome when a satisfactory solution 
had been reached. This is because they would not know each other’s utility function and may not 
even be explicitly aware of their own utility function. Even if they do, it is simply not possible for 
human negotiators to process all of the hundreds or thousands of possible solutions. 
Joint outcome was not significantly improved due to the multilingual support (H6-2b) 
(Proposition 2b). As analyzed earlier, the use of Chinese Star 2.0 may have hindered the 
multilingual supported Chinese subjects from effectively communicating with their counterparts. 
As joint outcome is the sum of the individual outcome, it follows that the joint outcome would be 
lower. 
 Chapter 6   Effects of NSS and Multilingual Support 
144 
6.4.3 Contract Balance 
The ANOVA test shows a significant interaction effect between multilingual support and NSS 
support on the contract balance of negotiated settlements (Figure 6-5).  
 
Figure 6-4. The Interaction Effect of NSS and Multilingual Support on Contract Balance 
Dyads with multilingual support but no NSS support obtain more balanced contracts 
corresponding to higher equality of outcome (mean = 14.91; s.d. = 11.39) than dyads with 
monolingual support and NSS support (mean = 19.05; s.d. = 13.79). In addition, dyads provided 
with both NSS and multilingual support obtain outcomes fairer (mean = 24.91; s.d. = 16.43) than 
dyads provided with only the CHAT support and with monolingual support (mean = 35.06; s.d. = 
15.81). When only the CHAT support is provided (i.e., no NSS support), a significant difference 
between the means is obtained between dyads provided with multilingual support and those with 
only monolingual support (t = 3.32; p = 0.00). The effect of multilingual support is less prominent 
in groups provided with NSS. 
This may be due to the synergistic effect of multilingual support and NSS support. The better 
equality of negotiated settlements shows that although the average individual outcome was lower, 
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absolute difference between the two outcomes was small. A possible explanation is that there 
may be goal differences between dyads with multilingual support and those without multilingual 
support (i.e., monolingual support conditions), when only CHAT facility but no NSS is supported 
for dyads. There was a chance that subjects assigned to multilingual conditions may have aimed 
to achieve fair solutions while those assigned to monolingual conditions aimed for solutions with 
high individual and high joint outcomes. We suggest that in further studies, subjects’ initial goals 
should be recorded so as to provide a statistical confirmation for this explanation. 
6.4.4 Time to Settlement 
Our hypothesis that dyads provided with NSS support will take a longer time to reach an 
agreement is not proved to be significant (H6-4a) (Proposition 1). Nevertheless, a marginally 
significant value (p=0.08) is observed, indicating certain level of effects due to decision 
technologies. It was asserted that there should be an increased time when using the NSS as it is 
confirmed in GSS research that the use of technology tends to extend decision time (George et al., 
1990). Ongoing use of the NSS should tend to reduce negotiation time (Delaney et al., 1997) and 
the effects should be confirmed by future studies that compare experienced negotiators who are 
pre-trained and familiar with the use of NSS, against those novice users. Another possible 
explanation is due to the use of the lean medium of CHAT facility for lingual heterogeneous 
dyads at both conditions. As non-NSS-supported dyads solely communicate with CHAT facility, 
their communication efficiency will be much lower compared to those with extra NSS support 
(Proposition 2a). This assertion should be confirmed by future studies which are configured to 
examine effects of media differences in conjunction with NSS technologies for dyads with 
varying levels of communication capability. 
The results for time to settlement support the hypothesis that dyads provided with multilingual 
support will take a longer time to reach an agreement (H6-4b) (Proposition 2b). The use of the 
Chinese editor by Chinese subjects in multilingual conditions accounts for the result largely. In 
 Chapter 6   Effects of NSS and Multilingual Support 
146 
other words, using the Chinese editor slows the process down. Aiken et al. (1995) in their study to 
compare performance for Korean and English groups using bilingual GSS, also question whether 
Koreans studying in America are identical with those from their native country. The subjects’ 
slower typing speeds using the Korean character set may have biased the results towards the use 
of an English GSS. Koreans in their native country may be forced to type better Korean words 
since they are less likely to be proficient in English. Besides, in multilingual conditions, every 
message entered is processed. The translation involved also slows down the negotiation process. 
6.4.5 Satisfaction with Settlement 
Satisfaction with the settlement was comparable between NSS-supported groups and those 
without NSS support (H6-5a). One reason may be that NSS-supported negotiators may not be 
aware of the possible better agreements that they have achieved, thus making their perceptions 
insignificantly different from those unsupported. Another possible explanation may be due to the 
negotiation setting which was limited to pure electronic communications. The electronic 
communication channel provides a sort of ‘formality’ which depersonalizes the negotiation and 
allows negotiators to concentrate on the content of the negotiation rather than on each other’s 
personalities (Lim and Benbasat, 1993; Sheffield, 1992). In this study, all groups negotiate via the 
electronic communication channel – the CHAT facility. While existing theories predicting the 
effects of NSS largely assume negotiations are conducted in face-to-face setting; nevertheless, the 
text-based chatting is a fundamentally different mode of communication. From the perspective of 
communication richness, the lack of nonverbal (e.g. expressions and gestures) and verbal cues in 
the communication process for dyads to use the CHAT facility may result in an increase of 
turbulence in the flow of communication. Tung and Quaddus (2002) point out that the lack of 
emotive cues may lead to misunderstanding amongst multicultural group participants. Coupled 
with the inability to transmit subtle meanings, this misunderstanding makes communication for 
dyads largely dependent on text-only information. Emotive cues to express subtle human 
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expressions such as despair, hand shaking, waving, kissing, and the like, are not presented in the 
NSS we developed for this study. This limitation may result in the insignificant level of 
satisfaction of dyads using multilingual NSS, and conceivably explains the lack of significant 
difference in satisfaction perceived by NSS-supported and non-NSS-supported groups.  
Based on Proposition 2a which is derived from media richness theories, lean media may result in 
lower communication efficiency. However, it is not obvious that the same effects will be 
observed when DSS technologies co-exist. The effect of DSS on negotiators’ perceptions towards 
the negotiated contract may be overridden by the underlying communication inefficiency of the 
use of pure text-based media. The situation may be changed if one were to provide a richer 
medium for communication purpose, such as an addition of audio or video facility, on top of the 
CHAT function. This assertion should be confirmed by future studies which are configured to 
examine the media effects in conjunction with NSS technologies for dyads with varying levels of 
communication capability. 
Results indicate that multilingual support does not significantly increase the satisfaction of the 
subjects with the settlement (H6-5b) (Proposition 2b). Again, the level of accuracy of the 
translation may contribute to the ineffective use of multilingual NSS. At times, the subjects may 
not fully apprehend what the opponent was trying to say. This hinders effective communication 
which is essential for successful negotiations (Chong and Kelemen, 1995). Hence, satisfaction 
with the settlement was not increased even with multilingual support.  
6.5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
This study advocates the use of computer technologies to effectively support multilingual 
negotiation dyads whose native languages are diverse. The findings derived from the 
experimental study suggest that NSS support helped to improve individual outcome and joint 
outcome significantly, which is consistent with past NSS empirical studies. The results also 
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showed that multilingual support helped to improve equality of outcome (under qualified 
conditions) but the time taken was significantly longer. 
The study contributes to both research and practice concerning e-Negotiations. For research, it 
represents a first step towards investigating to the notion that multilingual negotiations can be 
managed effectively by providing multilingual negotiation support. The study provides initial 
empirical evidence into the area of multilingual negotiation support and serves as a starting point 
for future studies. To system designers and practitioners, this study highlights the significance of 
addressing diverse linguist groups in global negotiation context by incorporating computer-based 
multilingual support features. Such element is especially prevalent to the fast-growing B2B e-
marketplaces which facilitate global SMEs to conduct business activities online. The provision of 
negotiation support tools that as well support multilingual communications is likely to attract 
non-English speaking individuals and companies to reach previously unattainable foreign 
business partners at a very low cost. Future work should pay greater attention to the opportunities 
as well as challenges of providing multilingual support for cross-cultural negotiators. 
A limitation of the system we employed for this study is its processing speed when multilingual 
support is present. For every message that the subjects enter, there is a backend process where the 
message undergoes translation. This translation process could take quite a while for some phrases. 
In addition, the translation application does not cater for complex sentences and idiomatic phrases. 
Moreover, Chinese subjects were required to use a Chinese editor, Chinese Star 2.0, when 
multilingual support was provided. The typing of Chinese characters is not as straightforward as 
that of English words. Even if the subjects were familiar with the software, the process of keying 
in Chinese words is still slower than the typing process of English words. This may have 
negatively affected the subjects’ satisfaction with the negotiation process. One possible way to 
reduce such unwanted effect could be through introducing a time delay for dyads not using the 
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translation system for a fairer comparison. The time delay can be determined a priori through a 
pilot study. 
Automatic translation programs are known to lack 100 percent accuracy due the complex nature 
of language (Aiken et al., 1994). Hence the ongoing multilingual system research relies on a high 
accuracy and fast translation speed and is still a promising area. Furthermore, good translation 
should embed ‘culture due diligence’ which can serve to introduce some of the originating 
culture’s sensibilities to the receiving culture (Ditaranto, 2005). It is yet to become feasible for us 
to conduct business negotiations freely with our native languages, due to the joint complexity of 
inadequate technology maturity and the subtle nature of language and cultures. Nevertheless, 
having personalized interfaces catered for different lingual groups serves as the starting point of 
developing a multilingual support system, which provides opportunities for non-English speaking 
businessmen to participate in online trading and negotiation. The lingual- and cultural-sensitive 
interfaces, together with translation-embedded e-Negotiation systems, can arguably contribute to 
enlarging the customer base for and add value to e-marketplaces. 
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7 CHAPTER 7  EFFECTS OF DECISION SUPPORT AND 
CONFLICT LEVEL FOR NEGOTIATIONS VIA 
VIDEOCONFERENCING41 (CATEGORY I AND II SYSTEMS) 
Despite the increasing use of videoconferencing that allows geographically dispersed individuals 
and firms to interact in an approximation of face-to-face interaction (Sniezek and Crede, 2002), 
most NSS empirical studies are still limited to simple keyboard interaction like email or text-
based chat facility, thus limiting their findings away from negotiators using advanced 
communication technologies. The purpose of this study is to provide evidence about the 
capability of a computerized NSS to enhance negotiation outcomes using videoconferencing 
channel. As an important factor, conflict level was investigated in the research model to 
distinguish between integrative and distributive bargaining situations (Walton and McKersie, 
1965). This study seeks answers to the following research questions:  
Can videoconferencing-based DSS improve the outcomes of dyadic remote negotiation over those 
facilitated by a pure videoconferencing channel? Does conflict level moderate the result? 
7.1 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
7.1.1 The Research Model 
Delaney et al. (1997) examine the separate effects of these two sets of components and showed 
that DSS component alone led to higher joint outcomes and more balanced contracts. The present 
                                                     
41
 The study has been presented at the IFIP TC8 International Conference on Decision Support Systems: 
DSS2004, Prato, Tuscany, Italy, 1-3 July 2004 (Lim and Yang, 2004), based on Yang Yinping’s Honors 
Year Project, School of Computing, NUS in year 2003. 
The study is presented briefly here that helps to address part of the guiding research framework. 
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study continues to sort out the effects of the two components and further explore the impact of the 
computer support on negotiation outcome where videoconferencing NSS is incorporated. 
Negotiation task characteristics, especially conflict level, have been shown to be of significant 
influence on negotiation processes and outcomes (Benbasat et al., 1993). Empirical research in 
NSS indicated that NSS effectiveness is likely to be moderated by the type of negotiation 
situation or the amount of conflict between negotiators (Jones, 1988; Foroughui et al., 1995; Goh 
et al., 2000). Consistent with past work (e.g. Jones, 1988, Foroughui et al., 1995, Lim, 2000), 
dependent variables in the current study include joint outcome (total utility of the negotiated 
settlement for both parties), contract balance (the absolute difference between the total utility 
scores achieved by each negotiator) and negotiation time. We examine the role of conflict level in 
moderating the relationship between degree of DSS support and negotiation outcomes. Figure 7-1 
depicts the research model. 
 
Figure 7-1. The Research Model 
To simulate Internet-based negotiations, the research model is examined at electronic negotiation 
settings where all communications between negotiation parties go through a default 
videoconferencing facility when no face-to-face communication is available. 
7.1.2 Hypotheses 
7.1.2.1 Joint Outcome and Contract Balance 
In line with Proposition 1, theoretical and empirical work has generally suggested the effects of 
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balance. For instance, Foroughi et al. (1995) study shows that the dyads with the comprehensive 
NSS had a higher joint outcome than the dyads with no computer support. Delaney et al’ (1997) 
follow up study, however, intended to examine whether this higher joint outcome is a result of the 
DSS portion of the NSS or of the combined effect of the DSS and the electronic communication 
component of the comprehensive NSS. Their hypotheses were supported that joint outcome 
differences are due to the DSS portion rather than to the combined effect of the two components 
of the comprehensive NSS.  
Contract balance is expected to become smaller when the DSS is used, because each party will be 
aware of the approximate number of points earned by the opponent for a particular solution. This 
awareness will help each bargainer find a contract alternative which he/she feels is fair both for 
himself and for his partner and which he/she can accept without losing face. The Foroughi et al. 
study (1995) resulted in a better contract balance (closer to zero) with the NSS than with no 
computer support.  Delaney et al. (1997) further found that DSS alone contribute to more 
equalized contract balance in low conflict setting. 
VC channel provides the videos, verbal communication as well as text-based communication that 
are close to face-to-face setting, where the latter sets Lim and Benbasat’s (1993) theoretical 
arguments on the effectiveness of NSS. It is conceivable that the theory can be extended to VC 
channels (in line with Proposition 2a).  Greater efficiency and fairer outcomes are expected with 
computer decision support than without computer support for negotiating dyads communicating 
through VC channel. In other words, for low conflict task where mutual gains are potentially 
available, we posit that NSS-supported dyads are to achieve higher join outcomes and lower 
contract balances than those unsupported using VC only (in line with Proposition 4). For high 
conflict task, NSS may not be particularly useful in distributive negotiation situations where 
negotiating parties tend to “split the difference” in coming up a reasonably efficient and fair 
settlement by using a satisfising strategy (Erickson et al., 1974; Raiffa, 1982; Jones, 1988). 
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Hypothesis 7-1: Negotiators with extra DSS support (DSS+VC) will achieve higher joint 
outcome than those with VC support only in the low-conflict situation but not in the high-conflict 
situation.  
Hypothesis 7-2: Negotiators with extra DSS support (DSS+VC) will achieve more equal 
settlements (in terms of smaller contract balances) than those with VC support only in the low-
conflict situation but not in the high-conflict situation.  
7.1.2.2 Time to Settlement 
For negotiation time, conflict level will not show moderating effect as the time in reaching 
agreement is mainly determined by the additional use of the NSS tool. GSS research 
demonstrates that the use of technology generally tends to extend decision time (Dennis et al. 
1988). It is proposed that the time involved in using NSS for the alternative generation and 
evaluation of alternatives increases the time required for the NSS over negotiation with no NSS 
support, because the NSS introduces explicit additional activities into the negotiation process (in 
line with Proposition 4). 
Hypothesis 7-3: Negotiators with extra DSS support (DSS+VC) will take more time in reaching 
agreement than those with VC support only.   
7.1.2.3 Confidence with Solution 
In line with Proposition 1, DSS essentially serve as external information processor and memory 
that help negotiators to overcome cognitive difficulties (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985) to simplify 
the processes of alternative evaluation and generations. Compared to unsupported cases, 
negotiators will feel more positive that they are able to obtain better, more efficient solutions. 
Lim and Benbasat (1993) analyze an efficiency related perception construct “confidence with 
solution” in negotiation setting. The decision aid, through helping negotiators to be capable of 
 Chapter 7   Effects of Decision Support and Conflict Level 
154 
performing rational analyses, was attributed to the large portion to the increase of confidence with 
solution perceived by negotiators.  
Hypothesis 7-4: Negotiators with extra DSS support (DSS + VC) will obtain higher level of 
confidence with the negotiated solution than those with VC support only.   
7.1.2.4 Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere  
In line with Proposition 1, the decision support functions help to address the problems associated 
with cognitive biases and socio-emotional effects of human negotiations in collaborating with 
each other. DSS also encourage negotiators to seek a mutually beneficial solution by displaying 
conflicting views and pairing of related items interests (Anson and Jelassi, 1990), instead of 
assuming a “fixed-pie” on that their interests are always in direct conflict with the other party and 
that one side will win at the expense of the other (Pruitt, 1983). Furthermore, even though dyads 
have accessed to rich medium of videoconferencing, the task-focused mode and problem solving 
orientation (Raiffa, 1982) provided by DSS support can help negotiators to focus attention away 
from the possible non-rational escalation of conflict as a result of very “personal” communication, 
in turn lead to more collaborative atmosphere.  
Hypothesis 7-5: Negotiators with extra DSS support (DSS + VC) will obtain higher level of 
perceived collaborative atmosphere than those with VC support only.   
7.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The experiment employed a 2x2 factorial design to investigate the impact of conflict level and 
degree of DSS support on negotiation outcomes. Subjects were recruited from students from a 
large university. Two separate rooms were used to simulate remote negotiation setting. In each 
room, PCs were equipped with headphone and web camera and installed the Microsoft’s 
NetMeeting software. A NSS prototype developed specifically for this experiment was made 
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available for subjects in NSS treatment groups. Figure 7-2 depicts the experimental design. The 
digit in each cell denotes the number of dyads in each treatment group. 
 
Figure 7-2. Experimental Design (Experiment 3) 
Subjects were recruited from students from National University of Singapore. Out of 102 people 
registered through an online registration system, 84 subjects had actually participated and formed 
42 negotiating dyads initially. However, only 35 dyads were used for final data analyses because 
3 dyads were found to collude among themselves based on chat log files and experiment 
instructor’s records. 4 dyads failed to reach agreements. 
7.2.1 Independent Variables 
Degree of NSS support was manipulated by the availability of a computer support tool to DSS 
treatment groups. Comparisons on negotiation outcomes between DSS-supported and non-
supported dyads indicate the effects of alternative evaluation and generation tools (featuring a 
specific DSS support technique). 
This DSS prototype used in this experiment (named as ProNeg) incorporated two components: 
alternative generator and alternative evaluator which have been described and used in earlier 
studies (e.g., Foroughui et al., 1995; Goh et al., 2000; Delaney et al., 1997). The alternative 
evaluator is to support alternative contract evaluation based on the preset preference scores of the 
negotiator (see Figure 7-3). It helps to calculate how a specific contract is beneficial to individual 
negotiator represented by the utility points. Users can plug in alternative contracts and this tool 













Degree of DSS Support 
VC only                      NSS (VC and DSS) 
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Figure 7-3. Alternative Evaluator - Score for the Alternative Evaluated  
The alternative generator is used to support alternative generation and possible concessions 
and/or solutions suggestions (see Figures 7-4). Based on the preset (one’s own) and estimated 
(the opponent’s) point structure of the negotiating dyads, it will calculate and generate hundreds 
of all possible contract alternatives. This tool hence facilitates decision making for the negotiators 










Figure 7-4. Alternative Generator - Three Contract Alternatives Generated 
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In both treatments, negotiators communicated through videoconferencing channel but the NSS 
treatment groups were additionally supported with ProNeg. Microsoft’s NetMeeting, a 
multimedia meeting system with text-chatting facility, audio/video channels and real-time file 
sharing capabilities, was the VC software used for all treatment groups. 
Conflict level was manipulated by pre-assigning different utility points to the four negotiating 
issues to dyads. The construction of negotiation task and point sheets was adapted from Jones’ 
study (1988), which involved negotiation between a seller (Simo Parts Distributor) and a buyer 
(Roberts Enterprise Inc.) over four issues - unit price, purchased quantity, time of first delivery 
and warranty period - for a purchase agreement for an engine sub-component called 
turbochargers (see Appendix A.2 for the public information for the negotiation task).  
In the low conflict treatment, the assigned weightages/utility points for negotiation issues were 
different. The buyer’s most important issue was quantity, followed by delivery time, whose utility 
points have been assigned 39 and 29 respectively. The two least important issues were warranty 
period and price. For the seller, price was the most important issue, followed by warranty period 
(corresponding points are 37 and 28). Delivery time and quantity were the least crucial issues. 
When the priorities of negotiators differ, the potential for mutually beneficial tradeoffs exist and 
integrative bargaining situation was created.  
In the high conflict treatments, negotiation issues for both buyer and seller were weighted 
similarly (i.e., pre-assigned approximately equal utility points). Price was given the most weight, 
followed by quantity; the two least important issues were delivery item and warranty period. In 
practice, the most important issues for the buyer were price and quantity, whose utility points are 
assigned 39 and 29 respectively. Similarly, points for the seller on these two issues were assigned 
35 and 29 as the seller’s most important issues as well. Hence there was little potential for them 
to logroll and the two parties were in high conflict of interests. This resulted in a zero-sum or 
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distributive bargaining situation where one party’s gains were almost equal to the other party’s 
losses (see Appendix A.3 for the private information for the negotiation task).  
The effects of age, gender and NSS experience were controlled through random assignment. Two 
experimenters, one for each of the two computational laboratories, used standardized instruction 
scripts to minimize experimenter bias. Before the experimental sessions, subjects were explicitly 
told that each of them would receive a small gift at the completion of the experiment and the best 
pair with the highest joint outcome would additionally receive $10 cash as incentive. 
7.2.2 Dependent Variables  
Consistent with previous empirical NSS studies and experimental studies in Chapter 5 and 6, 
multi-attribute utility techniques (Keeney and Raiffa, 1991) were used to measure dependent 
variables. The joint outcome of A and B was calculated as ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) + (Uxb + Uyb+ Uzb)). 
Contract balance was calculated as the absolute value of ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) - (Uxb + Uyb + Uzb)). 
Negotiation time was measured in minutes from the beginning of the negotiation until the dyads 
reached an agreement. Confidence with Solution and Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere are 
measured using a post-negotiation feedback questionnaire. Items are adapted from previous 
studies (Foroughi et al., 1995; Eliashberg et al., 1992; Lim, 2000) (see Appendix A.7). 
7.2.3 Negotiation Task 
This experiment task was adapted from Jones’ study (1988), which involves negotiation between 
a seller (Simo Parts Distributor.) and a buyer (Roberts Enterprise, Inc.) over four issues – unit 
price, purchased quantity, time of first delivery, and warranty period – for a purchase agreement 
for an engine sub-component called turbochargers.  
The background information (see Appendix A.2) further highlights to the subjects that due to the 
long geographic distance and to avoid unfavorable travel for both executives, the management 
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committees of the two companies had a prior discussion and jointly decided that they would use 
Microsoft NetMeeting to negotiate for the business deal. 
The low conflict nature was simulated by assigning different weightages for the issues, creating a 
bargaining situation in which mutually beneficial tradeoffs can be possible (see Appendix A.3). 
The high conflict was created by weighting the four issues similarly for the two negotiating 
parties resulting a distributive bargaining situation in which one party’s gain was nearly equal to 
the other one’s loss. A BATNA (an alternative offer from another company) was provided to both 
parties. This gave subjects a minimum point level to achieve in the negotiation. 
7.2.4 Experiment Procedure 
Two experiment facilitators, each in one room, administrated the standardized guidelines and 
instructions. Before the experimental session, subjects were explicitly told that they would 
receive extra cash on top of the basic participation rewards based on their negotiation 
performance. In the pre-negotiation stage, subjects were randomly assigned the role as buyer or 
seller. After receiving the general instruction, each subject was given sufficient time to read 
through experiment scenario for his respective company. Training on using Microsoft 
NetMeeting was conducted. Subjects next proceeded to read the confidential information of their 
negotiation task. After that, they were given to the point sheet and did an exercise of computing 
the utility score of an agreement to ensure they knew how to produce utility scores for contracts. 
For NSS treatment groups only, subjects were trained to use ProNeg. Subjects completed a pre-
negotiation questionnaire on personal information and a short quiz to make sure they understood 
their tasks. Both experimenters coordinated and announced the start of actual negotiation and 
recorded down the starting time. Upon settlement, subjects completed an agreement form. Both 
experimenters recorded the ending time. Dyads with the highest joint outcome in each 
experimental cell were then rewarded. 
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7.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Control checks in each treatment group were performed prior to hypotheses testing. ANOVA 
tests (on age, year of study, and experience) and Mann-Whitney U test (on gender) a showed no 
significant differences cross four different treatment groups.  
Reliability analysis on the only multi-item construct (confidence with solution) shows acceptable 
value (alpha= 0.825) in terms of construct reliability (Nunnally, 1978).  
ANOVA tests were conducted on the dependent variables (see Table 7-1). Statistical results show 
that conflict level and NSS support have main effects on joint outcome and perceived 
collaborative atmosphere; level of conflict has significant effect on joint outcome and contract 
balance. Significant interaction effects of the two independent variables were also found on joint 
outcome and negotiation time.  
Table 7-1. Summary of ANOVA Results  
Main Effects Dependent 
Variables 
Interaction Effect 
Level of Conflict Degree of NSS Support 
1. Joint Outcome YES (F=8.33, P=0.01**) F=126.56, P=0.00** F=6.61, P=0.02* 
2. Contract Balance NO (F=0.06, P=0.80) F=6.50, P=0.02* F=0.001, P=0.97 
3. Negotiation Time YES (F=7.63, P=0.01**) F=0.47, P=0.50 F=0.86, P=0.36 
4. Confidence with 
Solution 




NO (F=0.65, P=0.48) F=0.91, P=0.42 F=6.27, P=0.04* 
(* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01) 
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Table 7-2. Summary of Results on Hypotheses Testing (Experiment 3) 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Dependent 
Variables  
Conflict 






(4.55) H7-1: VC Only < NSS  .02* 
Joint Outcome 
High 101.80 (1.23) 
101.22 
(1.86)           VC Only = NSS .43 
Low 
9.63 
(5.97)    
10.13 
(5.64) H7-2: VC Only > NSS  .87 
Contract Balance 
High 7.39 (4.43) 
4.68 





(14.76) H7-3: VC Only < NSS  .02* 
Negotiation Time 
High 30.70 (16.03) 
22.67 














(0.99) H7-5: VC Only < NSS .04* 
(* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01) 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
7.4.1 Joint Outcome 
Conflict level shows significant moderating effect for DSS impact on joint outcome as we 
hypothesized (H7-1) (Proposition 1 and 4). An important result obtained here is that for low 
conflict task, we confirmed that DSS can help physically dispersed dyads to improve joint 
outcome significantly. As predicted by earlier NSS research (Anson and Jelassi 1990, Jelassi and 
Jones 1988), computer support helped subjects overcome the cognitive difficulty of these tasks, 
the tendency towards premature closure, and the preference for more available and more salient 
solutions, thus helping them achieve better joint outcomes than dyads who only had VC support 
(Foroughui et al. 1995). Without DSS support, subjects tended to satisfise rather than optimize 
(March and Simon, 1958) – they stopped negotiating when a satisfactory solution had been 
reached. This is because they did not know precisely each other’s utility function and might not 
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even be explicitly aware of their own utility function. Therefore, they simply can not easily 
determine if one alternative is better than another one due to the problem complexity for the 
negotiation task and cognitive limitations associated with human. Additional information and 
processing capabilities provided by DSS as decision aids had the effect of raising the negotiators’ 
expectations and hence resulted in further exploration for mutual gains.  
In high conflict settings, DSS+VC and VC dyads achieved comparable joint outcomes. Similar to 
research findings obtained in early studies (Jones 1988, Goh et al. 2000) when conflict level is 
high, there were no significant differences in negotiation outcomes found in our result between 
DSS+VC supported and VC supported dyads. This result underlines the important moderating 
effect of conflict level on the effectiveness of NSS. Arguably, compared to the general proven 
effectiveness of NSS, the seemingly indifferent effect of DSS in high conflict setting suggests 
that DSS does pay off where potential joint benefits are moderately possible. However, when 
negotiating parties are already in direct conflict towards issues of interests, i.e., there is little room 
for negotiators to potentially cooperate and all or most feasible alternatives are near-efficient, the 
additional decision support tool does not make significant difference to improve joint outcome for 
the dyads, as shown in our result.  
7.4.2 Contract Balance 
The results indicate that contract balance is comparable between DSS+VC and VC dyads in both 
conflict levels. Contrary to our hypothesis (H7-2) (Proposition 1 and 4), dyads with DSS+VC 
support did not achieve lower contract balance (higher balanced contract) than VC dyads in low 
conflict setting. This result is consistent with some studies (Jones 1988, Goh et al. 2000) but not 
as in (Foroughui et al. 1995). It can be explained that such result was due to the fact that a 
bargainer often accepted a settlement in which the partner had many more points than he did, 
since he didn’t know exactly what his bargaining partner’s points were (Jones, 1988). Possible 
explanation can also be found in the design of the negotiation support tool used in this study. The 
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DSS tools explicitly encouraged subjects to achieve the highest joint outcomes. The alternative 
evaluator helped subjects to estimate the opponents’ point structures, and the alternative 
generator gave optimal solutions in terms of the three best optimal joint outcomes. Hence 
contract balances (fairness of outcome) were neither emphasized nor not highlighted through the 
course of experiment. 
7.4.3 Time to Settlement 
Significant interaction effect between conflict level and DSS support was detected for negotiation 
time. Results indicate that negotiation time was greater for DSS+VC dyads than VC dyads in low 
conflict setting than that in high conflict setting, instead of shorter as hypothesized by Lim and 
Benbasat (1993). This might be explained by relative unfamiliarity of the subjects with the 
computer support system (Foroughui et al. 1995, Delaney et al. 1997). The significant increase in 
time for low conflict negotiation also suggests that in situations where integrative solutions were 
possible, negotiating parties considered their options more thoroughly to achieve more efficient 
and fairer settlements (Goh et al. 2000). DSS, in this case, encourage dyads to explore further 
negotiation with their opponents. Conceivably, ongoing use of the NSS should tend to reduce 
negotiation time (Delaney et al. 1997). This is to be confirmed by future studies in which 
negotiators are to be pre-trained and ensured familiar with the use of negotiation support tool and 
compared against those who those use NSS for very first time. In high conflict setting, 
negotiation time was shorter for NSS dyads than VC dyads. This suggests that in situations where 
negotiators were in direct conflict of interests, subjects did not intend to consider their options as 
thoroughly as in low conflict setting where mutual gains were possible, to seek for more efficient 
and fairer settlements. Future study is needed to further explore the important moderating role of 
conflict level for NSS impact on negotiation time. 
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7.4.4 Confidence with Solution 
In contrary to our hypothesis 7-4 (Proposition 1), DSS+VC dyads did not report significantly 
higher level of confidence with solution than VC dyads. As suggested in literature review, DSS 
did not lead to significant differences in satisfaction levels between the groups (Delaney et al., 
1997; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). In Section 4.3.1.1.3, we argued that compared to satisfaction, 
confidence with solution (Lim and Benbasat, 1993) would be a better surrogate to assess the 
psychological effect due to DSS support. Our data, however, did not provide evidence for this 
hypothesis. According to Stake and Rangaswamy (2000)’s review of NSS experimental studies, it 
is analyzed that subjects who have attain (indeed) higher outcomes do not necessarily know that 
they have done better, and hence reported that they were neither more, or less, satisfied with the 
settlement than those who (indeed) obtained lower outcomes. It could be the same case for the 
reported level of confidence with solution. As far as measurement issues are concerned, post-
negotiation questionnaire may be ineffective to capture the psychological state that reflects the 
process-related confidence. It is thus a challenging, yet important task, for future research to 
undergo more ways to measure the level of confidence gained by using DSS technologies for 
negotiation tasks. 
7.4.5 Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere  
Hypothesis 7-5 asserting DSS will positively enhance negotiators’ perceptions towards 
collaborative atmosphere is supported by our data (Proposition 1). Further analysis on different 
conflict settings suggest that the DSS significantly improve Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 
in high conflict level (p=0.03) but not in low conflict level settings (p=0.38). When negotiators’ 
interests are similar, i.e., conflict level is high, one party’s gain is largely on the other’s loss. In 
such situations, unsupported negotiating dyads will behave in distributed manner and perceive 
each other less friendly and collaborative. DSS, however, can help negotiators to be focused in 
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task and minimize the percentage of direct interactions through social channels which reduce 
further escalation of conflict. Such effects may not be observed in low conflict setting where 
negotiators have room to trade for mutual benefits. Hence, DSS will be particularly useful to 
improve negotiators’ relationships in distributive bargaining by lowering the amount of conflict 
perceived by negotiators.  
7.5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
This study was conducted to investigate whether remote negotiation realized by a 
videoconferencing environment alone could be as effective as those additionally supported by 
DSS, for two levels of conflict. The distinctive contribution of this present study is twofold. First, 
it is noted that most of the past researchers did not evaluate the effects of the DSS and the 
electronic communication separately; this study examined a full NSS and proceeded to sort out 
the individual effects of the two components following suggestion in (Delaney et al. 1997). As 
well, the electronic communication component engaged in this study was more advanced and 
enriched with multiple communication features: audio, video, and electronic messaging. Second, 
resulting from the use of videoconferencing, negotiating dyads were physically separated and 
hence a remote negotiation setting was created in this study to simulate a negotiation activity for 
physically dispersed dyads. This added to the knowledge of empirical NSS research where studies 
on remote negotiation are relatively rare.  
The current study has the following limitations in terms of the generalizability of the results. 
Student subjects are used in a laboratory setting, under the assumption that their bargaining 
behavior with and without computer support would provide insights into the usefulness of NSS in 
actual organizational settings. Although student subjects have been found to be acceptable 
surrogates for organizational decision makers (Gallupe 1985), the research methodology of 
laboratory experimentation and use of student subjects may connote with reduced realism vis-à-
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vis real-world negotiations. A small sample may also limit the generalizability of the results. In 
addition, similar to recent research, this study adapted the negotiation task developed in Jones’ 
(1988) work. The negotiation case used in this study assumed the willingness of the negotiators to 
share information with each other about their preferences for the issues, a situation which does 
not always occur in real-life negotiations. Hence this well-structured and fixed negotiation task 
may not fully reflect the complex nature of negotiation problems of the real world. Nevertheless, 
our analyses on the impact of DSS over social-psychological attitudes, negotiators’ confidence 
with solution and perceived collaborative atmosphere, have been preliminary in this study. The 
next study will incorporate an in-depth instrument development process and more attitudinal 
measures to capture the effects of ENS on negotiation processes. In summary, although we have 
shown the DSS technology can generally enhance mutual benefits of negotiators for low conflict 
negotiation tasks, the findings are limited due to its size, sample and task. Hence, generalization 
of the findings to more complex, unstructured negotiation task involving business negotiators 
should be cautioned.  
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8 CHAPTER 8 EFFECTS OF AUTOMATED NEGOTIATION 
SUPPORT AND CONFLICT LEVEL INVOLVING 
INTELLIGENT AGENTS42 (CATEGORY I, II AND III SYSTEMS) 
In terms of the extent to which computerized negotiation support tool can imitate human 
negotiation behaviors, ENS can be categorized by the intelligence level of the agents (as defined 
in Section 4.1.4.3). It is conceivable that different levels of e-Negotiation systems in terms of 
agent intelligence may result in different extents to which human negotiators interact with the 
systems and the outcomes will vary accordingly. At the same time, empirical studies have shown 
that the effectiveness of NSS is likely to be moderated by level of conflict between the 
negotiation parties (Foroughi et al., 1995; Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997; Goh et al., 2000). The 
initial conflict of interests displays basic characteristics of the negotiation scenario which would 
likely impact the bargaining orientations and negotiators’ attitudes. This study attempts to 
investigate the joint impact of the intelligence level of NSS and the level of conflict on 
negotiation outcomes and perceptions towards the system, seeking answers to the following 
research questions:  
(1) How will system intelligence levels influence the negotiation outcomes measured from both 
economic and psychological perspectives? How will the level of conflict moderate the above 
relationship?  
(2) How will system intelligence levels affect users’ perceived control and anxiety towards the 
system?  
                                                     
42
 This research project takes place during years 2004 to 2006 with contributions from other collaborators. 
A preliminary work was presented at Group Decision and Negotiation 2005, Vienna, Austria, 10-13 July 
2005 (Yang et al., 2005). Major part of the research was presented at the International Conference of 
Human-Computer Interaction 2007, Beijing, China, July 22-27, 2007 (Yang et al., 2007a) and 16th 
Workshop on Information Technology and Systems: WITS06, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States, 9-10 
December, 2006 (Yang et al., 2006). This chapter reports details of this research. 
 Chapter 8   Effects of Automated Negotiation Agents and Conflict Level 
168 
8.1 THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
8.1.1 The Research Model 
Our research model posits that intelligence level of NSS and level of conflict have joint impacts 
on negotiation outcomes, assessed in terms of joint outcome, contract balance, and negotiation 
time, as well as on perceived collaborative atmosphere and satisfaction. The former set of 
variables reflects the economic outcomes of negotiation outcomes while the latter measure the 
social-psychological outcomes that assess the possibility of win-win situation and future business 
relationship. Apart from outcomes associated with negotiations, the model also examines the 
main effects of the types of NSS on users’ specific perceptions towards using the system. Figure 
8-1 depicts the research model. 
 
Figure 8-1. The Research Model 
To simulate Internet-based negotiations, the research model is examined at electronic negotiation 
settings where all negotiation parties communicate through a default text-based messaging 
facility when no face-to-face communication is available. 




1. Joint Outcome  
2. Contract Balance 
3. Negotiation Time 
 
Social-psychological outcomes: 
4. Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 
5. Satisfaction  
 
System-specific perceptions: 
6. Perceived Control towards System 
7. Anxiety towards System 
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8.1.2 Hypotheses 
8.1.2.1 Joint Outcome and Contract Balance 
Among the three, the Level-3 system is virtually designed with the most powerful decision-
making support capabilities. For Level-1 system, negotiators have to communicate with each 
other and reach agreement with decision aids (alternative generator) which is based on 
negotiators’ estimation on their opponents’ preferences. As human negotiators have inherent 
socio-emotional bias that will result in communication inefficiency and cognitive barriers that 
hinder them from objective judgment (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; Fishchhoff, 1981; Lewicki 
and Litterer, 1985), certain risks in reaching optimal agreements are still faced by negotiations 
using Level-1 system. Furthermore, erroneous predictions about opponent’s preference 
information can result in poorer outcomes (Faratin et al., 2000).  Level-3 system, however, 
engage sophisticated agent’s estimation on opponent’s issue priorities and its high processing 
power help to promote holistic considerations of all the issues, focusing on trade-offs rather than 
zero-sum situations. In line with Proposition 3, it is hypothesized that Level-3 system will lead to 
higher joint outcomes than Level-1 system. However, in the high-conflict situation, studies 
demonstrate comparable joint outcomes for computer-supported and no-computer-supported 
dyads (Jones, 1988). In other words, negotiators with NSS support are not particularly useful in 
distributive negotiation as negotiators tend to “split the difference” in arriving at reasonably 
efficient settlements using satisfising strategies (Goh et al., 2000). 
Hypothesis 8-1a: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will achieve a higher joint outcome than those with the decision-
support focused NSS (Level-1 system) in the low-conflict situation but not in the high-conflict 
situation.  
The Level-2 system, which implements a self-interested agent, has powerful processing capability 
in searching the negotiation space without engaging human negotiators’ inputs and cognitive 
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effort. Although it has advantages in reducing users’ cognitive load, without learning capability 
and adequate information about opponents’ preferences, Level-2 system will obtain solutions that 
are optimal under its “internal” models that may depart from those truly superior settlements for 
the opponents. The Level-3 system allows negotiators to provide estimations about opponents’ 
preferences and cross-references its own estimation from the learning components, can better 
reflect opponents’ preference structure. The joint outcome, as a sum of self and opponent’s utility 
scores, is expected to be improved for Level-3 system compared to Level-2 system (in line with 
Proposition 3). 
Hypothesis 8-1b: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will achieve a higher joint outcome than those with the fully 
autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system) in the low-conflict situation but not in the high-
conflict situation.  
Similar to the analysis for joint outcome, the Level-3 system has the most powerful decision 
support capabilities among the three (Proposition 3). Furthermore, due to its learning capability 
and personality features, it takes into account of the preference information of the opponent and 
more truthfully take care of opponents’ preference in reaching settlements. Thus the Level-3 
system is expected to result in the fairest agreement among the three. When conflict level is high, 
in similar logic of system effects on joint outcomes, the effects of different level of systems may 
not be manifested in terms of improvement of contract balances (Goh et al., 2000) (suggested by 
Proposition 4). 
Hypothesis 8-2a: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will achieve more equal settlements (in terms of smaller contract 
balances) than those with the decision-support focused NSS (Level-1 system) in the low-conflict 
situation but not in the high-conflict situation.  
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Hypothesis 8-2b: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will achieve more equal settlements (in terms of smaller contract 
balances) than those with the fully autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system) in the low-
conflict situation but not in the high-conflict situation.  
8.1.2.2 Time to Settlement 
In the low-conflict negotiation context, mutually beneficial trade-offs are possible since 
negotiation parties have different ratings for each of the issues. Thus, there is bigger room for 
negotiation agreement to be settled. In such situations, negotiators using any of the three systems 
can relatively easily reach agreements with their opponents. The negotiation time mainly depends 
on the sophistication of different technologies. Based on Dennis et al.’s (1988) and Foroughi et 
al.’s (1995) studies, the use of technology generally tends to extend decision time. Since the 
Level-1 system adopts less sophisticated technology than the other two, which employ artificial 
intelligence techniques, it is expected to result in shortest negotiation time. Moreover, 
incremental learning from other agent’s proposals can speed up negotiation process (Soo and 
Hung, 2002). Hence, the Level-3 system with learning capabilities is expected to result in shorter 
negotiation time than the Level-2 system (Proposition 3). 
Hypothesis 8-3a: In the low-conflict situation, negotiators with the negotiation agents with 
personality and learning capabilities (Level-3 system) will take more time than those with the 
decision-support focused NSS (Level-1 system) in reaching an agreement.  
Hypothesis 8-3b: In the low-conflict situation, negotiators with the negotiation agents with 
personality and learning capabilities (Level-3 system) will take less time than those with the fully 
autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system) in reaching an agreement.  
However, in the high negotiation context, one party’s gain is nearly equal to the other one’s loss. 
Thus, it is highly unlikely for the other party to accept proposals that maximize one party’s utility 
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points. Hence, human negotiators with the Level-1 system need to undergo many rounds of offers 
or counteroffers to reach an agreement, where a great amount of time is spent in considering 
whether or not to accept opponent’s offers or waiting for the opponents’ decisions. According to 
Goh et al.’s (2000) study, electronic bargaining agents have the potential to save human 
negotiators’ time as they are able to make decisions promptly based on the built-in decision 
functions. Soo and Hung (2002) demonstrate that agent’s incremental learning capabilities can 
even shorten the negotiation time. Therefore, agent-based NSS are hypothesized to result in less 
negotiation time than non-agent-based NSS, and agent-based NSS with learning capabilities are 
hypothesized to result in even less negotiation time than agent-based NSS without learning 
capabilities.  
Hypothesis 8-3c: In the high-conflict situation, negotiators with the negotiation agents with 
personality and learning capabilities (Level-3 system) will take less time than those with the 
decision-support focused NSS (Level-1 system) in reaching an agreement.  
Hypothesis 8-3d: In the high-conflict situation, negotiators with the negotiation agents with 
personality and learning capabilities (Level-3 system) will take less time than those with the fully 
autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system) in reaching an agreement.  
8.1.2.3 Satisfaction with Settlement 
Satisfaction with the settlement reflects the subjective feeling towards the negotiated agreement 
contract. Recent empirical research has shown that negotiations with NSS generally yield greater 
satisfaction than those without. The increase in satisfaction is not mainly due to the DSS portion 
of NSS, but also the electronic communication component. Lim and Benbasat (1993) assert that 
satisfaction will be higher for negotiators provided with full communication (task-oriented) and 
decision support than for dyads provided only with decision support.  
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Nevertheless, there are no theoretical arguments that we can directly relate to the effects of 
alternate designs involving DSS and agent technologies on negotiators’ satisfaction. Assuming 
that rational negotiators would feel satisfied with the contract if they believe that efficient and/or 
fair agreements have been reached, satisfaction can be assessed from the two dimensions of 
perception: perceived efficiency (confidence with solution) and perceived fairness. As argued 
earlier, Level-3 systems integrate most sophisticated support technologies which are predicted to 
result in better efficiency and fairness for negotiation dyads. Negotiators using Level-3 systems 
will tend to be more satisfied as they have confidences in reach efficient and fair solutions. Thus, 
we put forth 
Hypothesis 8-4a: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will be more satisfied than those the decision-support focused NSS 
(Level-1 system).  
Hypothesis 8-4b: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will be more satisfied than those with the fully autonomous 
negotiation agents (Level-2 system).  
8.1.2.4 Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere  
In the low-conflict situation, negotiators may have different preferences for the issues and mutual 
benefits are potentially available; there will be a minimum of non-rational escalation of conflict 
(Lewicki and Litterer, 1985) and negotiators will be able to sense the atmosphere in the course of 
negotiation more collaborative than competitive. In such situations, the intelligence level of NSS 
is expected to have comparable effect on Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere.  
However, in the high-conflict negotiation context, negotiators’ preferences for the issues are 
weighted similarly, and thus one party’s gain is nearly equal to the other one’s loss. Negotiators 
will sense the atmosphere in the course of negotiation more competitive than collaborative. 
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Electronic communication component of NSS is believed to help focus negotiators’ attention on 
the content of the negotiation instead of any personal conflicts (Lim and Banbasat, 1993; 
Foroughi et al., 1995). As agent-based NSS (i.e., the Level-2 and Level-3 systems) employs 
agents to autonomously communicate with the opponents in terms of offers and counter-offers, 
less personal conflicts will be manifested than non-agent-based NSS (i.e., the Level-1 system). In 
other words, agent-based NSS and non-agent-based NSS differ in terms of the degree of process 
automation which supersedes negotiators’ communication process. These differences are 
expected to escalate when negotiators face high level of conflict of interests. According to Starke 
and Rangaswamy (2000), agents can help people who are uncomfortable with “haggling with 
another person” to negotiate better. By decreasing the chance of conflicting interaction with the 
opponents (which is very likely to happen when negotiators’ preferences for the negotiation 
issues are pitted directly against each other), conflict is deescalated and the competitive 
atmosphere is depersonalized further. 
Hypothesis 8-5a: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will perceive greater collaborative atmosphere than those the 
decision-support focused NSS (Level-1 system) in the high-conflict situation but not in the low-
conflict situation.  
Hypothesis 8-5b: Negotiators with the fully autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system) will 
perceive greater collaborative atmosphere than those with the decision-support focused 
negotiation agents (Level-1 system) in the high-conflict situation but not in the low-conflict 
situation.  
8.1.2.5 Perceived Control 
We examine users’ perceived control over the NSS depends on their perception or belief about 
the three dimensions of control, namely behavioral control, decision control and cognitive control 
(Frese, 1987). If trainings are provided for understanding the functionality of all the three types of 
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system, cognitive control may not vary significantly from one another. Hence, perceived control 
may mainly differ in the aspect of decision making and action taking. 
The classical conflict resolution concepts are good candidate to make analogy to explain the 
“notion” of control in negotiation process. As discussed in Section 2.3.3.3, negotiators may 
surrender control over the dispute process and the dispute outcome and the levels of control 
surrender create four forms of third-party interventions for conflict resolution (Sheppard, 1984).  
Level-1 system which employs traditional DSS support approach assumes the role of “facilitator” 
for negotiations; the negotiators still have high level of control in the conduct of negotiations.  
NSS with decision support focus on mainly providing supplementary analytical tools. They still 
require human negotiators to make decision and take the action to negotiate with opponents 
(decision and behavioral control). Conversely, Level-3 system which is a fully autonomous agent 
assumes a role similar to “arbitrator” would constitute an extreme case of a change in the locus of 
control from humans to computer agents (Rangaswamy and Shell, 1997). Agent-based NSS 
without personality on behalf of the human users take over the control on both action taking and 
decision making. Thus, Level-1 and Level-2 systems are presenting two extreme cases in terms of 
control of the course of negotiations. Level-3 system which incorporates additional features of 
personalization and learning stands in between, as users can plug in their preferences and adjust 
agent’s negotiation strategy in any time during the negotiation process (behavioral control). 
Hypothesis 8-6a:  Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will result in lower perceived control than those with the decision-
support focused NSS (Level-1 system).  
Hypothesis 8-6b: Negotiators with the negotiation agents with personality and learning 
capabilities (Level-3 system) will result in higher perceived control than those with the fully 
autonomous negotiation agents (Level-2 system). 
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8.1.2.6 System Anxiety 
Computer anxiety is the product of combinations of psychological variables such as neuroticism 
and locus of control (Marakas et al., 2000). Locus of control has been regarded as one salient 
correlate of computer anxiety in the literature (e.g., Crable et al., 1994). System anxiety which is 
considered as the anxiety associated with the particular use of a system comes under the umbrella 
of computer anxiety. Therefore, most literature of the latter is relevant to the former. We 
hypothesize users with higher perceived control are expected to experience lower anxiety towards 
using the system. 
Hypothesis 8-7: The level of system anxiety is negatively related to the level of perceived control 
of the system. 
8.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
An experiment with a 3x2 random factorial design was conducted. First, pilot study that involves 
8 subjects was conducted one week before the actual experiment. Experimental procedures were 
smoothened, system interfaces were modified and questionnaire instruments were finalized, 
according to the constructive feedback gathered in the pilot study. All negotiation sessions were 
conducted online where buyer and seller were seated in different locations. The three web-based 
system prototypes are developed which enable simulation of e-Negotiations activities across 
geographical span when it is infeasible for business partners to travel for face-to-face negotiation.  
For the actual experiment, we have recruited a total of 130 subjects who are pursuing 
undergraduate and postgraduate studies at a large university. They are randomly assigned as the 
role of buyer and seller. Each pair is then randomly assigned to different treatment groups. Due to 
the absences of some subjects, the final data set used for statistical analysis come from a total of 
112 subjects (56 pairs) who have completed the entire experiment for valid data analysis. 
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To motivate participations, subjects received appreciation gifts for their participation. Cash 
voucher worth of S$200 was announced to award the pair who would obtain highest joint 
outcome. Figure 8-2 depicts the experimental design, with the number of dyads contained in each 
of the treatment cells. 
 System Intelligence Level 
          Level-1         Level-2         Level-3 











High 10 8 10 
Figure 8-2. Experimental Design (Experiment 4) 
8.2.1 Independent Variables 
The system intelligence level was manipulated using three web-based ENS distinguished in 
agent intelligence. The other related functions are made identical for all the three systems – 
preparation functions in pre-negotiation phase (rate issues, input point structure, specify bottom 
line), a text messaging tool and an agreement screen – to remove confounding effects from 
system artifacts. The Level-2 and the Level-3 agent-based NSS adopted concession-based 
patterns in terms of negotiation strategies. The Level-3 system that integrates decision support as 
well as agent-based technologies with personalized features is of particular theoretical interests 
for examinations. Effects of additional autonomous features are examined when the differences 
between Level-3 and Level-1 system are compared along each dependent variable. Effects of 
additional personalized and learning features are examined when differences between Level-3 
and Level-2 systems are compared for each dependent variable. The differences between Level-1 
and Level-2 are compared in post-hoc manner. 
The Level-1 system (see Figure 8-3) incorporates an alternative evaluator and an alternative 
generator that necessitate typical NSS functions used in previous empirical studies (Delaney et al. 
1997; Foroughi et al. 1995; Goh et al. 2000). The system captures negotiator’s own issue 
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preferences and utility structure in the pre-negotiation phase; the alternative evaluator component 
calculates the utility point achieved for a particular contract; the alternative generator component 
computes the best three optimal agreements with the highest joint outcome and lowest contract 
balance, by allowing user to input his/her estimation on the opponent’s issue rating. The text-
messaging tool facilitates online communication and the exchange of offers. Contract-related 
buttons including “Propose”, “Reject” and “Accept” are integrated into the text messaging tool, to 
ease the effort of keying in the details of every single contract or decisions on opponents’ offers 
from time to time. It serves as a baseline system. 
 
Figure 8-3. Main Page of the Level-1 System 
The Level-2 system (see Figure 8-4) implements a self-interested agent with concession-based 
negotiation tactic. The agent was programmed to first propose the highest self utility points (100) 
and then concede bit by bit based on user’s pre-specified utility point structure in the pre-
negotiation phase. The buyer and seller agents will take turn to make proposal until one party 
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would accept the other’s offer. The proposal history window that reflects the agent’s negotiation 
process is available. 
 
Figure 8-4. Main Page of the Level-2 System 
The Level-3 system (see Figure 8-5) implements a sophisticated agent with personality features 
and learning capability and an alternative evaluator. The latter function is similar to the one in 
type I system. Personality features were realized through functions providing choice between the 
two negotiation tactics - Soft Concession/Conceder and Tough Concession/Boulware43 (Faratin et 
al., 1998; Lopes et al., 2001) – so that negotiators are able to adjust the style they want to 
approach the bargaining process, conceding by either faster (soft) or slower (soft). Additionally, 
the system has an agent’s estimation function based on the idea of Bayesian Theorem, through 
                                                     
43
 The Boulware strategy is named after Lemuel Boulware (1895-1990), a former vice president of General 
Electric. When faced with a strike, Boulware became famous for telling the International Union of 
Electrical Workers (IUE) at the onset of negotiations that the company had already evaluated the workers' 
needs and was putting forth its "first, last and best offer" on the table. The Labor Unions bitterly fount these 
positions and continued to resent them years after the companies abandoned this strategy (Northrup, 1964; 
Selekman et al., 1958). In negotiation, a Boulwarism is an offer or counter-offer that is not meant to be 
negotiated, denoting a very “tough” attitude in negotiations. 
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negotiation history study and probability analysis. After more than 50 encounters with the 
negotiation opponents, the agent can “learn” from the behaviors of its opponents and was able to 
provide estimations on opponents’ issue priorities 44 . While the agent was automatically 
negotiating, the user was able to modify their estimation on opponents’ issue ratings during the 
process; the agent’s belief can be updated and adjusted to reflect how the user’s belief on tactics 
appropriated for the subsequent negotiation. 
 
Figure 8-5. Main Page of the Level-3 System 
The other independent variable conflict level was manipulated by assigning weightage points to 
each of the negotiation issues. Keeney and Raiffa (1991) suggest that the weightage points 
assigned in the preparation session of negotiation reflect negotiator’s preference for a particular 
issue.  The total weightage points reflect the tradeoff values between various issues as well as 
between the various values for each issue; they sum up to 100. In line with Jones (1988) study, 
                                                     
44
  Faratin et al. (2000) regard this as partial information, and they have proved that there is no significant 
difference between negotiation outcomes achieved by using partial information or perfect information (i.e., 
the exact issue ratings. 
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low-conflict treatment was simulated by assigning different weightages for the issues whereas 
high-conflict treatment was manipulated such that issues for both parities were weighted similarly. 
For illustration, a low-conflict situation was where buyers concerned purchased quantity and 
delivery time, with weightage points 39 and 29 respectively; while sellers cared about the other 
two issues, i.e., unit price and warranty period, with weightage points 37 and 28 accordingly. On 
the contrary, in a high-conflict treatment, both buyers and sellers focused on unit price and 
purchased quantity, with weightage points 39 and 29 for buyers and 35 and 29 for sellers (see 
Appendix A.3). 
All other pertinent variables not studied in this study were randomized or kept consistent to 
ensure adequate control and internal validity. Effects of age, gender and past experience were 
controlled through random assignment. Two experimenters, one for each of the two 
computational laboratories, used standardized instruction scripts to minimize experimenter bias. 
Before the experimental sessions, subjects were explicitly told that each of them would receive a 
small gift at the completion of the experiment and the best pair with the highest joint outcome and 
lowest contract balance would additionally receive $200 cash-equivalent shopping vouchers. 
8.2.2 Dependent Variables  
According to Keeney and Raiffa’s (1991) weightage point method, the joint outcome of a 
negotiation dyad was calculated as the sum of each party’s total weightage points whereas the 
contract balance was the absolute difference between the two parties’ weightage points for the 
final agreement.  Consistent with the literature and our previous studies, the joint outcome of A 
and B for the final agreement was ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) + (Uxb + Uyb+ Uzb)) and the contract balance 
between them was | ((Uxa + Uya + Uza) - (Uxb + Uyb+ Uzb)) |. Negotiation time was measured in 
minutes. It was calculated by the system server automatically, as the time when dyads start the 
negotiation process and when they reach the final agreements were recorded by the systems. A 
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post-negotiation attitude questionnaire was administered to subjects in all treatment groups (see 
Appendix A.7).  
Perceived collaborative atmosphere and satisfaction with settlements were assessed by a post-
negotiation questionnaire. Subjects’ perceptions towards efficiency and fairness formed up two 
dimensions towards satisfaction with settlement. Questionnaire items on were adapted from 
previous NSS studies (Eliashberg et al., 1992; Lim, 2000; Foroughi et al., 1995). 
Based on Morris and Marshall’s (2004) work to measure perceived control towards IS using a 55-
item questionnaire derived from the literature and experts’ input, we develop the measurement of 
perceived control towards NSS by breaking the construct down into three dimensions 
compromising cognitive control, behavioral control, and decisional control. Cognitive control 
was addressed by the internal factors such as knowledge which is specific to the understanding of 
how the system (ProNeg) works. Decisional control was addressed by factors that deal with the 
ability to set expected outcome and make decisions about the strategy and sequence. Behavioral 
control was addressed through the factors that deal with strategic choosing and task approach 
towards the usage of ProNeg. System anxiety is the specific anxiety associated with the use of 
the NSS. We adapted the items for an email system anxiety measurement (Brown et al. 2004) to 
the system of our interest, i.e., the ProNeg e-Negotiation systems. 
8.2.3 Negotiation Task 
The experimental task, consistent with Experiment 3, was adapted from Jones’ study (1988), As 
described in the background information (see Appendix A.2), due to the long geographic distance 
and the inconvenient timing for the managers to travel, the management committees of the two 
companies had a prior discussion and jointly decided that they would use a web-based 
Negotiation Support System that is offered by a neutral third party to negotiate for a deal.  
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8.2.4 Experiment Procedure 
In the pre-negotiation preparation phase, subjects were briefed about the experiment 
procedures and were reminded that they have a chance to win a $200 cash voucher (Appendix 
A.1). They were then asked to read the background information of the negotiation case (Appendix 
A.2); at the same time, the experimenters randomly assigned each subject to the role of buyer or 
seller. This assignment in turn determined their seating locations in different laboratories to 
simulate remote negotiation. Once reaching their respective decision rooms, subjects were asked 
to read the confidential information sheet on point structure and bottom line for their own 
company, as well as to do a simple exercise to ensure they understood the task (Appendix A.3). 
Depending on different treatment groups, subjects were trained on how to use the ProNeg system 
with user manuals (Appendix A.4) and short Q&A session was conducted. Subjects were asked to 
fill in a pre-negotiation questionnaire on past experiences and computer self-efficacy (Appendix 
A.5). Subjects were provided a distinguished login ID (adjacent ID numbers pair up two subjects) 
randomly to access the web-based ProNeg system.  
Subjects were asked to log into the ProNeg system and start actual negotiation. No time limit 
was set for reaching agreements. 
In the post-negotiation phase, upon settlement, subjects were asked to record down their final 
agreement (Appendix A.6). Subjects filled in a post-negotiation questionnaire assessing perceived 
control, system anxiety, as well as demographic information (Appendix A.7). Before leaving, 
subjects received small gifts and were debriefed. Throughout the experiment process, 
standardized scripts were used. 
8.3 DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
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The SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) for Windows Release 15.0 was used to perform 
statistical analysis on the experimental results. Prior to statistical testing, control checks on age, 
gender and past experiences were performed to check the effectiveness of random assignment. 
Then reliability and construct validity were examined to ensure questionnaire items reflected for 
the constructs they were intended. Descriptive statistics for each of the six dependent variables 
were presented in line with the experimental design. Proposed main effects and interaction effects 
were tested using MANOVA whereas hypotheses testing was performed using One-way ANOVA 
with planned comparisons.  
8.3.1 Control and Reliability Tests 
Prior to validation checks, demographic information is analyzed. The average age of subjects was 
23.0 years and 67.9% were males. All subjects had experiences with group work. The subjects 
have relatively high computer efficacy (5.13 out of 7) and computer use experience (4.56 out of 
5); they have been moderately exposed to business decisions (2.33 out of 5).  
To examine the internal validity, validation tests for controlled variables were performed to 
examine the effectiveness of random assignment. Two-way ANOVA tests on age, past 
experiences (of group work, computer usage, business decisions and NSS usage), and computer 
efficacy and Mann-Whitney U and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests on gender showed that subjects 
under different treatments did not differ significantly. However, the age of subjects differed 
across different conflict level (p=0.01), further data analyses hence employed age of subjects as 
covariate to examine the potential impact of age on the dependent variables (Neter et al. 1990).  
The results indicated that effects of these variables are adequately controlled (details for control 
check are presented in Appendix B.1).  
To assess construct validity and reliability of subjective data collected via post-negotiation 
questionnaire, factor analysis and reliability tests were performed on items intended for 
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satisfaction with settlement, perceived collaborative atmosphere, perceived control and system 
anxiety (see Appendix B.2). Exploratory factor analysis on items intended for satisfaction with 
settlement, perceived collaborative atmosphere, perceived control and system anxiety showed that 
PC_CC_3 and PC_CC_4 from perceived control and SA_3 from system anxiety did not satisfy 
the discriminant and convergent criteria; they were dropped for subsequent analysis45.  
Next, confirmatory factor analysis was performed extracting five factors from the final set of 
items. The results show satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity where the factor 
loadings for the intended constructs were greater than the commonly accepted threshold of 0.546 
(Hair et al., 1995). Finally, reliability analysis was conducted and the results show acceptable 
results on satisfaction with settlement (alpha =0.920), perceived collaborative atmosphere (alpha 
=0.792), perceived control (alpha =0.919) and system anxiety (alpha = 0.822), according to 
Nunnally’s (1978) suggestion that Cronbach’s alpha of at least 0.7 would indicate that a construct 
had sufficient reliability. Hence with the assurance of reliability and construct validity, we 
proceed to use the items obtained in Table B-10 (Appendix B.2) for subsequent inferential test.  
                                                     
45
 This is supported by a careful reflection and theoretical examination. For PC_CC_3 and PC_CC_4, the 
two items were intended to measure users’ perception of similarity comparing ProNeg with other systems, 
which may not be well related to users’ perception in terms of cognitive control. Unlike other applications 
such as email and Microsoft office, the NSS technology is relatively specialized software for supporting 
business negotiations. It is still an emerging technology which is yet adopted in the industry (Lim, 2003), 
and has not been previously exposed to most the subjects in our study (average of NSS usage is 0.14 out of 
5). Hence, it is conceivable that dropping them did not affect the comprehension of perceived control 
towards NSS. SA_3 was a reversed item intended for system anxiety. As removing it would not affect face 
validity of the construct, it was also dropped. 
46
 Nevertheless, PC_CC_1 and PC_CC_2 do not load on the same latent factor as the other items for 
perceived control. This may be due to the fact that perceived control has three theoretical dimensions as we 
defined, and the cognitive control dimension does not necessarily load with other dimensions 
demonstrating characteristics of formative dimensions. In order to capture the differences between them, 
subsequent data analysis involved separate examination on the different dimensions of perceived control 
(PCONTROL_CC and PCONTROL_DCBC).  
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8.3.2 Analysis of Variance Tests and Hypotheses Testing 
The nature of the task used in the experiment created a situation in which negotiators attempted to 
maximize their joint outcome rather than merely maximize their individual scores. Thus, 
cooperative atmosphere was generally achieved for all negotiators (mean = 5.06 out of 7). 
Moreover, negotiators in low-conflict treatments generally perceived significantly higher 
collaborative atmosphere (mean = 5.39) than those in the high-conflict treatments (mean = 4.72) 
(F=9.77, p=0.002**). This suggested that the manipulation of conflict level was effectively 
perceived by the subjects in different treatment conditions.  
Prior to analysis of variance tests, descriptive statistics and profile plots are generated (see 
Appendix B.3). Two-way Multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA) tests were performed to investigate 
the proposed main and interaction effects of system intelligence level and conflict level. 
MANOVA was selected because it could test multiple dependent variables simultaneously while 
keep track of their correlation with each other. In addition, MANOVA could protect against type 
I error rate inflation if the dependent variables were correlated47. Homogeneity of Variances tests 
were conducted in order to examine if the assumption of analysis of variance tests can be met. 
Details of Two-Way MANOVA tests are presented in Appendix B.4. 
The results show main effect of system type on joint outcome, satisfaction with settlement (and 
the perceived efficiency dimension), and perceived control (and the decisional and behavioral 
control dimensions), main effect of conflict level on all dependent variables except for perceived 
control (and its dimensions). Significant interaction effects were detected on negotiation time, and 
perceived collaborative atmosphere. Table 8-1 summarizes the results of the Two-Way 
MANOVA tests. 
                                                     
47
 ANOVA tests on each of the dependent variables were also performed. The results are indifferent with 
those obtained from MANOVA tests. 
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Table 8-1. Summary of Two-Way MANOVA Results 
Main Effects Dependent Variables Interaction Effect 
Level of Conflict System 
Intelligence Level 
1. Joint Outcome NO (F=1.28, P=.283) F=1705.27, P=.000** F=3.51, P=.034* 
2. Contract Balance NO (F=1.28, P=.283) F=4.53, P=.036* F=2.31, P=.104 
3. Negotiation Time YES (F=15.45, P=.000**) F=6.60, P=.012* F=1.89, P=.156 
4. Satisfaction 
- Perceived Efficiency 
- Perceived Fairness 
NO (F=.59, P=.554) 
NO (F=.88, P=.419) 







5. Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 
YES (F=5.67, P=.005**) F=9.77, P=.002** F=0.41, P=.666 
6. Perceived Control 
- Cognitive Control 
- Decisional and 
Behavioral Control 
NO (F=1.01, P=.368) 
NO (F=0.37, P=.692) 









7. System Anxiety NO (F=0.77, P=.466) F=13.63, P=.000** F=2.40, P=.096 
(* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01) 
Hypotheses were mainly tested using contrast tests based on Two-Way MANOVA outputs where 
system type has main effect, and based on One-way ANOVA for each conflict levels where 
interaction effects are significant (details on hypotheses testing are presented in Appendix B.5). 
Although multiple statistical tests on a set of data may increase the vulnerability of the test to 
Type I errors, Coakes and Steed (2000) suggest that performing one less comparison than the 
number of levels of the independent variables is permitted to control the familywise error rate. 
Table 8-2 summarizes the cell means, standard deviations as well as results of hypotheses testing. 
Table 8-2. Summary of Results on Hypotheses Testing (Experiment 4) 
System Intelligence Level 
Mean (Standard Deviation) Dependent Variables  
Conflict 
Level 
Level-1 Level-2 Level-3 
Hypotheses P-Value 







(4.14) H8-1b: Level-3 > Level-2 >.05 
H8-1a: Level-3 = Level-1  >.05 
Joint 
Outcome 




(1.86) H8-1b: Level-3 = Level-2 >.05 







(7.25) H8-2b: Level-3 < Level-2 >.05 
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(5.01) H8-2b: Level-3 = Level-2 >.05 







(10.65) H8-3b: Level-3 < Level-2 .021* 









(13.17) H8-3d: Level-3 < Level-2 >.05 









(1.18) H8-4b: Level-3 > Level-2 .030*^ 







(0.81) H8-5b: Level-2 = Level-1 .013* 









(1.24) H8-5b: Level-2 > Level-1 .082 
H8-6a: Level-3 < Level-1 .042*^ Perceived 






(1.32) H8-6b: Level-3 > Level-2 >.05 







(1.19) H8-7: Level-3 < Level-2 >.05 
* denotes p<.05, ** denotes p<.01 
^ Significant effects are observed on Perceived Efficiency (for Satisfaction with Settlement) and on 
Decisional and Behavioral Control dimensions (for Perceived Control). 
A linear regression test on perceived control and system anxiety was conducted to investigate if 
there was any main effect between them. The results indicate that the level of anxiety is 
negatively related to perceived control (Beta = -0.468).  
Post-hoc multiple comparisons tests as shown in Table B-13 and Table B-16 are analyzed to 
detect possible significant effects that are not hypothesized a priori.  Tukey HSD test and Games-
Howell test are chosen for situations where homogeneity of variances can or cannot be assumed. 
The results are discussed along dependent variables where significant effect is detected. 
8.4 DISCUSSION 
8.4.1 Joint Outcome and Contract Balance 
The differences between Level-3 versus Level-1 systems (likewise between Level-3 Vs. Level-2 
systems) have not proved to be significant in both conflict settings. Plausible explanations may 
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be found in the design of the three systems. First of all, all of the three systems employed 
information processing technologies and electronic communication tool to support negotiations. 
Thus, the differences in joint outcomes and contract balances among these three systems may not 
be as significant as those between NSS and non-NSS.  
Furthermore, the alternative generator of the Level-1 system was developed to return the best 
three optimal agreements with the highest joint outcome and lowest contract balance, based on 
negotiators’ own issue ratings and their estimation of opponents’ preferences. Although it was 
hypothesized to face the risk of erroneous predictions, the online text-messaging tool may 
arguably just offset this risk by allowing negotiators to communicate and learn from each other’s 
interests. Nevertheless, both of the Level-2 and Level-3 systems used simple concession-based 
negotiation tactics, although differing in the availability of learning mechanisms and personality 
features. According to Jennings et al.’s (2001) study, agents playing monotonic concession 
protocol will reach agreement on a deal that is Pareto optimal. The monotonic concession 
protocol means that negotiation proceeds in a sequence of rounds, where at every round each 
agent puts forward a proposal. If the proposals do not overlap, then negotiation proceeds to a 
further round, where the agents either make a concession or else put forward the proposal they 
made on the preceding round. The concession-based negotiation tactic built into the two agent-
based NSS in this study was actually monotonic; negotiators using these two agent-based NSS 
can achieve comparable performance with those using the Level-1 system. The capability that 
negotiators with agent-based systems can achieve comparably outcomes in terms of efficiency 
and fairness with those supported by NSS speaks for the feasibility of agents in performing 
moderately structured negotiation tasks. 
8.4.2 Time to Settlement 
As predicted in H8-3a and H8-3b, the Level-2 system yielded the longest time to settlement, and 
then followed by the Level-3 and the Level-1 system in the low-conflict treatments. This result 
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confirms that the use of more sophisticated technology tended to extend the decision time (Dennis 
et al., 1988; Foroughi et al., 1995). Nevertheless, it casts doubts on the efficiency of adopting 
simple concession-based negotiation tactics for the agent-based NSS in the low-conflict 
negotiation context. As agent with fixed strategy of concession always started with the highest 
self utility points, and then conceded bit by bit by proposing a series of contracts with 
diminishing values. This would probably lead to the time wastage in the early stage of the 
negotiation process. However, this needs to be confirmed by future studies on agent-based NSS 
built-in with other flexible negotiation tactics.  
In the high-conflict treatments, results indicate no significant differences in negotiation time 
among the three systems. The non-significant difference in negotiation time may be due to the 
built-in concession-based negotiation tactic as discussed above. Arguably, it was also likely that 
the result was an artifact of users’ unfamiliarity with the agent-based NSS used in the experiment 
study. Although trainings are conducted for users to understand the functionalities in each 
treatment, the relative novel features and its underlying mechanisms (especially for Level-3 
system) can be harder for users to comprehend. Ongoing use of the NSS could still possibly 
reduce the negotiation time (Lim and Benbasat, 1993), and this needs to be confirmed by future 
studies where negotiators’ familiarity with the NSS used in the experiment is ensured beforehand.  
8.4.3 Satisfaction with Settlement 
Measured from the perceived efficiency dimension, negotiators with the Level-3 system were 
more satisfied with the settlement than those with the Level-2 system as hypothesized in H8-4b. 
However, negotiators with the Level-3 system were comparably satisfied as those with the Level-
1 system (H8-4a). Furthermore, our analysis showed that negotiators with the fully automated 
Level-2 system perceived lowest level of efficiency towards the system, albeit the fact that all the 
three systems have led to compared outcomes in terms of efficiency and fairness. 
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The disparity of actual performance and users’ perceived performance is consistent with findings 
in IS literature. The result that negotiators perceived lowest efficiency with Level-2 system 
implies that total automation, despite its similar level of efficiency and effectiveness compared to 
traditional negotiation support tools, would not be the optimal design for NSS as people may not 
be able to perceive its capability. Arguably, the negotiation task employed in the experiment 
might be relatively undemanding for cognitive processing, which causes the agent-based NSS to 
be under-appreciated by users. When users are confronted with a more complicated task 
involving more issues with tremendous cognitive effort beyond the capability of human 
negotiators, people may better appreciate agent-based systems (Level-3 and Level-2 compared to 
Level-1) that help to automate the negotiation process. Another possible reason pertains to the 
relative unfamiliarity of negotiation support systems. While allowing more control and 
adaptability, Level-3 system also demonstrated a relative difficulty to comprehend its underlying 
mechanisms. If users can not fully appreciate the sophisticated built-in features, there is almost no 
difference between system Level-3 and system Level-2 in spite of the enhanced design features. 
Our analysis highlighted another noteworthy point – the perceived fairness dimension of 
satisfaction was insignificant across different system type treatments. This implies that 
negotiators’ perceptions towards the notion of fairness may not be adequately captured by the 
system artifacts. In order words, perceived fairness shall not be regarded as direct dependent 
variables in NSS studies. Its variances may be due to other psychological variables reflecting the 
process of negotiations, which deserves further investigations in future studies.  
Negotiators who have been satisfied with negotiation settlements in early encounters are likely to 
approach future contacts with positive attitudes, thus improving their performance in the long run 
(Delaney et al., 1997). Therefore, improving satisfaction is extremely crucial for the future design 
of agent-based NSS and factors that contribute to user satisfaction in negotiation settings needs to 
be further explored. 
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8.4.4 Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere  
Results show that in high-conflict situation, negotiators with agent-based systems (Level-3 and 
Level-2) perceived a friendlier atmosphere than non-agent-based Level-1 system (supporting H8-
5a and H8-5b)48 . This result provided important evidence that NSS with certain degrees of 
process automation could deescalate the conflict and depersonalize the negotiation atmosphere, 
thereby creating better collaborative atmosphere in distributive negotiation as we hypothesized.  
Our data analysis also suggested that in low-conflict situation, negotiators using non-agent-based 
Level-1 system perceived greater collaborative atmosphere than agent-based system in this 
circumstance (post-hoc analysis showed that Level-1 and Level-2 is significantly differed at 
p=0.023 level). In the low-conflict treatments, as negotiators’ preferences for the four issues were 
not pitted directly against each other, there were not many conflicts involved and trade-offs are 
available. Therefore, negotiators supported by decision making functions only (Level-1 system) 
would have perceived the positive collaborative mood during their encounters with their 
opponents, other than those supported with autonomous agents. The result implies an interesting 
observation: agent-based systems that assert a great deal of automation of negotiation process can 
moderate or balance the effect of the level of conflict. When the conflict of interests is high, the 
agents communicate on behalf of human negotiators and thus avoid direct confrontation between 
the negotiating parties; when conflict is low, negotiators would not realize degree of cooperation 
of their opponents. Future research shall look into this interesting phenomenon in order to 
confirm the potential benefits of agent-based NSS in promoting friendliness and minimizing 
negative atmosphere catered for different conflict settings. 
                                                     
48
 There difference between level-3 and level-1 system is significant at p<0.05; level-2 and level-1 is 
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8.4.5 Perceived Control 
In line with H8-6a, Level-1 NSS with decision support focus result in higher perceived control 
(mean=5.22) than Level-3 agent-based NSS with personality features (mean=4.69). Post-hoc 
analysis showed that negotiators using Level-1 system also perceived significantly higher control 
than Level-2 system (mean=4.16). From a human-centric perspective of system design, being 
blocked away from the decision making process causes people to feel a loss of control. The 
automation feature of ENS will significantly lower users’ perception towards their capability to 
control the negotiation process. Psychology research also suggests that as control is the general 
motive for human activities, losing motive may result in a negative relation towards the final 
outcome. This is an important message to researchers interested in system design. It is again 
implied that total automation, despite its efficiency and effectiveness, is not the optimal design for 
NSS when people desire a self control for negotiation activities. 
However, the data also reveal that users did not perceive higher control over Level-3 system with 
personality and learning features than Level-2 agent-based NSS without personality; H8-6b is not 
supported. Possible reasons may lie in the relatively undemanding negotiation task. The task 
comprises four issues of interests that generate total of 728 contract alternatives. Arguably, this 
might be a relatively not-so-complex task for cognitive processing, which causes the agent-based 
systems to be under-appreciated by users. When users are confronted with a more complicated 
task involving more issues with tremendous cognitive effort beyond the capability of human 
negotiators, people may better appreciate Level-3 system that help to better approach the 
negotiation process with situated strategy and control the process. Another possible reason is 
users’ relative unfamiliarity of negotiation support systems. Allowing more control and 
adaptability, Level-3 also demonstrated a relative difficulty to comprehend its underlying 
mechanisms. If users can not fully appreciate the features associated with Level-3 system, there 
stands little difference between Level-3 and Level-2 system in spite of the enhancement of design. 
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Our analysis highlighted that the cognitive control dimension of perceived control towards 
systems was insignificant across different system type treatments. This may be explained by the 
demographic analysis of our study’s sample. The sample is based on university students who are 
in computing-related major. The relative high computer self-efficacy and experiences may for 
these subjects make cognitive differences between them insignificant. In order words, the 
decisional and behavioral dimensions showed to be more sensitive to the treatment effects of 
system types. Future studies should be extended to more diverse sample to capture the variability 
of all three theoretical dimensions of perceived control.  
8.4.6 System Anxiety 
Negotiators using Level-3 system reported significantly higher level of anxiety towards the 
system (mean=2.43) than those using Level-1 system (mean=2.43), whereas no significant 
differences were observed between Level-3 and Level-2, Level-1 and Level-2 systems. Perceived 
control can be used as an intermediate psychological variable to explain these effects. As users 
with Level-3 system experienced lower level of control, they felt more anxious during the 
negotiation process working with the system compared to those with Level-1 system leaving 
more control to users. The negative relationship between perceived control and system anxiety 
asserted and in line with the psychology literature supported the interpretation of results. The 
model explains the effects of system artifacts over human perception during the negotiation 
process, which is believed to enhance the current development to understand NSS effectiveness 
from socio-emotional perspective. 
System anxiety is an important psychological attitude that would affect negotiators’ performance 
including achieving win-win solutions and greater satisfaction. Better understanding and 
assessing this variable may help to diminish a negative effect caused by system. Understanding 
the psychological effects due to alternate system designs will contribute to better the design for 
next-generation e-Negotiation systems involving agent technologies.  
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8.5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS  
The study investigates the joint impact of system intelligence level and conflict level on 
negotiation outcomes measuring from economic effectiveness and efficiency as well as 
psychological values. With alternate designs and empirical examinations incorporating agent-
based negotiation, substantive findings and implications were drawn. New insights, which are 
previously not provided in the literature, suggest valuable and instructive to subsequent research 
on the design of agent-based NSS. 
With the increasing possibility that negotiation agents are used to support B2B negotiations, the 
design and evaluation of agent-based ENS offer a fertile area of research. Starke and 
Rangaswamy (2000) suggest that NSS are intended to assist negotiators in negotiating effectively 
and a measure of the effectiveness of NSS may be defined as the degree to which NSS increases 
the likelihood of enabling a Pareto-efficient contract while satisfying other criteria, e.g., 
minimized contract imbalance. Consistent with Goh et al.’s (2000) findings, we suggest that 
agent-based NSS can save human negotiators’ effort without jeopardizing the negotiation 
outcomes, particularly, joint outcome and contract balance. However, the possibility that the use 
of NSS can reduce the negotiation time (Lim and Benbasat, 1993) still needs to be confirmed. 
Thus, researchers and practitioners interested in agent-based NSS ought to investigate more on 
the negotiation tactics and machine-learning mechanisms that can be practically implemented into 
the systems to achieve better performances, i.e., greater outcome efficiency and equality (joint 
outcome and contract balance) and process efficiency (negotiation time).  
Secondly, as negotiators’ perceptions may differ substantially from objective negotiation 
economic analyses (Thompson and Hastie, 1990), the insights gained from how different 
intelligence levels of NSS affect psychological measures of negotiation outcomes will help NSS 
designers to better the future design of negotiation agents. The issue of locus of control needs to 
be concisely addressed as it has a potential impact on negotiators’ behaviors and attitudes. From a 
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human-centric perspective, full automation may not be the final goal for the design of NSS. More 
useful and sophisticated personality features, which can enable a better representation of 
negotiators’ preferences and strategies, are desirable for advanced agent-based system design, so 
as to achieve a level of satisfaction comparable to, if not better than, that of the fundamental NSS. 
This study has also captured an empirical investigation of perceived control in assessing the effect 
of the e-Negotiation systems per se. It produces a parsimonious eight-item measurement from 
three dimensions of control studied in psychology literature, which is to better situate perceived 
control in the realm of NSS research. With a better understanding on perceived control from 
users’ perspective, the design and implementation of NSS can be directed to focus on the intrinsic 
needs of the negotiators. 
The findings of this study are limited in the following. First, we continue to use the same task 
developed by Jones (1988) which was studied in a series of NSS experiments.  The use of same 
task in NSS literature allows consistent comparison of research findings. However, the task is 
relatively structured and is limited to represent cognitive demanding negotiation scenarios in real 
life negotiations. This has also resulted that the superiority of advanced system designs over 
simper ones may not be manifested in our study. Second, our sample demographic analysis 
suggested that the subjects demonstrated a relatively high level of computer experiences and self-
efficacy. The findings of our study may be limited to more diverse and larger sample where 
negotiators may have different levels of computer skills. Finally, the strategies used for agent-
based systems in our study are tied with the underlying research model assuming equal 
bargaining power of the negotiating parties with adequate time to reach agreements. Adaptation 
to these strategies should be made to cater for other negotiation situations, in the presence of 
unequal bargaining power and/or time limit. 
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9 CHAPTER 9  THE CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE OF E-
NEGOTIATIONS IN E-MARKETPLACES 
Consider a generic business negotiation scenario in today’s global marketplace: a supplier 
company and a buyer company in a certain industry need to identify each other, make initial 
contact, and prepare to negotiate an agreement. The companies are geographically dispersed and 
face-to-face meetings may be costly. They have Internet access and a moderate level of 
knowledge in computer and communication technologies. How can Internet-based e-Negotiation 
systems be designed to cater for the negotiation needs in such general business pursuits? Figure 
9-1 depicts the basic architecture/setting of the fifth research arena that was identified in Section 
1.1. This chapter presents research efforts which explore how e-Negotiations can be designed to 
contribute to the growth of present-day B2B e-marketplaces, in addressing the third research 
objective of this dissertation. 
 
Figure 9-1. ENS Architecture for Negotiations in e-Marketplaces 
Supporting negotiation activities in B2B e-marketplaces directly pertains to the collective 
contributions of e-Negotiation technologies. While various e-marketplace websites have emerged 
and launched support functions to facilitate buyer/seller trading (e.g., Alibaba.com’s 
TradeManager), negotiation support features are rarely incorporated. The relatively poor 
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the academic research effort of three decades towards the design and implementation of 
computer-supported negotiations tools. This discrepancy partly accounts for the recent surge in 
research aimed at a better understanding of NSS adoption issues. Earlier attempts involved 
utilizing IT acceptance theories to explore the use of standalone NSSs (Lim, 2003; Lee et al., 
2007). More recently, several studies (Köhne et al., 2003; Vetschera et al., 2006; Turel and Yuan, 
2007; Kersten et al., 2007) have attempted to study this interesting phenomenon by addressing 
more NSS-specific and novel factors in NSS adoption. For instance, Turel and Yuan (2007) have 
proposed studying the “perceived intention of the negotiation partner” in the e-Negotiations 
context, a topic which has not been explored in technology acceptance studies generally. 
Vetschera et al. (2006) and Kersten et al. (2007) conducted exploratory and confirmatory studies 
on user assessment with the Inspire system. Culture, gender and system features were highlighted 
in their empirical findings.   
Although understanding of NSS acceptance has undoubtedly advanced beyond general 
technology adoption, several important questions remain unaddressed. To acquire a fuller 
perspective of the pertinent issues, extensive research in the form of longitudinal studies 
combining qualitative and quantitative examinations is required.  The conceptual and empirical 
work presented in this chapter represents very initial attempts in meeting this objective. 
Specifically, it aims to extend our understanding of existing literature and the findings of 
laboratory studies to a greater and relevant context in which e-Negotiation technologies can be 
applied.  
9.1 OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATION SERVICES AND PACKAGES  
We begin our quest by reviewing existing negotiation-related commercial packages. A growing 
number of commercial e-Negotiations services have emerged in the market in recent years, with 
some commercial e-Negotiation services based on prototypes intended initially for research 
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purposes, e.g., the SmartSettle software based on a NSS research prototype of ICANS (Thiessen 
and Loucks, 1994; Thiessen et al., 1998). Table 9-1 summarizes negotiations services that have 
appeared as commercial packages in different categories, as an update and extension of the 
summary of Yuan and Turel (2004). 
Table 9-1. Commercial Negotiation Services and Packages  
Service Types Package and Descriptions URL 
WinSquared  www.winxwin.com 
WinSquared is negotiation software that offers a systematic guide to help negotiators 
communication effectively, reach agreement and obtain cooperation. 
NegotiationEdge www.negotiatingedge.com 
The Negotiating Edge is a global consulting company that provides training and 
consulting services in negotiation, sales negotiation, project management negotiation, 
negotiation for purchasers, persuasion and influence skills, cross-cultural negotiation, and 
conflict resolution as well as targeted programs for negotiators. 
ICN www.dobetterdeals.com 
International Computer Negotiations (ICN) is a consulting organization, dedicated to 
helping technology professionals get the best deals possible when negotiating with 
suppliers. ICN has the Managed Acquisition Process™ to allow clients to manage 
negotiation. 
The Negotiation Institute www.negotiation.com/ 
The Negotiation Institute, Inc. is located in New York. It provides customized training for 
the art and the success of negotiation 





This web site provides information about the research and education program on 
negotiation at the Law School of Harvard University. 
Contract Management Solutions www.cmsi.com  
Contract Management Solutions provides web-based contract management software and 
solutions that encompass the entire contract life-cycle including contract negotiations.  
UpsideContract www.upsidecontract.com  
UpsideContract is contract management software that offers a fully automated web-
enabled contract management process, including contract negotiations. UpsideContract is 




Win² is negotiation software help negotiators’ in terms of communicating, reaching 
agreement and obtaining cooperation. Using a database of more than 600 techniques, Win² 
analyzes the facts of users’ negotiation situation and recommends practical approaches for 
exchanging information, making proposals and gaining concurrence. 
Internet Neutral www.internetneutral.com  Mediation and 
Arbitration  Internet Neutral administrates the mediation process. Internet Neutral has developed a 
standard mandatory mediation clause, which can be easily inserted into a commercial 
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contract. To prepare mediation, a mediation agreement has to be signed by the parties 
involved and the mediation is scheduled and conducted jointly or privately through email, 
instant message, chatting room or videoconferencing. 
NovaForum www.novaforum.com  
Novaforum is an online arbitration service that offers businesses ways to resolve legal 
conflicts online with a verdict guaranteed within 72 hours. The company piloted 200 
online cases from January to June 2000 before its beta site was launched. Due to the 
voluntary nature of the service (both parties must agree to participate), rates of compliance 
with NovaForum’s solutions are higher than other forms of judgment. 
Online Resolution www.onlineresolution.com  
Online Resolution provides three types of dispute resolution services including online 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration. It also sells Resolution Room, a licensed secure 
online groupware, to dispute resolution professionals for their private practices. 
CyberSettle www.cybersettle.com  
CyberSettle is an online system that supports users to negotiate insurance claims over the 
Web. The parties follow a well-defined protocol to guide the negotiations between insurer 
and claimant. 
Square Trade www.squaretrade.com  
The SquareTrade Online Dispute Resolution Service (ODR) is a fast and convenient way 
for parties anywhere in the world to resolve issues that have arisen over online 
transactions. During ODR, parties work together to resolve problems within the 
SquareTrade system quickly, either independently using our Direct Negotiation tool, 
through mediation, or through arbitration. The Online Dispute Resolution service is web-
based and capable of handling disputes between parties based in different countries. 
All Settle www.allsettle.com  
Allsettle is an automated Internet dispute resolution service for a single value settlement. 
Claimants and Claims Adjusters can make and continuously adjust confidential demands 
and offers in order to reach a settlement. 
SmartSettle www.smartsettle.com  
Negotiation 
Support 
SmartSettle, by ICAN Systems Inc., is a secure negotiation support system using 
optimization to produce fair and efficient solutions based on negotiators’ private 
preferences. SmartSettle provides analytical support which has its roots in decision and 
negotiation analysis in order to guide negotiating parties towards Pareto-optimal frontier. 
This system is extended from a web-based research prototype ICANS (Thiessen and 
Loucks, 1994; Thiessen et al., 1998). 
LiveExchange www.moai.com 
LiveExchange™, by Moai Technologies, Inc. (founded in 1996 at San Francisco, CA), 
focuses on providing strategic sourcing solutions to deliver global reach and increased 
supplier competition to corporations and net market makers. 
Similar to EcommBuilder, LiveExchange also provides process-oriented negotiation 
support capable in handling multi-issue and multi-stage negotiations. 
Moai is allied with Accenture. 
Ozro Negotiate (formerly 
EcommBuilder)  
www.ozro.com  ( formerly www.tradeaccess.com) 






and facilitate big 
pool of buyers 
and sellers, so 








EcommBuilder™, a proprietary negotiation platform by TradeAccess(R) Inc. (founded in 
1998 at Cambridge, MA.), is launched in 2000 to handle business processes involved in 
negotiating commercial relationships. EcommBuilder provides process-oriented 
negotiation support capable in handling multi-issue and multi-stage negotiations. 
TradeAccess changes name to Ozro Inc. in March 2001. Ozro itself offers the means to 
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the middle path through its patented Negotiation technology, Ozro Negotiate™, that 
provides iterative multivariate negotiation solution and provide easy connectivity to 
enterprise data and third-party applications. 
Source: http://www.eyedeas.net/clients/ozro/aboutus/factsheet.cfm  
Square Trade www.squaretrade.com 
SquareTrade provides web-based tools for parties to resolve dispute in auction through 
direct online negotiation, mediation or arbitration. 
SquareTrade is allied with eBay. 
TradeManager (Alitalk) www.alibaba.com  
well as delivery)  
 
TradeManager (Alitalk), developed by Alibaba.com, is an in-house developed tool to 
facilitate buyer-seller communications. The features include multimedia communication, 
file transfer, and contact management etc. 
9.2 E-NEGOTIATIONS IN B2B E-MARKETPLACES  
Interest in e-Negotiation in industry has grown exponentially since the late 1990s, possibly as a 
consequence of the globalization of the world’s economy; the rapid penetration rate of the 
Internet in both developing and developed countries; the advance of information and 
communication technologies; the swift advance in Internet users’ online communication skills; 
and the growth of e-commerce and e-marketplaces.  In this section we will examine how e-
Negotiations can be linked to the current development of e-marketplaces. 
The increase in B2B transactions over the Internet has been phenomenal. The total value of global 
commerce was estimated to have exceeded US$50 trillion by 2005, with as much as 10% of 
transactions being conducted online, according to various analysts. With the latest developments 
in the B2B e-marketplace, there is great potential for online intermediaries to match suppliers and 
buyers involving tens of thousands of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) globally.  
In a general sense, markets (electronic or otherwise) serve three main functions: to match buyers 
and sellers, facilitate transactions, and provide the institutional infrastructure for business (Bakos, 
1998). In traditional marketplaces, intermediaries are the ones who provide trading infrastructure 
(such as a sales network) and manage the complexity of matching buyers’ and sellers’ needs; they 
can enable, to different extents, the completion of a transaction (Turban et al., 2002). Mediated 
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transactions use an outside, third-party intermediary to provide some assistance to at least one 
party in one or more commercial functions. In contrast, unmediated transactions require the buyer 
and supplier to determine their needs, locate each other, negotiate, and for both to settle directly. 
The introduction of Internet and e-commerce has resulted in the automation of many tasks 
provided by intermediaries. While some traditional agents may have vanished, others have 
survived, or will even prosper. The key here is whether the new mediators are bringing value to 
the changed paradigms. New intermediaries are in a position to provide a variety of value-added 
services, to both suppliers and buyers, which may more than offset the negative effects of the 
additional costs that intermediation is supposed to introduce into the value chain (Giaglis et al., 
2002). Based on Bakos’ (1998) work, Giagilis et al. (2002) outlined the potential values that 
intermediation can provide (see Table 9-2). Such value-added services require an integrated 
approach. For instance, a well serviced travel package which takes care of the entire trip, 
including buying tickets for high-season concert shows, is likely to attract customers to remain 
with travel agencies offering such packages instead of switching to other less expensive, less 
integrated tour packages. 





Potential added value of intermediation  










Intermediaries receive market signals and pass them 
on to sellers, allowing them to configure an improved 
product mix. 
YES 
 Searching Intermediaries can reduce search costs for both 
sellers and buyers by providing a ‘one-stop shop’ for 





Intermediaries can generate the necessary liquidity 
for smooth market operation and in certain cases (e.g. 
auctions) may even provide the infrastructural 




Logistics Intermediaries can achieve economies of scale and 
scope for logistical operations more easily than 
individual sellers can. 
NO 
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 Settlement Intermediaries facilitate, monitor and guarantee the 
settlement transactions. 
NO 
 Trust Intermediaries guarantee to sellers and buyers the 





Legal Intermediaries (usually governments and 
international bodies) provide the legal basis for 
market operation. 
NO 
 Regulatory Intermediaries provide mechanism for the 
enforcement of legal, ethical, and behavioral rules in 
markets. 
NO 
* Three websites that lead China’s trading e-marketplaces are examined: Alibaba (www.alibaba.com), 
Global Sources (www.globalsources.com) and Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
(www.tdctrade.com)  
 
A similar idea may be extended to online intermediaries including B2B e-marketplaces. E-
marketplaces49 rely on advanced use of IT to perform essentially the same functions as traditional 
markets, albeit with increased efficiency and reduced transaction costs (Malone et al., 1987). In 
contrast with the company-centric models which utilize e-procurement systems, e-marketplace 
models typically involve online intermediaries which serve multiple buyer and supplier 
companies. The revenue of e-marketplace websites mainly comes from annual membership fees, 
transaction fees (flat or percentage), fees for value-added services, and advertisement income. 
Figure 9-2 illustrates three major many-to-many B2B models which vary in terms of the 
sophistication of market functions: from simple catalog-based exchanges, to B2B portals with 
facilitation functions, and to sophisticated dynamic exchanges50.  
 
                                                     
49
 The term e-marketplaces is also referred to as exchanges, e-markets, trading communities, trading 
exchanges, exchange hubs, Internet exchange, B2B portals, and many others with a variety of functions 
(Turban et al., 2002). 
50
 In this specification, the characteristics of a B2B dynamic exchanges is considered a highly sophisticated 
type of e-marketplace, which can be matched to the first two market functions identified by Bakos (1998). 
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Figure 9-2. Many-to-Many B2B Models and Their Characteristics (Turban et al., 2002) 
9.3 AN EXPLORATORY STUDY ON PERCEPTIONS OF E-NEGOTIATIONS IN 
CHINA’S B2B E-MARKETPLACES51 
In the past decades, the rapid growth of China’s economy has put the country in the forefront of 
most of the world’s Internet companies. This section illustrates the current status and growth 
opportunities of e-Negotiations in the China online market, which represent one of the most 
active entities in the world economy. In this dissertation, an exploratory field study was carried 
out to discover a comprehensive list of technological and social-psychological factors leading to 
negotiators’ intention to use e-Negotiations services.  
                                                     
51
 The field study, as a joint work with other contributors, has appeared in the proceedings of Group 
Decision and Negotiation 2007: GDN2007, Montreal, Canada, 14-17 May, 2007. 
B2B Catalog-Based Exchanges 
• A place for selling and buying 
• Fixed prices (updated as needed) 
 
B2B Portals 
• Community services 
• Communication tools 
• Classified ads 
• Employment market 
• May sell, buy 
• Fixed prices 
• May do auctions 
B2B Dynamic Exchanges 
• Match buyer/supplier orders at dynamic prices, auctions 
• Provide trading-related information and services (payment, logistics) 
• Highly regulated 
• May provide general information, news, etc. 
• May provide for negotiations 
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9.3.1 Background 
While e-commerce is changing the way companies all over the world conduct business, the 
viability and advantages of having a B2B e-marketplace in the Chinese context are significant for 
at least two trading parties: 1) for the domestic suppliers, especially the small manufacturing, 
private companies; and 2) the global buyers abroad. By acting as global trade intermediaries, e-
marketplace sites are allowing many SMEs to reach far wider markets and to compete directly 
with larger competitors. At the same time, with a relatively low-cost labor market as well as the 
Chinese government’s willingness to facilitate foreign investment that result in an ever-improving 
infrastructure, China is poised to consolidate its dominance in the manufacturing and exporting 
sectors. Her commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO) with the promise of lower 
tariffs and increased foreign access to the Chinese market, have also fuelled the interest of global 
businesses in the country which implies foreign trade to China’s manufacturers. 
Sensing the great potential in linking up domestic suppliers in China and global purchasers, a 
number of B2B e-marketplace websites have been launched. Alibaba.com, based in mainland 
China, is one of the dominant e-marketplace websites that are emerged during the dotcom era. Its 
main commitment in matching Chinese suppliers and global buyers has seen competition from 
traditional import/export intermediaries that also utilize the Internet channel (e.g., the Hong 
Kong-based company, Global Sources, which has a 36-year experience in the import/export 
industry). At the same time, similar online catalogs have been put up by websites initiated by 
city-level government/trading authorities such as tdctrade.com (the Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council) and ebusiness.cantonfair.org.cn (the China Foreign Trade Centre).  
Not all trading activities and processes, however, have been effectively supported in existing e-
marketplaces that assume intermediary roles. Initially, fixed-price or single-issue (auction) 52 
                                                     
52
 Auction is considered a simplified form of negotiation, featuring a single issue on price. 
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systems attracted much attention owning to e-market development effort (e.g., eBay, Yahoo! 
Auctions, and Amazon Auctions). Nevertheless, as the complexity of closing a deal increased 
with multiple issues (e.g., price, purchase quantities, warranty periods, and delivery terms), 
multiple-issue negotiations that were commonplace in real-world business transactions required 
more sophisticated support. When multiple negotiation issues exist, there is more room for 
integrative, win-win solutions as well as opportunities for the use of computer support tools to 
help structure and facilitate negotiations between buyers and suppliers. Apparently, consolidation 
and strong competition exist in the e-marketplace industry.  
Millions of users, who may be concurrently subscribing to more than one e-marketplace site, have 
witnessed very fierce competition in the online intermediary industry targeting the China segment. 
The majority of e-marketplaces have since evolved from “catalog-based exchanges” to higher-
stage B2B business models characterized by the “B2B portals” (see Figure 9-2). One of the active 
e-marketplace players, Alibaba, has already positioned itself as reaching the “B2B dynamic 
exchanges” model. The site provides extended trading-related information such as industry news 
and trading tutorials, an instant communication tool for buyers and sellers to contact each other 
(TradeManager), and payment services (Alipay). However, its current practices have not reached 
the full comprehensiveness of the “B2B dynamic exchanges” model. At present, users are still 
seen to seek other means to make initial contact (through phone calls, emails, and other instant 
messaging tools such as MSN Messenger), negotiate, and make deals with each other. None of 
the e-marketplace websites that we have examined so far have attended to these unsupported 
areas. 
This gap provides potential for more integrated services, such as more effective communication, 
negotiation support, and post-negotiation settlements, which represent emerging areas and 
opportunities for e-marketplace growth. At the conceptual level, we envisage further 
investigations on the understanding of e-marketplace industry and suggest viable negotiation 
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support facilities to enhance the functions offered by e-marketplace websites, destined towards an 
integrated seamless web-based trading environment. 
9.3.2 Research Approach 
The participating SMEs in e-marketplace websites represent a large pool of potential users who 
could adopt advanced trading services, such as negotiation tools for decision support, 
communication and automation. We chose to interview participants on China’s B2B e-
marketplace website. It was stressed earlier that there are two important reasons for studying the 
practices of e-marketplaces targeting the Chinese market. First, in recent years, the rapid growth 
of China’s economy has attracted an ever-increasing number of Internet companies, including e-
marketplace intermediaries. The online matchmaking services are especially pertinent to China’s 
international trading transactions: they open doors for global buyers to meet a large number of 
domestic manufacturers who supply attractive products, and at the same time provide local 
businesses with access to previously inaccessible foreign markets.  
Second, many NSS adoption studies tend to be characterized by a North American perspective, 
while in actual practice trading companies continually adapt to new circumstances and varying 
cultural contexts. The insights and perspectives from the East will produce potentially new and 
useful knowledge. 
In this exploratory work, twelve companies which participated in two large international trade 
exhibitions were studied. The exhibitions are held in spring and fall every year in Hong Kong, 
and are organized by an e-marketplace website as well as Hong Kong SAR’s local government 
separately. Each of the exhibitions attracts thousands of suppliers from China as well as more 
than 30,000 global purchasers. We have randomly approached twelve companies for focused 
interviews on research in e-Negotiations adoption. A general architecture for the e-Negotiation 
systems was presented to interviewees, as well as descriptions of a typical NSS prototype with a 
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screenshot that included a messenger (as electronic communication channel) and decision support 
tool (see Appendix C.1). We incorporated a list of possible ENS functions and features, namely 
multilingual interface design, automatic documentation, and negotiation agents. Then we asked 
for the respondents’ comments on the attractiveness of each function. Guiding Questions used in 
the Interviews (Translated from Chinese) are: 
a. What do you think of the e-Negotiation systems (as described earlier)? Would you use 
the system once it is implemented and made available in e-marketplace websites? 
b. Do you think the following features can help in terms of the system’s usability? 
• Multilingual Interface such as Chinese-English Translation  
• Contract Documentation 
• Mediation from e-Marketplace Websites 
• Automatic Negotiation using Intelligent Agents  
c. Please illustrate any concerns your company may have in adopting the system. 
The interviews were not limited to seeking answers to the above questions; In fact, general and 
more elaborated comments were also recorded. Mandarin was the language used in our data 
collection. 
9.3.3 Results  
Appendix C.2 records the wide range of issues that concerned the managers when they were 
asked to consider accepting e-Negotiation functions offered by e-marketplace websites. We 
analyzed the trends of the concerns and synthesized revealed factors into a research framework on 
ENS adoption (see Figure 9-3). The factors for four categories were identified as system 
characteristics, negotiation characteristics, as well as institutional and situational characteristics.  
They were proposed to correlate with perceived system effectiveness and trust beliefs, which 
jointly determine a company’s intention to adopt e-Negotiation systems. Propositions were 
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related to each relationship and derived with brief justification from the data analysis and relevant 
literature53. 
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Figure 9-3. Proposed Research Framework for ENS Adoptions 
9.3.3.1 System Characteristics and Perceived System Effectiveness 
System characteristics have been decomposed into various functionalities that e-Negotiation 
systems can incorporate, namely decision support, electronic communication and multimedia, 
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 The framework and propositions are preliminary and high level in nature. It deserves future efforts to 
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multilingual support, contract documentation, e-mediation (escrow or dispute resolution 
performed by e-marketplace websites), and automated agents. Not surprisingly, the basic 
characteristics or features of the system are the underlying artifacts that affect users’ attitudes 
toward them. From our field study, the sales manager in Case 2 indicated that: “I might be willing 
to use the system, depending on the performance of the DSS component if it is accurate.” 
Moreover, the sales manager in Case 2 showed great interest in NSS functions such as 
multilingual support, contract drafting and e-market mediation. Additionally, the sales manager in 
Case 3 implied that: “If the mediation role is assumed by the e-marketplace that we currently 
subscribe to, we may consider adopting it.” Overall, because the system characteristics were in 
favor of the sales manager in Case 3, a very positive attitude was revealed towards the 
effectiveness of e-Negotiation systems. Based on these findings and in line with NSS acceptance 
literature, we posit: 
Proposition 9-1: The different system characteristics and functions affect the effectiveness of e-
Negotiation Systems as perceived by negotiators. 
9.3.3.2 Negotiator’s Characteristics and Perceived System Effectiveness 
Individual traits have long been the subject of interest of psychologists studying negotiation 
problems. Users’ demographics such as age, gender and general experience (Taylor and Todd, 
1995; Venkatesh et al., 2003; Kersten et al., 2007) are not manifested to be critical characteristics 
in our observed data. This may be due to the relative small pool of interviewees who may 
represent a group who are dominantly young, male and relatively experienced sales managers.  
IT experience and IT knowledge are however found to be salient user characteristics that are 
related to positive attitudes towards NSS technologies. Quite a number of our cases reported 
negative feelings toward the multilingual support function due to previous negative experiences 
in using translation software (e.g., cases 3 and 4). In addition, the interviewee in Case 7 
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questioned the efficiency of the ENS system and particularly felt skeptical in using it because of 
his previous experience with the limited network bandwidth. 
Proposition 9-2: Negotiators’ IT experience and knowledge are positively related to their beliefs 
on the effectiveness of e-Negotiation systems. 
9.3.3.3 Institutional Factors and Trust in e-Negotiation Systems and Trading Partners 
Trust is one party’s belief that the other party will take action to honor agreements that have been 
reached (Wilson and Moller, 1991). Recent e-commerce literature has also centered on building 
effective electronic marketplaces with institution-based trust (McKnight et al., 2002; Pavlou and 
Gefen, 2004; Gefen and Pavlou, 2006). Institutional mechanisms include feedback features, 
escrow services and credit card guarantees that are created by third parties (or intermediaries) to 
facilitate transaction success. Pavlou and Gefen (2004) proposed that users’ perceived 
effectiveness of feedback mechanism, of escrow services, and of credit card guarantees, as well 
as of trust in intermediaries consist of “institutional structures”. These four constructs correlate to 
trust and perceived risk towards the community of sellers.  
In this proposed framework, we differentiate between the potential adopters’ trust beliefs towards 
the e-Negotiation system itself and towards the trading partners. Quite a number of the cases we 
studied highlighted trust issues regarding the credibility of e-marketplaces, owing to the fact that 
the e-marketplace is a third party mediating between the buyer and seller (cases 4 and 10). In our 
data analysis, it was found that there was no trust issue between clients with established 
relationships (Case 1). In contrast, trust is a main concern if the client is not an acquaintance, in 
particular, when the client is from a foreign country (cases 1, 6, 7, and 12). The interviewee in 
Case 10 found it “hard to build up trust with clients if communication and negotiation are 
undertaken by using only a computer” (Case 10). The underlying reason is that the existing 
trading system cannot really protect the sellers though contracts were signed. In addition, some 
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interviewees revealed that international lawsuits were too expensive and time-consuming (cases 3, 
4, and 9).  
Proposition 9-3a: Trust towards e-Negotiation systems is related to the perceived credibility of e-
marketplaces (system providers) and the perceived reliability of payment mechanisms. 
Apart from institutional trust, interpersonal trust in the traditional dyadic (one-to-one) sense has 
been understood as belief that the seller/or buyer will behave in accordance with the consumer’s 
confident expectations by showing ability, integrity, and benevolence (see Doney and Cannon, 
1997; Luhmann, 1979). Trust building between two trading partners is a difficult process, 
especially in an Internet environment (Case 4). In fact, the interviewee in Case 7 felt that buyers 
from the Internet were less trustworthy. From an e-marketplace perspective, both seller and buyer 
are customers; and this may cause distrust if a seller does not trust the e-marketplace to take on 
the mediation role properly (Case 9). 
Companies are always willing to do business with established, creditable partners. The credibility 
of new potential business partners, especially those from the Internet, is difficult to assess. Hence, 
mechanisms have been implemented to establish branding effects and trust for well-trusted 
companies (e.g., “premium suppliers” and “VIP buyers” schemes in Alibaba.com). Besides, new 
clients can enhance their credibility by agreeing to use certain reliable payment mechanisms (as 
in cases 2 and 12). The interviewee in Case 2 felt that “payment is another major concern in 
international trading; and this is even more crucial than the price”. On its part, the interviewee in 
Case 3 preferred a letter of certificate issued by a bank when dealing with new clients, while it 
was willing to accept telegraphic transfer for established clients.  
Proposition 9-3b: Trust towards trading partners is related to the perceived credibility of e-
marketplaces (system providers), the perceived creditability of partners, and the perceived 
reliability of payment mechanisms. 
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9.3.3.4 The Moderating Role of Situational Factors  
Companies in different industries tend to have different attitudes towards e-Negotiation Systems. 
For instance, the interviewee in Case 1 pointed out that an element of physical touch for their 
products should be emphasized, that in logo-printing, which was their primary business, 
customization was necessary for most of their buyers who were mainly supermarkets and 
department stores. Thus it was not feasible for them to participate in online product exhibition. 
Consequently, the e-Negotiation system was not perceived as useful in her opinion. By contrast, 
the interviewee in Case 11 dealt with professional audio systems which were standardized in 
industry, and hence considered web-based categories as suitable and relatively sufficient. 
Proposition 9-4: The relationship between system characteristics and perceived effectiveness of 
e-Negotiation systems is moderated by the industry characteristics associated with the company, 
the market situation, its IT utilization, and its culture and sub-culture. 
A company’s utilization of IT, reflected in the existence of its company website presence and the 
use of other enterprise level systems, demonstrates a level of acceptance of IT by that company in 
general. Hence such higher utilization of IT may lead to higher trust beliefs towards the e-
Negotiation systems. 
Proposition 9-5a: The relationship stated in Proposition 9-3a is moderated by a company’s 
utilization of IT and cultural/sub-cultural orientations. 
Culture is believed to have a profound impact on how people in the marketplace perceive, behave 
and communicate. In almost all cultures, trust provides the foundation upon which both parties to 
a negotiation can work together. However, negotiators from some cultures trust that opposing 
parties will fulfill their obligations because there is a signed contract and the sanction of law to 
back it up, while negotiators from other cultures trust that the opposing party will fulfill their 
obligations because of the relationship that exists between them (Bird and Metcalf, 2003). When 
the negotiation is taking place in a western context where the legal system is relatively 
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established and mature, the governmental agencies are viewed as providing an adequate, reliable, 
and effective underpinning for commercial transactions. It can be a very different scenario for 
negotiations in countries with relatively less mature legal systems. Here, negotiators trust the 
opposing parties because they have invested in a relationship that has been built up over time, and 
they believe that the opposing parties are committed to it. The relationship between the parties is 
what really matters; the contract is simply a symbol of the bond between the parties who drafted 
it (Victor, 1992). Consequently, less emphasis is placed on detailed, written contracts. In our 
interview, the interviewees in cases 4 and 9 revealed that the “contract is merely a form”; and 
“even if the buyer breaks the contract, we wouldn’t go to court as it is too complicated and 
expensive. We would rather bear the expenses”. 
Proposition 9-5b: The relationship stated in Proposition 9-3b is moderated by cultural/sub-
cultural orientations. 
9.3.3.5 Determinants of Adoption Intention of e-Negotiations 
In the proposed framework, adoption intention is a joint result of technological factors (perceived 
system effectiveness and Trust towards Systems) as well as trust towards trading partners. We 
found that the effectiveness of systems was highlighted almost by almost all our case companies, 
which suggests that technology effectiveness and efficiency are still a major concern for 
companies regarding adopting novel systems. Trust beliefs in the system (as a result of 
institutional mechanisms) and towards the trading partners are particularly crucial in 
practitioners’ acceptance decisions on e-Negotiations functions. We suggest that the research 
framework addressing NSS adoption factors should include the three key constructs in the 
framework, especially trust beliefs in the system and towards partners, which have not been 
extensively examined in earlier empirical studies. 
Proposition 9-6: Perceived effectiveness of e-Negotiation systems and trust beliefs towards e-
Negotiation systems and buyers determine a company’s intention to adopt e-Negotiation systems. 
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9.3.4 Discussion and Remarks 
It is unquestionably interesting as well as important for researchers and practitioners alike to 
understand the key determinants of a company’s intention to adopt ENS technologies. This study 
contributes to an ongoing effort in the ENS-research community: in a particular culture of 
interests, how and why e-Negotiations are deemed effective and trustworthy; and the key factors 
leading to companies’ adoption intentions. Specifically, we hold that the key factors fall into four 
important categories: system characteristics, negotiator characteristics, as well as institutional 
and situational characteristics. The factors interplay as antecedents to users’ beliefs towards 
system effectiveness, and trust towards using the system. The effectiveness of e-Negotiation 
systems and trust beliefs are major determinants of users’ intentions to adopt Negotiation Support 
functions in e-marketplaces. 
Indeed, the adoption of ENS in today’s e-marketplaces is a complex and timely research issue. 
The derived research framework and propositions in this study are rather preliminary and high 
level in nature; they deserve further theoretical and empirical underpinnings. Confirmatory 
studies utilizing large-scale surveys of SMEs participating in e-marketplaces is an area for future 
study. Accumulatively, the utilization of strengths from both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches and culture-orientated data collection will provide relevant and deeper insights into 
unanswered questions, as well as achieve generalizability to intended populations. 
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10 CHAPTER 10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
10.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This dissertation looks into a particular business phenomenon, i.e., negotiation, and investigates 
effects of various computer-based systems that are designed to enhance negotiation process and 
outcomes. A theoretical research framework was built aiming to clearly classify three key 
functionalities of ENSs and to define appropriate metrics that can assess the quality and efficacy 
of the ENS artifact on negotiation process and outcomes, in which both economic and social-
psychological perspectives are applied as our theoretical lens. In this dissertation, different 
methodologies were leveraged in order to acquire a holistic understanding of the joint impact of 
ENS technologies and their social-psychological complications.  
With regard to the three ENS categories as well as their sub-classifications, a series of laboratory 
experiments were carried out to examine the effects of different configurations of technological 
features and level of conflict on negotiation outcomes. Furthermore, in order to acquire rich, 
contemporary knowledge on industry perceptions towards ENS technologies, we studied the 
collective use of ENS technologies in an emerging business environment in the B2B e-
marketplace. Due to the exploratory nature of this quest, field interviews were conducted based 
on a status quo analysis of existing e-Negotiations packages in commercial settings. Collectively, 
our research findings and insights are summarized as follows. 
First, it was found that under controlled experiment settings, especially under a low conflict level, 
decision support tools (used in pre-negotiation and negotiation stages) can generally help 
negotiators to achieve higher joint outcomes, while pre-negotiation and multilingual support tools 
(when used together with DSSs) help to create more equal contracts. Negotiators supported by all 
extra system artifacts tended to spend more time to reach agreement than unsupported ones. 
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Second, alternate designs of negotiation agents, compared with decision support tools, do not 
significantly vary in terms of the economic aspects of negotiation process and outcomes; however, 
there is a significant interaction effect due to system intelligence level and conflict level on 
negotiators’ perceived collaborative atmosphere. Furthermore, system intelligence level has 
significant main effect on negotiators’ satisfaction with negotiated settlement and on perceived 
control towards the system, where the latter would be the underlying psychological cause that 
results in different levels of user anxiety towards the system. Additionally, the use of autonomous 
negotiation agents can help to alleviate the negative aspects of social-psychological perceptions in 
high-conflict situations. 
Third, the potential for e-Negotiation technologies is promising, especially in emerging new 
contexts such as B2B electronic marketplaces. Our exploratory field study highlighted important 
technological, individual and institutional factors leading to the adoption of ENS.  Among others, 
system characteristics, trust beliefs, and cultural mechanisms are deemed critical factors leading 
to successful adoption of ENS in today’s e-marketplaces. 
10.2 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Before e-Negotiations can be largely adopted in industry and add value to the growth of B2B 
electronic marketplaces, a number of socio-technological issues ought to be addressed through 
empirical tests and finer-grained theoretical underpinnings.  
This dissertation contributes to e-Negotiation research and practices in the following ways. 
Primarily, it conceptually classifies three key technological aspects of e-Negotiation systems. The 
experimental studies involving all the three system designs in this dissertation provide an 
enriched spectrum of theoretical and empirical insights in terms of e-Negotiation design and use, 
which in turn make our findings more pertinent and generalizable to ENS research and practice 
communities. The human aspect of computer-based negotiation support and the dynamics 
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between users and ENS are deemed the keys to developing a highly relevant and comprehensive 
theory to advance our understanding of ENS success. While we discussed the implications 
particular to each study in chapters 5 to 9, the synthesizing insights brought about by the 
empirical studies were presented following three perspectives, i.e., in terms of theories, ENS 
designers, and in terms of e-marketplace stakeholders. 
Implications for Theoretical Development. ENSs differ significantly in their design objectives 
and functionalities, such as the improvement of task clarity and increase of salience of certain 
negotiation issues, the elimination of communication barriers, as well as automation of the 
negotiation process. The differing designs will provide markedly different consequences on 
negotiation process and outcomes. It is of immense theoretical interest to understand the specific 
manner in which a certain ENS influences cognition, behavior of its users and their performances.  
Existing literature suggests mixed effects due to ENS technologies on negotiation process and 
outcomes. This dissertation contributes to the theoretical development of ENSs by 
conceptualizing three key categories of ENS functionalities: group decision support, multimedia 
communication support, and agent-based automation. We further examined the three important 
technological aspects for e-Negotiation systems by looking at DSS technologies based on the 
different negotiation stages they support, at EC channels differing in social-oriented and task-
oriented purposes, as well as at agents technologies distinguished by their intelligence levels in 
automating the negotiation process.  
The effects of ENS technologies are assessed from multiple dimensions in terms of negotiation 
process and outcomes, and consisting of economic measures on efficiency, fairness and time to 
settlement as well as social-psychological perceptions on satisfaction and on the collaborative 
atmosphere. We believe that this multi-dimensional assessment provides a reasonable and 
meaningful way to triangulate the notion of “negotiation quality”, which can be used to evaluate 
the efficacy of ENS functionalities. The findings contribute towards understanding in which 
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specific manner e-Negotiations will affect the negotiators’ performance and perceptions, towards 
a finer-grained theoretical model of ENSs.  Moreover, the results in comparing different ENS 
design concepts widen our knowledge of ENSs by analyzing how various system artifacts 
influence users’ cognition and behavior which subsequently enhance the efficiency and efficacy 
of negotiations, following the suggestion by Starke and Rangaswamy (2000).  
Implications for ENS Design and Development. It has been discussed in this dissertation that 
multi-issue negotiations common in the business world require sophisticated support involving 
decision and communication support technologies. When negotiations take place electronically in 
an e-commerce setting, a wider range of as well as more complex forms of technologies are 
necessitated for computer-based negotiations to be effective and successful. Consistent with ENS 
literature, the findings of this dissertation emphasize the significant opportunities for computer 
technologies to help people and firms to achieve superior settlements in appropriate settings. 
Nevertheless, ENS developers need to be cautious that it is unwise to simply including all 
seemingly useful features into an ENS without careful integration. As Ramesh and Kannan (2001) 
argued, a major impediment to the adoption of negotiation support systems is that they are often 
developed as stand-alone applications and do not seamlessly integrate with tools used in everyday 
work processes. With the popularity of instant messaging in today’s workplaces, the ENS 
developer may consider integrating ENS features into the already available communication 
software wherever appropriate.  
Implications for e-Market Stakeholders. From the perspective of online intermediaries, 
negotiation support is an element that will need to be built into the next generation of e-
marketplaces. Some service providers, such as Moai Technology’s CompleteSource software 
package, already have this function available in their current service offerings. Intermediaries that 
integrate negotiation facilitation function will have a significant competitive advantage over e-
markets that do not (Raisch, 2001). Our field study with e-market participants highlights the 
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expressive needs for effective negotiation support in online businesses. For intermediaries to 
survive and sustain in today’s highly competitive e-marketplaces, more integrated functionalities 
should be built into their online platform or larger systems in order to sustain a critical mass of 
market participants for competitive advantage. The seamless integration of ENS technologies is 
envisioned to be the next significant area to contribute to the growth of e-marketplaces. 
10.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In concluding the experimental studies of this dissertation, we posit some higher-level 
methodological comments apart from the limitations stated in each study. First, MAUT-based 
approaches have had a wide impact on the design of existing DSS or agent-based negotiation 
systems including those in our studies. As an important enabling mechanism, all these systems 
are challenged by the inherent limitation of MAUT-based techniques centered on the elicitation 
of decision-makers’ preferences. Preference elicitation, or more generally preference modeling, 
has been a topic of discussion ever since the early part of this century (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). Nevertheless, preferences are difficult to measure and rationality is a scarce 
resource in real world settings (Simon, 1957). It will continually be a critical task for agent-based 
negotiation systems as agents must be parameterized with the negotiators’ preferences before 
being delegated to the negotiation task for making decisions. 
It is also noted by several scholars that the availability of background information together with a 
value point structure can reduce the level of experimental control that can be asserted (Korhonen 
et al., 1995; Teich et al., 2000). While we have adopted negotiation tasks consistent with previous 
literature that are derived from real-life negotiation scenarios (salary negotiation in Experiment 1 
and manufacturer-supplier negotiation in experiments 2 to 4), there still exists a likelihood that 
our subjects could have followed their personal preferences by constructing their own point 
 Chapter 10   Concluding Remarks 
221 
structures other than the ones provided. This situation stimulates a realistic methodological 
challenge to the design of negotiation experiments. 
The favorable results arising from ENS support in improving outcome efficiency have to be 
tempered by the realization that the assessment relies on certain conditions imposed by the 
experiment, including relatively structured task and negotiator preferences that remain unchanged 
over the course of a negotiation. These conditions might or might not be met in practice. 
There are several possible areas for extending the work of this doctoral dissertation to greater 
breadth and depth in future research. First, it would be interesting to integrate a greater sense of 
human “control” into the design and implementation of automated negotiation engine. This 
involves deeper research on personalizing agents with more intelligent and flexible strategies. To 
improve our design of ENS for the ultimate adoption of human users, a good balance of system 
“flexibility” (giving certain control to users) and “efficiency” (having machine automation) needs 
to be built into the next-generation of agent-based e-Negotiation systems.  
Second, in the emerging paradigm of service-oriented architecture that essentially views “IT as a 
service”, automation of service delivery has been regarded as a key advancement which will be of 
great practical value. There is growing interest in investigating the use of negotiation agents to 
establish service level agreements efficiently and automatically.  In this new paradigm, it will be 
an exciting challenge to apply and adapt existing ENS technologies to contribute to the design of 
an e-Negotiation engine for automating the entire process of IT service delivery.  
Third, building functionalities to support buyers and suppliers’ negotiation process is believed to 
be the next challenge as well as a key area for future growth of B2B e-marketplaces. Further 
research should be conducted in an extension to the exploratory study of ENS adoption carried 
out in this dissertation. Trust mechanisms and market efficiencies should be investigated as 




Adams, J. S. (1963). “Towards an Understanding of Inequity”, Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 67(5), pp. 422-436. 
Adams, J. S. (1965). “Inequity in Social Exchange”, In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 2. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 267-300. 
Aiken, M. (2002). “Multilingual Communication in Electronic Meetings”, SIGGROUP Bulletin, 
23(1), pp. 18–19. 
Aiken, M., Kim, D., Hwang, C. and Lu, L. C., (1995). “A Korean Group Decision Support 
System”, Information and Management, 28(5), pp. 303-310. 
Aiken, M., Martin, J., Shirani, A. and Singleto, T., (1994). “A Group Decision Support System 
for Multicultural and Multilingual Communication”, Decision Support Systems, 12(2), pp. 
93–96. 
Aiken, M., Sloan, H., and Martin, J. (1998). "Using a Bilingual Group Support System", 
Behaviour and Information Technology, 17(3), pp. 141-144. 
Anson, R., and Jelassi, M.T. (1990). “A Developmental Framework for Computer-Supported 
Conflict Resolution”, European Journal of Operational Research, 46(2), pp. 181-199. 
Arunachalam, V. and Dilla, W.N. (1995). “Judgment Accuracy and Outcomes in Negotiation: A 
Causal Modeling Analysis of Decision-Aiding Effects”, Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 61, pp. 289-304. 
Adler, N.J. and Graham, J.L. (1989). “Cross-cultural Interaction: The International Comparison 
Fallacy?”, Journal of International Business Studies, 20, pp. 515-537. 
Albin, D. (1993). “The Role of Fairness in Negotiation", Negotiation Journal, 9, pp. 223-243. 
Antrim, L.N. and Lax, D.A. (1987). "Support and Analysis for International Commercial Debt 
Negotiations", Working Paper Series, WP-10, Program on the Processes of International 
Negotiation, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA. 
Averill, J.R. (1973). “Personal Control over Aversive Stimuli and Its Relationship to Stress”, 
Psychological Bulletin, 80, pp. 286-303. 
Azjen, I. (1991). “Theory of Planned Behavior”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Process, 50, pp. 179-211. 
Barry, B. and Friedman R A. (1998). “Bargainer Characteristics in Distributive and Integrative 
Negotiation”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, pp. 345-359. 
Bakos, Y. (1998). "The Emerging Role of Electronic Marketplaces on the Internet", 
Communications of the ACM, 41(8), pp. 35–42. 
Bazerman, M.H. and Carroll, J.S. (1987). Negotiator Cognition - Research in Organizational 
Behavior, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Bazerman, M.H., Magliozzi, T., and Neale, M.A. (1985). “Integrative Bargaining in a 




Bazerman, M.H., Mannix, E.A., and Thompson, L.L. (1988). “Groups as Mixed Motive 
Negotiations”, In Lawler, E.J., and Markovsky, B. (Eds.), Advances in Group Processes 
(Vol. 5, pp. 195-216). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Bazerman, M.H., and Neale, M.A. (1983). “Hueristics in Negotiation: Limitations to Effective 
Dispute Resolution”, in Negotiation in Organizations, In Bazerman, M. and Lewicki, R. 
(Eds), Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Beam, C., and Segev, A. (1997). “Automated negotiations: a survey of the state of the art”, 
Wirtschaftsinformatik, 39(3), pp. 263-268. 
Benbasat, I., DeSanctis, G., and Nault, B.R. (1993). “Empirical Research in Managerial Support 
Systems: A Review and Assessment”, in Holsapple, C.W., and Whinston, A.B. (Eds.), 
Recent Developments in Decision Support Systems, Springer Verlag, Berlin, Germany. 
Bird, A., and Metcalf, L. (2003). “Integrating Twelve Dimensions of Negotiating Behavior and 
Hofstede’s Work-Related Values: A Six-Country Comparison.” in Proceedings of The 
Seventh International Conference on Global Business and Economic Development, 
Bangkok, Thailand, January 8-11, 2003, pp. 802-815. 
Box, G.E.P. (1954). "Some theorems on quadratic forms applied in the study of analysis of 
variance problems." Annals of Statistics, 25: 290-302. 
Braun, P., Brzostowski, J., Kersten, G., Kim, J. B., Kowalczyk, R., Strecker, S. (2006). “E-
Negotiation Systems and Software Agents: Methods, Models, and Applications”, In J. 
Gupta, G. Forgionne, and M. Mora (Eds.), Intelligent Decision-Making Support Systems: 
Foundation, Applications, and Challenges, London: Springer, 2006.  
Brett, J., Barsness, Z., and Goldberg, S. (1996). “The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent 
Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major Service Providers”, Negotiation Journal, 12, pp. 
259-269. 
Brown, B.R. (1977). “Face-Saving and Face-Restoration in Negotiations”, in D. Druckman (Ed.): 
Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspectives. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Brown, S.A., Fuller, R.M., and Vivian, C. (2004). “Who’s Afraid of the Virtual World? Anxiety 
and Computer-Mediated Communication”, Journal of the Association for Information 
Systems, 5(2), pp. 79-107. 
Bui, T. X.  (1992). “Building DSS for negotiators: a three–step design process”, In Proceedings of 
the 25th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, U.S., 1992. 
Bui, T.X. (1994). “Evaluating Negotiation Support Systems: A Conceptualization”, In 
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
Hawaii, U.S., 1994. 
Bui, T.X., and Shakun, M.F. (1996). “Negotiation Processes, Evolutionary Systems Design and 
Negotiator”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 5, pp. 339-353. 
Bui, T. X., and Shakun, M.F. (1997). "Negotiation Processes, Evolutionary systems Design, and 
Negotiator", In M.F. Shakun (Ed.), Negotiation Processes: Modeling Frameworks and 
Information Technology. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 39-55. 
Bui, T.X. and Ondrus, J. (2003). “M-Computing for Real-Time Negotiation Support”, In 




Carmel, E. and Herniter B.C. (1989). “MEDINASS: Conceptual Design of a System for 
Negotiation Sessions”, In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Decision 
Support Systems, San Diego, CA, 1989, pp. 239-256. 
Carnevale, P.J.D., and Isen, A M. (1986). “The influence of positive affect and visual access on 
the discovery of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation”, Organizational behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 1986, 37, pp. 1-13. 
Cellich, C., and Jain, S.C. (2004). Global Business Negotiations: A Practical Guide. South-
Western, Mason, Ohio. 
Chavez, A., and Maes, P., (1996). “Kasbah: An Agent Marketplace for Buying and Selling 
Goods”, In Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Practical Application 
of Intelligent Agents and Multi-Agent Technology, pp. 75-90. 
Chen, E., Kersten, G.E., and Vahidov, R. (2004). “Agent-Supported Negotiations on E-
Marketplace”, International Journal of Electronic Business, 3(1), pp. 28-49. 
Chodorow, N. (1974). “Family Structure and Feminine Personality”, Women, Culture and 
Society, in Rosaldo, M.Z. and Lamphere, L. (Eds), Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Chong, J.C., and Kelemen, M. (1995). Cultural Competences: Managing Co-operatively Across 
Cultures, London: Dartmouth Publishing. 
Clayman, D.R. (1995). “Measures of Joint Performance in Dyadic Mixed-Motive Negotiations”, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64(1), pp. 38-48. 
Coehoorn, R.M., and Jennings, N.R. (2004). “Learning an Opponent’s Preferences to Make 
Effective Multi-Issue Negotiation Trade-Offs”, 6th International Conference on Electronic 
Commerce, ACM, 2004, pp.59-68. 
Contini, B., (1968). “The Value of Time in Bargaining Negotiations: Some Experimental 
Evidence”, The American Economic Review, 58, pp. 374-393. 
Corley, R., Black, R.L., and Reed, O.L. (1977). The Legal Environment of Business (4th Ed.). 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Crable, E.A., Brodzinski, J.D., Scherer, R.F., and Jones, P.D. (1994). “The Impact of Cognitive 
Appraisal, Locus of Control and Level of Exposure on the Computer Anxiety of Novice 
Computer User”, Journal of Educational Computing Research, 10(4), pp. 329-340. 
Dawes, R.M. (1988). Rational Choice in an Uncertain World. New York:.Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich. 
Delaney, M.M., Foroughi, A., and Perkins, W.C. (1997). “An Empirical Study of the Efficacy of 
a Computerized Negotiation Support System (NSS)”, Decision Support Systems, 20(3), pp. 
185-197. 
De Monte, B. (1987). How to Do Business with the Japanese: a Complete Guide to Japanese 
Customs and Business. Lincolnwood, Ill.: NTC Business Books. 
Dennis, A.R., George, J.F., Jessup, L.M., Nunamaker, J.F. and Vogel, D.R., (1988). “Information 
Technology to Support Electronic Meetings”, MIS quarterly, 12(4), December 1988, pp. 
591–624. 
DeSanctis, G. and Gallupe, R.B. (1987). “A Foundation for the Study of Group Decision Support 
Systems”, Management Science, 33(5), pp. 589-609. 
Deutsch, M. (1973). The Resolution of Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
 Bibliography 
225 
Ditaranto, E. (2005). “Translating Culture”, Multilingual Computing and Technology, 75, pp. 
4546. 
Doney, P.M., and Cannon, J.P. (1997). “An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships”, Journal of Marketing, 61(1), pp. 35-51. 
Douglas, A. (1962). Industrial peacemaking. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Druckman, D. (1996). “Is There a U.S. Negotiating Style?”, International Negotiation, 1, pp. 
327-334. 
Einhorn, H., and Hogarth, R. (1978). “Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of 
Validity”, Psychology Review, 85, pp. 395-416. 
Eliashberg, J. Gauvin, S., Lilien, G.L., and Rangaswamy, A. (1992). “An Experimental Study of 
Alternative Preparation Aids for International Negotiations, Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 1, pp. 243-267. 
Elkouri, F. and Elkouri, E. (1985). How Arbitration Works (4th Ed.). Washington, DC: BNA, Inc. 
Erickson, B., Holmes, J., Frey, R., Walker, L., and Thibaut, J. (1974). “Functions of a Third Party 
in the Resolution of Conflict: The Role of a Judge in Pretrial Conferences”, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 30, pp. 293-306. 
Espinasse, B., Picolet, G., and Chouraqui (1997). “Negotiation Support Systems: A Multi-
Creteria and Multi-Agent Approach”, European Journal of Operational Research, 103, pp. 
389-409. 
Faley, T., and Tedeschi, J.T. (1971). “Status and Reactions to Threats”, Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 17, pp. 192-199. 
Faratin, P., Sierra, C. and Jennings, N.R. (1998). “Negotiation Decision Functions for 
Autonomous Agents”, Robotics and Autonomous Systems September, 24(3), pp. 159-182.  
Faratin, P., Sierra, C. and Jennings, N.R. (2000). “Using Similarity Criteria to Make Negotiation 
Trade-Offs”, Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, 2000, 
pp. 01-19.  
Farber, H.S. (1981). “Divergent Expectations, Threat Strategies, and Bargaining under 
Arbitration”, Presented to the Econometric Society, San Diego, CA. 
Fisher, R. and Ury W. (1981). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin. 
Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving 
In. 2nd Ed. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Books. 
Fiske, A.P. (1991). Structures of Social Life. New York: The Free Press. 
Foroughi, A. (1995). “A Survey of the Use of Computer Support for Negotiations”, Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 11(4), pp. 121-134. 
Foroughi, A. and Jelassi, M.T. (1990). “NSS Solutions to Major Negotiation Stumbling Blocks”. 
In 23rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Hawaii, U.S., 1990. 
Foroughi, A., Perkins, W.C., and Jelassi, M.T. (1995). "An Empirical Study of an Interactive, 
Session-oriented Computerized Negotiation Support System", Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 6(4), pp. 485-512. 
 Bibliography 
226 
Foroughi, A., Perkins, W. C., and Jessup, L.M. (2005). “A Comparison of Audio-Conferencing 
and Computer Conferencing in a Dispersed Negotiation Setting: Efficiency Matters!”, 
Journal of Organizational and End User Computing, 17(3), pp. 1-26. 
Foster, D.A. (1992). Bargaining Across Borders: How to Negotiate Business Successfully 
Anywhere in the World. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Fox, M.L., Dwyer, D.J., and Ganster, D.C. (1993). “Effects of Stressful Job Demands and Control 
on Physiological and Attitudinal Outcomes in a Hospital Setting”, Academy of Management 
Journal, 36(2), pp. 289-318. 
Fraser, N.M., and Hipel, K.M. (1981). “Computer Assistance in Labor-Management 
Negotiations”, Interfaces, 11(2), pp. 22-29. 
French, J.R.P., and Raven, B. (1959). “The Bases of Social Power”, In Cartwright, D. (Ed.), 
Studies in Social Power. Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social Research. 
Frese, M. (1987). “Theory of Control and Complexity: Implications for Software Design and 
Integration of Computer Systems into the Work Place”, In Psychological Issues of Human 
Computer Interaction in the Work Place, Frese,  M., Ulich, E., and Dzida, W. (Eds.), 
Elsevier Science Publishers: Holland. 
Fulmer, I.S. and Barry, B. (2002). “The “Smart” Negotiator: Cognitive Ability and Emotional 
Intelligence In negotiation”, In Proceedings of the Fifteenth Conference of the International 
Association for Conflict Management, Park City, Utah. 
Gallupe, R.B. (1985), “The Impact of Task Difficulty on the Use of a Group Decision Support 
System”, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Minnesota. 
Gefen, D. and Pavlou, P.A. (2006). “The Moderating Role of Perceived Regulatory Effectiveness 
of Online Marketplaces on the Role of Trust and Risk on Transaction Intentions.” in 
Proceedings of 27th International Conferences of Information Systems (ICIS), Milwaukee, 
U.S., December 10-13, 2006. 
Gelfand, M.J., and Christakopoulou, S. (1999). “Culture and Negotiator Cognition: Judgment 
Accuracy and Negotiation Processes in Individualistic and Collectivistic Cultures”, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, pp. 248-269. 
George, J., Easton, G., Nunamaker, Jr. J.F., and Northcraft, G. (1990). “A Study of Collaborative 
Group Work with and without Computer-Based Support”, Information Systems Research, 4, 
pp. 394-415. 
Giaglis, G.M., Klein, S., and O’Keefe, R.M. (2002). “The Role of Intermediaries in Electronic 
Marketplaces: Developing a Contingency Model”, Information Systems Journal, 12(3), pp. 
231-246. 
Goh, K.Y., Teo, H.H., Wu, H.X., and Wei, K.K. (2000). “Computer-Supported Negotiations: An 
Experimental Study of Bargaining in Electronic Commerce,” In Proceedings of the 21st 
Annual International Conference on Information Systems, Brisbane, Australia, pp. 104-116. 
Goul, M., Henderson, J.C., and Tonge, F.M. (1992), "The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence as 
a Reference Discipline for Decision Support Systems Research", Decision Sciences, 23(6), 
pp. 1263-1276. 
Graham, J.L. (1984). “A Comparison of Japanese and American Business Negotiations”, 
International Journal of Research in Marketing, 1, pp. 50-68. 
Graham, J.L. (1985). “The Influence of Culture on the Process of Business Negotiations: An 
Exploratory Study”, Journal of International Business Studies, 16, pp. 81-96. 
 Bibliography 
227 
Graham, J.L. (1993). “The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a Distinct Approach”, 
Negotiation Journal, 9, pp. 123-140. 
Graham, J.L., and Mintu-Wimsat, A. (1997). “Culture’s Influence on Business Negotiations in 
Four Countries”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 6(5), pp. 483-502. 
Graham, J.L., Mintu-Wimsat, A., and Rodgers, W. (1994). “Explorations of Negotiation 
Behaviors in Ten Cultures using a Model Developed in the United States”, Management 
Science, 40(1), pp. 72-95. 
Greenhalgh, L. (2001). Managing Strategic Relationships. New York: The Free Press. 
Hamner, W.C. (1974). “Effects of Bargaining Strategy and Pressure to Reach Agreement in a 
Stalemated Negotiation”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, pp. 458-467. 
Fraser, N.M., and Hipel, K.M. (1981). “Computer Assistance in Labor-Management 
Negotiations”, Interfaces, 11(2), pp. 22-29. 
Hair, J F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., and Black, W. C. (1995). Multivariate Data Analysis 
with Reading. 4th Edition. Englewood Clffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hausken, K. (1997). “Game-Theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory”, Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 6, pp. 511-528. 
Hiltrop, J.M., and Rubin, J.Z. (1981). “Position Loss and Image Loss in Bargaining”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 25, pp. 521-534. 
Hofstede, G. (1989). “Cultural Predictors of National Negotiation Styles”, In. F. Mautner-
Markhof (Ed.), Processes of international negotiations (pp. 193-201). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations. Berkshire, England: McGraw-Hill. 
Hofstede, G., and Bond, M.H. (1988). “The Confucian Connection: From Cultural Roots to 
Economic Growth”, Organizational Dynamics, 16(4), pp. 4-21. 
Holden, N. J. (1987). "The Development of the Concept of Communication Competence to 
Evaluate Industrial Firms’ Performance in Cross-cultural Interactions", R&D Management, 
17(2), pp.137-151. 
Holsapple, C.W., Lai, H., and Whinston, A.B. (1996). Implications of Negotiation Theory for 
Research and Development of Negotiation Support Systems, Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 6 (3), p. 255-274. 
Holsapple, C.W., Lai, H., and Whinston, A.B. (1998). A Formal Basis for Negotiation Support 
System Research, Group Decision and Negotiation, 7(3), p. 203-227. 
Homans, G.C. (1961). Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World Co. 
Huber, V., and Neale, M. (1986). “Effects of Cognitive Heuristics and Goals on Negotiator 
Performance and Subsequent Goal Setting”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 38, pp. 342-365. 
Huang P. and Sycara K. (2002). “A Computational Model for Online Agent Negotiation”, 




Hung, P.C.K., Li, H., and Jeng, J-J. (2004). "WS-Negotiation: An Overview of Research Issues", 
In Proceedings of the 37th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii, 
U.S., 2004. 
Jarke, M. and Jelassi, M.T. (1986). “View Integration in Negotiation Support Systems”, 
Transactions of the Sixth International Conference on Decision Support Systems, 
Washington, DC, pp. 180-188. 
Jarke, M., Jelassi, M.T., and Shakun, M.F. (1987). “Mediator: Towards a Negotiation Support 
System”, European Journal of Operational Research, 31(3), pp. 314-334. 
Jelassi, M.T., and Foroughi, A. (1989). “Negotiation Support Systems: An Overview of Design 
Issues and Existing Software”, Decision Support Systems, 5(2), pp. 167-181. 
Jelassi, M.T., and Jones, B.H. (1988). “Getting to yes with NSS: How Computers Can Support 
Negotiations”, In R.M. Lee, A.M. McCosh and P. Migliarese (Eds.), Organizational 
Decision Support Systems, Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 75-85. 
Joncour, N., Sinclair, K., and Bailey, M. (1994). “Computer Anxiety, Computer Experience and 
Self-Efficacy”, In Proceedings of Annual Conference of the Australian Association for 
Research in Education, Newcastle, New South Wales, 1994. 
Jones, B.H. (1988). “Analytical Mediation: an Empirical Examination of the Effects of Computer 
Support for Different Levels of Conflict in Two-Party Negotiation”, Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University Graduate School of Business, Bloomington, Indiana. 
Jonker, C., and Robu, V. (2004). “An Agent Architecture for Multi-Attribute Negotiation”, In 
B.Nebel (Ed.). In Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on AI, IJCAI’01, 
2001, pp. 1195-1201. 
Jonker, C.M., Robu, V., and Treur, J. (2007). “An Agent Architecture for Multi-Attribute 
Negotiation using Incomplete Preference Information”, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent 
Systems, 15(2), pp. 221-252. 
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. and Thaler, R. (1986). “Fairness and the Assumption of Economics”, 
Journal of Business, 59, pp. 285-300. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under Risk”, 
Econometrica, 47, pp. 263-291. 
Karasek, R.A. (1979). “Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental Strain: Implications for 
Job Redesign”, Administrative Science Quarterly (24), pp. 285-308. 
Keeney, R., and Raiffa, H. (1991). “Structuring and Analyzing Values for Multiple-issue 
Negotiations”, In H.P. Young (Ed.) Negotiation Analysis (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press), pp. 131-151. 
Kelley, H.H. (1966). “A Classroom Study of the Dilemmas in Interpersonal Negotiations”, In 
Archibald K. (Ed.), Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion. 
Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies. 
Kersten, G.E. (1985). “NEGO-Group Decision Support System”, Information and Management, 
8(5), pp. 237-246. 
Kersten, G.E. (1987). “On Two Roles Decision Support Systems Can Play in Negotiations”, 
Information Processing & Management, 23(6), pp. 605-614. 
 Bibliography 
229 
Kersten, G.E. (2003). “The Science and Engineering of e-Negotiation: an Introduction”, In 
Proceedings of 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Science. Hawaii, U.S., 
2003. 
Kersten, G.E., Etezadi, J., Chen, E., and Vetschera, R. (2007). “User Assessment of E-negotiation 
Systems”, Proceedings of the 40th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Sciences, 
Hawaii, U.S., 2007, pp. 1-9. 
Kersten, G.E., and Lo, G. (2001). “Negotiation Support Systems and Software Agents in E-
Business Negotiations”, The First International Conference on Electronic Business, Hong 
Kong.  
Kersten, G.E., and Lo, G. (2003). “Aspire: An Integrated Negotiation Support System and 
Software Agents for e-Business Negotiation”, International Journal of Internet and 
Enterprise Management, 1(3). 
Kersten, G.E., Michalowski, W., Cray, D., and Lee, I. (1991). “An Analytic Basis for Decision 
Support in Negotiations”, Naval Logistic Research, 38, pp. 743-761. 
Kersten, G.E., and Noronha, S.J. (1999). “WWW-Based Negotiation Support: Design, 
Implementation, and Use”, Decision Support Systems, 25, pp. 135-154. 
Kochan, T.A. (1980). Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations. Homewood, IL: Richard D. 
Irwin. 
Kohne, F., Schoop, M., and Staskiewicz, D. (2005). “An Empirical Investigation of The User 
Acceptance of Electronic Negotiation Support System Features”, In Proceedings of the 
European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). Regensburg, Germany, 2005. 
Korhonen, P., Oretskin, N., Teich, J. and Wallenius, J. (1995). „ The Impact of a Biased Starting 
Position in a Single Negotiation Text Type Mediation“, Group Decision and Negotiation, 4, 
pp. 357-374. 
Kramer, R.M. (1991). “The More the Merrier? Social Psychological Aspects of Multiparty 
Negotiations in Organizations”, In Bazerman, M., Lewicki, R., and Sheppard, B.H., 
Research on Negotiation in Organizations (Vol. 3, pp. 307-332), Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Kray, L.J., Thompson, L, and Galinsky, A. (2001). “Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype 
Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 80, pp. 942-958. 
Lacey, H.M. (1979). “Control, Perceived Control, and the Methodological Role of Cognitive 
Constructs”, in Perlmuter, L.C. and Monty, R.A. (Eds.), Choice and Perceived Control, 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erbaumn Associates. 
Lax, D.A., and Sebenius, J.K. (1986). The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation 
and Competitive Gain, The Free Press, NY. 
Lax, D.A., and Sebenius, J.K. (1987). “Measuring the Degree of Joint Gains Achieved by 
Negotiators”, Unpublished Manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 
Le Poole, S. (1989). “Negotiating with Clint Eastwood in Brussels”, Management Review, 78, pp. 
58-60. 
Lee, K. C., Kang, I., and Kim, J. S. (2007). “Exploring the User Interface of Negotiation Support 
Systems from the User Acceptance Perspective”, Computers in Human Behavior, 23, 2007, 
pp. 220-239. 
Lewicki, R., and Litterer, J. (1985). Negotiation. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 
 Bibliography 
230 
Lewicki, R.J., Saunders, D.M., and Minton, J.W., (1999), Negotiation. 3rd Ed Boston : 
Irwin/McGraw-Hill. 
Li, J., and Cao, Y.D. (2004). “Bayesian Learning in Bilateral Multi-Issue Negotiation and Its 
Application in MAS-based Electronic Commerce”, In Proceedings of the IEEE/WIC/ACM 
International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, 2004, pp. 437-440. 
Lim, J.L.H. (1999). “Multi-Stage Negotiation Support: A Conceptual Framework”, Information 
and Software Technology, 41(5), pp. 249-255. 
Lim, J. (2000) An Experimental Investigation of the Impact of NSS and Proximity on Negotiation 
Outcomes”, Behavioral and Information Technology, 19(5), pp.329-338. 
Lim, J. (2003). “A Conceptual Framework on the Adoption of Negotiation Support Systems”, 
Information and Software Technology, 45, pp. 469-477. 
Lim, L.H. and Benbasat, I. (1993). ”A theoretical perspective of negotiation support systems”, 
Journal of Management Information Systems, 9(3), pp. 27-44. 
Lim, S.G., and Murnighan, J.K. (1994). “Phases, Deadlines and the Bargaining Process”, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 58, pp. 153-171. 
Lim, J. and Yang, Y.P. (2004). "Videoconferencing NSS and Conflict Level: An Experimental 
Study", In Proceedings of the IFIP TC8 International Conference on Decision Support 
Systems: DSS2004, Prato, Tuscany, Italy, 1-3 July 2004. 
Lim, J. and Yang, Y.P. (2005). "Exploring Multilingual Negotiation Support for English-Chinese 
Dyads: An Experimental Study", In Proceedings of the 38th Annual Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences: HICSS38, IEEE Computer Society, Hawaii, United States, 
3-6 January 2005. 
Lim, J. and Yang, Y.P. (2007). “Enhancing Negotiators’ Performance with Computer Support for 
Pre-Negotiation Preparation and Negotiation: An Experimental Investigation in an East 
Asian Context ", Journal of Global Information Management. 15(1), January-March 2007, 
pp. 18-42. 
Lim, J. and Yang, Y.P. (2008). “Exploring Computer-Based Multilingual Negotiation Support for    
English-Chinese Dyads: Can We Negotiate in Our Native Languages?" Behaviour & 
Information Technology. Forthcoming. 
Lomuscio, A.R., Wooldridge, M., and Jennings, N.R. (2001). A Classification Scheme for 
Negotiation in Electronic Commerce, Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: A European 
Perspective. Springer Verlag, pp. 19–33. 
Lopes, F., Novais, A.Q., Mamede, N., and Coelho, H. (2001). “Negotiation Tactics for 
Autonomous Agents”, 12th International Workshop on Database and Expert Systems 
Applications, pp. 07-08.  
Luhmann, N. (1979). Trust and Power. John Wiley and Sons: London, U.K.  
Ma, Z.Z. and Jaeger, A. (2005). “Getting to Yes in China: Exploring Personality Effects in 
Chinese Negotiation Styles”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 14, pp. 415-437. 
McKnight, D.H., Choudhury, V., and Kacmar, C. (2002). “Developing and Validating Trust 
Measures for e-Commerce: An Integrative Typology”, Information Systems Research, 13(3), 
September 2002, pp. 334-359. 
Maes, P., Guttman, R.H., and Moukas, A.G. (1999). “Agents that Buy and Sell”, Communication 
of the ACM, 42(3), pp. 81-91. 
 Bibliography 
231 
Marakas, G.M., Johnson, M.D., and Palmer, J.W. (2000). “A Theoretical Model of Differential 
Social Attributions Towards Computing Technology: When the Metaphor Becomes the 
Model”, Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 52, pp. 719-750. 
March, R.M. (1988). The Japanese Negotiator: Subtlety and Strategy beyond Western Logic. 
Tokyo, New York: Kodansha International. 
March, J.G., and Simon, H.A. (1958), Organizations (New York: John Wiley).  
March. R.M., and Wu, S.H. (2007). The Chinese Negotiator: How to Succeed in the World’s 
Largest Market. Tokyo, New York: Kodansha International. 
Matwin, S., Szapiro, T., and Haigh, K. (1991). Genetic Algorithms Approach to a Negotiaition 
Support System, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 21(1), pp. 102–114. 
Matwin, S., Szpakowicz, S., Koperczak, Z., Kersten, G., and Michalowski, W. (1989). 
“Negoplan: An Expert System Shell for Negotiation Support”, IEEE Expert, 4(4), pp. 50-62. 
Maule, A.J., and Hockey, R.J. (1993). “State, Stress, and Time Pressure”, In Svenson, O. and 
Maule, A.J. (Eds.), Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making. 
New York: Plenum Press, pp. 83-101. 
McAlister, L., Bazerman, M.H., and Fader, P. (1986). “Power and Goal-setting in Channel 
Negotiations”, Journal of Marketing Research, 23, pp. 228-236. 
Malone, T., Yates, J., and Benjamin, R.I. (1987). “Electronic Markets and Electronic 
Hierarchies”, Communications of the ACM, 30(6), pp. 484–497. 
Milter, R.G., Darling, T.A., and Mumpower J.L. (1996). “The Effects of Substantive Task 
Characteristics on Negotiators’ Ability to Reach Efficient Agreements”, Acta Psychologica, 
93, pp. 207-228. 
Moai.com, (2000). “An Introduction to Dynamic Commerce and Negotiated e-Commerce: A 
Review and Analysis of Trends and Opportunities in Commerce on the Internet”, White 
Paper, URL: http://www.ondemandsourcing.com/Papers/dynamiccommerce.pdf (Accessed 
at December, 2007). 
Morris, S.A., and Marshall, T.E. (2004). “Perceived Control in Information Systems”, Journal of 
Organizational and End User Computing (16:2), pp. 38-56. 
Moore, C. (1996). The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (2nd Ed.). 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Morley, I., and Stephenson, G. (1977). The Social Psychology of Bargaining. London: Allen and 
Unwin. 
Mumpower, J., Schuman, S., and Zumbolo, A. (1988). “Analytical Mediation: an Application in 
Collective Bargaining”, In R.M. Lee, A.M. McCosh, and P. Migliarese (Eds.), 
Organizational Decision Support Systems, New York: Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. 
(North Holland), pp. 61-73. 
Nash, J. (1950). “The Bargaining Problem”, Econometrica, 18, pp. 155-162. 
Nash, J. (1953). “Two-person Cooperative Games”, Econometrica, 21(1), pp. 128-140. 
Neal, M.A. and Bazerman, M. H. (1983). “The Role of Perspective-Taking Ability in Negotiating 




Neale, M.A., and Bazerman, M.H. (1985a). “The Effects of Externally Set Goals on Reaching 
Integrative Agreements in Competitive Markets”, Journal of Occupational Behavior, 6, pp. 
19-32. 
Neale, M.A., Bazerman, M.H. (1985b), "The Effect of Framing on Conflict and Negotiator 
Overconfidence", Academy of Management Journal, 28(2), pp.34-49.  
Neale, M.A. and Northcraft, G.B., (1986). “Experts, Amateurs and Refrigerators: Comparing 
Expert and Amateur Negotiators in a Novel Task”, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 38, pp. 305-317. 
Oliver, J.R. (1997). “A Machine Learning Approach to Automated Negotiation and Prospects for 
Electronic Commerce”, Journal of Management Information Systems, 13(3), Winter, 1996-
97, pp. 83-112. 
Oliver, R.L., Balakrishnan, P.V., and Barry, B. (1994), “Outcome Satisfaction in Negotiation: A 
Test of Expectancy Disconfirmation”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 60, pp. 252-275. 
Papazoglou, M.P., and Georgakopoulos, D. (2003). “Service-Oriented Computing”, 
Communications of the ACM, 46(10), pp. 25-28. 
Pavlou, P.A., and Gefen, D. (2004). “Building Effective Online Marketplaces with Institution-
Based Trust.” Information Systems Research, 15(1), pp. 37-59. 
Perkins, W.C., Hershauer, J.C., Foroughi, A., Delaney, M.M. (1996). “Can a Negotiation Support 
System Help a Purchasing Manager?”, International Journal of Purchasing and Materials 
Management, 32(2), pp. 37-45. 
Pilisuk, N. and Skolnick, P. (1978). “Inducing Trust: A Test of the Osgood Proposal”, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 8, p. 121-133. 
Pinkley, R.L., Neale, M.A., and Bennett, R.J.  (1994). “The Impact of Alternatives to Settlement 
in Dyadic Negotiation“, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 57, pp. 
97-116. 
Pruitt, D.G. (1981). Negotiation Behavior. New York: Academic Press. 
Pruitt, D.G. (1983). “Strategic Choice in Negotiation”, American Behavioral Scientist, 27, pp. 
167-194. 
Pruitt, D.G., and Carnevale, P.J.D. (1993). Negotiation in Social Conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: 
Brooks-Cole. 
Pruitt, D.G., Carnevale, P.J., Forcey, B., and Van Slyck, M. (1986). "Gender Effects in 
Negotiation: Constituent Surveillance and Contentious Behavior", Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 22(3), pp.264-275. 
Pruitt, D.G., and Drews, J.L., (1969). “The Effect of Time Pressure, Time Elapsed, and the 
Opponent’s Concession Rate on Behavior in Negotiation”, Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 5, pp. 43-60. 
Pruitt, D.G., and Rubin, J.Z. (1986). Social Conflict: Escalation, Impasse, and Resolution, 
Reading. MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Pye, L.W. (1992). Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles. 
New York: Quorum Books. 




Raiffa, H., Richardson J. and Metcalfe D. (2002). Negotiation Analysis: The science and art of 
collaborative decision marking. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press. 
Ramalingam, V., and Weidenbeck, S. (1998). “Development and Validation of Scores on a 
Computer Programming Self-Efficacy Scale and Group Analyses of Novice Programmer 
Self-Efficacy”, Journal of Educational Computing Research, 19(4), pp. 367-381. 
Rangaswamy, A., Eliashberg, J., Burke, R., and Wind, J.  (1989). “Developing Marketing Expert 
Systems: An Application to International Negotiations”, Journal of Marketing, 53(4), 
October 1989, pp. 24-49. 
Rangaswamy, A. and Shell, G.R. (1997). “Using Computers to Realize Joint Gains in 
Negotiations: Towards an Electronic Bargaining Table”, Management Science, 43(8), pp. 
1147-1163. 
Rao, V.S., and Jarvenpass, S.L. (1991). “Computer Support for Groups: Theory-Based Models 
for GDSS Research”, Management Science, 37, p. 1347-1362. 
Rekosh, J.H., and Feigenbaum, K.D. (1966). “The Necessity of Mutual Trust for Cooperative 
Behavior in a Two-Person Game”, Journal of Social Psychology, 69, pp. 149-154. 
Roth, A.E., and Murnighan, J.K. (1982). “The Role of Information in Bargaining: An 
Experimental Study”, Econometrica, 50, pp. 1123-1142. 
Roth, A.E., Murnighan, J.K. and Schoumaker, F. (1988). “The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: 
Some Experimental Evidence”, American Economic Review, 78(4), pp. 806-823. 
Rosenschein J.S, and Zlotkin, G. (1994). Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for 
Automated Negotiation among Computers. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA. 
Rubin, J.Z, and Brown, B.R. (1975). The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation. New 
York: Academic. 
Rubinstein, A. (1982). “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, 50(1), pp. 
97-109. 
Sargent, L.D. and Terry, D.J. (1998). “The Effects of Work Control and Job-Demands on 
Employee Adjustment and Work Performance”, Journal of Occupational and 
Organizational Psychology, 71, pp. 219-236. 
Scholz, R., Fleischer, A., and Bentpup, A. (1982). "Aspiration Forming and Predictions Based on 
Aspiration Levels Compared between Professional and Nonprofessional Bargainers", in 
Tietz, R. (Ed): Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, pp. 109-
121. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Schoop, M., Jertila, A. and List, T. (2003). “Negoisst: A Negotiation Support System for 
Electronic Business-to-Business Negotiations in E-Commerce”, Data and Knowledge 
Engineering, 47(3), pp. 371-401. 
Schoop, M. and Quix, C. (2001a). “DOC.COM: Combining Document and Communication 
Management for Negotiation Support in Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce”, In 
Proceedings of the 34th HICSS, 2001. 
Schoop, M. and Quix, C. (2001b). “Doc.Com: A Framework for Effective Negotiation Support in 
Electronic Marketplaces”, Computer Networks, 37, pp. 153-170. 
Sengupta, K., and Te’eni, D. (1993). “Cognitive Feedback in GDSS: Improving Control and 
Convergence”, MIS Quarterly, 17(1), pp. 87-109.  
 Bibliography 
234 
Shakun, M.F. (1988). Evolutionary Systems Design: Policy Making under Complexity and Group 
Decision Support Systems, Oakland, CA.: Holden-Day. 
Shakun, M.F. (2003). “United States-China Plane Collision Negotiation”, Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 12(6), pp. 477-480. 
Sheffield, (1992). “The Effects of Bargaining Orientation and Communication Medium on 
Negotiation”, In the Proceedings of the 25th Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences, pp. 174–184. 
Sheppard, B.H. (1984). “Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework”, In Staw, 
B.M. and Chummings, L.L. (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior (Vol. 6, pp. 141-
190). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Sheppard, B.H. and Tuchinsky, M. (1996). “Interfirm Relations: A Grammar of Pairs”, In B.M. 
Star and Cummings, L.L. (Eds), Research on Organizational Behavior (Vol. 18, pp. 331-
373). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Siegel, S., and Fouraker, L.E. (1960). Bargaining and Group Decision Making: Experiments in 
Bilateral Monopoly, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Siegel, S. and Harnett, D.L. (1964). “Bargaining Behavior: A Comparison between Mature 
Industrial Personnel and College Students”, Operations Research, 12(2), pp. 334-343. 
Sierra, C., Faratin, P., and Jennings, N.R. (1997). ”A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model 
between Autonomous Agents”, In Proceedings of the 8th Modeling Autonomous Agents in a 
Multi-Agent World (MAAMAW). 
Sniezek, J.A. and Crede, M. (2002). “Group Judgment Process and Outcomes in 
Videoconferencing VS. Face-to-Face Groups”, In Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences. 
Sokolova, M., Nastase, V., Szpakowicz, S., and Shan, M. (2005). "Analysis and Models of 
Language in Electronic Negotiations", In M. Draminski, et al. (Eds.), Issues in Intelligent 
Systems, Models and Techniques (pp. 197-211). Warszawa: Akademicka Oficyna 
Wydawnicza EXIT. 
Soo, V.W., and Hung, C.A. (2002). “On-Line Incremental Learning in Bilateral Multi-Issue 
Negotiation”, 1st International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent 
Systems, pp. 314-315.  
Spielberger, C.D. (1972). “Conceptual and Methodological Issues in Anxiety Research”, in 
Anxiety: Current Trends in Theory and Research (2), Spielberger, C.D. and Sarason, I.G.  
(Eds.), Academic Press, New York, pp. 481-494. 
Starke, K. and Rangaswamy, A. (2000). “Computer-Mediated Negotiations: Review and 
Research Opportunities”, Encyclopaedia of Microcomputers (Vol. 26), New York: Marcel 
Inc. 
Steele, C.M. (1997). “A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance”, American Psychologist, 52, pp. 613-629. 
Strobel, M., and Weinhardt, C. (2003). “The Montreal Taxonomy for Electronic Negotiations”, 
Group Decision and Negotiation, 12(2), pp. 143-164. 
Stuhlmacher, A.F., and Walters, A.E. (1999). "Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A 
Meta-Analysis", Personnel Psychology, 52(3), pp. 653-677.  
 Bibliography 
235 
Swingle, P.G. (1970). “Exploitative Behavior in Non-Zero-Sum Games”, Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 16, pp. 121-132. 
Sycara, K.P. (1990). “Negotiation Planning: An AI Approach”, European Journal of Operational 
Research, 46, pp. 216-3-234. 
Sycara, K. (1992). “The PERSUADER”, In Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence, Shapiro, D. 
(Ed.), John Wiley and Sons Inc., New York. 
Taylor, S., and Todd, P.A. (1995) “Assessing IT Usage: The Role of Prior Experience.” MIS 
Quarterly, 19(4), 561-570. 
Teich, J., Korhonen, P., Wallenius, H., and Wallenius, J. (2000). „Conducting Dyadic Multiple 
Issue Negotiation Experiments: Methodological Recommendations“, Group Decision and 
Negotiation, 9, pp. 347-354. 
Thiessen, E.M., and Loucks D.P. (1994). “ICANS: Interactive Computer Assisted Negotiation 
Support”, In Proceedings of the Workshop on Computer Assisted Negotiation and 
Mediation: Prospects and Limits, Harvard, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA. 
Thiessen, E.M., Loucks, D.P. and Stedinger, J.R. (1998). “Computer-Assisted Negotiations of 
Water Resources Conflicts”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 7(2), pp. 109-129. 
Thompson, L. (1990). “Negotiation Behavior and Outcomes: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical 
Issues”, Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), pp. 515-532. 
Thompson, L.L., and Hastie, R. (1990). “Social Perception in Negotiation”, Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47, pp. 98-123. 
Thompson, L. and Loewenstein, G. (1992). “Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and 
Interpersonal Conflict”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, pp. 
176-197. 
Thompson, L., Peterson, E., and Kray, L. (1995). “Social context in negotiation: An information-
processing perspective”, In R. Kramer and D. Messick (Eds.), Negotiation as a Social 
Process. New York: Russell Sage. 
Tinsley, C., Curhan, J., and Kwak, R.S. (1999). “Adopting a Dual Lens Approach for 
Overcoming the Dilemma of Difference in International Business Negotiations”, 
International Negotiation, 4, pp. 1-18. 
Toothacker, L.E. (1993). Multiple Comparisons Procedures. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.  
Touval, S. (1988). “Multilateral Negotiation: An Analytical Approach”, Negotiation Journal, 
5(2), pp. 159-173. 
Tripp, T.M., and Sondak, H. (1992). “An Evaluation of Dependent Variables in Experimental 
Negotiation Studies: The Role of Impasse Rates and Pareto Efficiency”, Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, pp. 273-295. 
Tse, D.K., Francis, J., and Walls, J. (1994). "Cultural Differences in Conducting Intra- and Inter- 
Cultural Negotiations: A Sino-Canadian Comparison", Journal of International Business 
Studies, 25, pp. 537-555. 
Tung, L.L., and Quaddus, M.A. (2002). "Cultural Differences Explaining the Differences in 




Turban, E., King, D., Lee, J., Warkentin, M., and Chung, H.M. (2002). Electronic Commerce 
2002: A Managerial Perspective (2nd Edition). Prentice Hall, 2002. 
Turel, O., and Yuan, Y. (2007). “User Acceptance of Web-Based Negotiation Support Systems: 
The Role of Perceived Intention of the Negotiating Partner to Negotiate Online”, Group 
Decision and Negotiation (forthcoming). 
Tversky, A., and Kahnemen, D. (1981). “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of 
Choice”, Science, 211, pp. 453-458. 
Vallery, K.L., Neale, M.A., and Mannix, E.A. (1995). “Relationships in Negotiations: The role of 
Reputation, the Shadow of the Future, and Interpersonal Knowledge on the Process and 
Outcome of Negotiations”, In Bies, R.J., Lewicki, R., and Sheppard, B. (Eds.), Research in 
Bargaining and Negotiation in Organizations. Vol. 5, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Vetschera, R., Kersten, G., and Koeszegi, S. (2006). “User Assessment of Internet-Based 
Negotiation Support Systems: An Exploratory Study”, Journal of Organizational 
Computing, 16(2), pp.123-148. 
Victor, D. (1992). International Business Communication, New York: Harper Collins Publishers. 
Wall, J.A., and Blum, M. (1991). “Negotiations”, Journal of Management, 17, pp. 273-303. 
Walster, E. H., Walster, G. W., and Berscheid, E. (1978). Equity: Theory and Research. Boston: 
Allyn & Bacon. 
Walton, R.E., and McKersie, R.B. (1965). A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations. McGraw-
Hill Book Company, New York. 
Weigand, H., Moor, A.D., Schoop, M., and Dignum, F. (2003). “B2B Negotiation Support: The 
Need for a Communication Perspective”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 12, p.3-29. 
Whorf, B.L. (1952). Collected Papers on Metalinguistics. Washington D.C: Department of State, 
Foreign Service Institute. 
Wichman, H. (1970). “Effects of Isolation and Communication on Cooperation in a Two-Person 
Game”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, pp. 114-120. 
Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus, S., Holley, K.M., and Harris, M.A. (1995). “GENIE: A Decision Support 
System for Crisis Negotiations”, Decision Support Systems, 14, pp. 369-391. 
Wilson, D.T., and Moller, K.E.K. (1991). “Buyer-Seller Relationships: Alternative 
Conceptualizations”, in Paliwoda, S.J. (Ed.), New Perspectives on International Marketing, 
New York: Routledge, pp. 87-107. 
Yang, Y.P., Zhong, Y., Guo, X. J., and Lim, J. (2005). "An Empirical Study on Negotiators' 
Perceived Control and System Anxiety towards Agent-based Negotiation Support Tool", In 
Proceedings of Group Decision and Negotiation 2005: GDN2005. Vienna, Austria, 10-13 
July 2005. 
Yang, Y.P., Lim, J., and Chen, Y. (2006). "Alternate Designs on Agent-Based e-Negotiation 
Systems: Concepts and Implementation", 16th Workshop on Information Technology and 
Systems: WITS2006, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, United States, 9-10 December, 2006.  
Yang, Y.P., Lim, J., Zhong, Y., Guo, X, and Li, X. (2007a). "Who is Taking Over Control? A 
Psychological Perspective in Examining Effects of Agent-based Negotiation Support 
Technologies". In D. Harris (Ed.): Engineering Psychology and Cognitive Ergonomics, 
Proceedings of International Conference of Human-Computer Interaction 2007, LNAI 4562, 
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007, pp. 222-231, 2007. 
 Bibliography 
237 
Yang, Y.P., Zhong, Y., and Lim, J. (2007b). “Attitudes towards Accepting Negotiation Support 
Functions in e-Marketplace Websites: An Exploratory Field Study in China”. Group 
Decision and Negotiation 2007: GDN2007, Montreal, Canada, 14-17 May, 2007.  
Yates, J. and Orlikowski, W.J. (1992). “Genres of Organizational Communication: An Approach 
to Studying Communication and Media”, Academy of Management Review. 17, pp. 299-326. 
Young, H.P. (1991). “Fair Division”, in Young, H.P. (Ed.), Negotiation Analysis, University of 
Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, pp. 25-45. 
Yuan, Y., Rose, J., Suarga, S., and Archer, N. (1998). “A Web-Based Negotiation Support 
System”, International Journal of Electronic Markets, 8(3), pp. 13-17. 
Yuan, Y.F., Head, M., and Du, M. (2003). “The Effects of Multimedia Communication on Web-
Based Negotiation.” Group Decision and Negotiation, 12, pp. 89-109. 
Yukl, G. (1974). "Effects of the Opponent’s Initial Offer, Concession Magnitude, and Concession 
Frequency on Bargaining Behavior", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30(3), 
pp. 323-335. 
Zartman, I.W., and Berman, M.R. (1982). The Practical Negotiator. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Zeng, D, and Sycara, K. (1998). “Bayesian Learning in Negotiation”, International Journal of 
Human Computer Studies, 48(1), pp. 125-141. 
 Appendix A Experimental Materials 
A-1 
APPENDIX A  EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS 
A.1 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS  
(This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
Thank you very much for participating in the online negotiation study. The following is an 
overview of the experimental procedures:  
Pre-Negotiation preparation: 
1. You will be assigned as the role of a purchasing manager or sales manager representing 
either Buyer Company or Seller Company. You will read the File B: Background Information 
of Negotiation Case for both your own and the opponent Company. 
2. You will be given File C: Confidential Information Sheet for your own company. An 
exercise will be conducted to ensure you will understand the task. 
3. You will be given File D: User Manual for ProNeg and be trained to use the 
Negotiation Support System. 
4. You will be asked to fill in File E: Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire. 
5. You will be given File F: Negotiation Memo and log into the online negotiation system 
using the Username and Password given.  
Actual Negotiation: 
6.  Please DO NOT proceed to the actual negotiation until you are told to do so.  
7.  While you are negotiating with your opponent using the online Negotiation Support 
System (ProNeg), an instructor will be available in the room for assistance.   
Note: There will be NO TIME LIMIT for your negotiation session.  
Post-Negotiation: 
8. After settlement, you will be asked to fill in File G: Post-Negotiation Questionnaire. 
There are two rules you are expected to follow:  
1) Try to imagine yourself as professional business people who try to clinch a deal with the other 
party. In other words, take your role seriously and play as well as you can.   
2) You should not reveal any aspect of this study to anyone. It is important that people do not 
have preconceived notions or expectations about the procedures.  
 
To appreciate your time and effort, the experiment administrator will give away a small gift as a 
token of appreciation. The pair of participants who achieve the HIGHEST join outcome will 
receive a $200 Takashimaya shopping voucher. (Joint outcome is calculated by adding up the 
utility scores achieved by both you and your opponent on the final agreement.) 
A.2 PUBLIC INFORMATION ON THE BACKGROUND NEGOTIATION TASK 
Background Information on Buyer, Roberts Enterprise, Inc. (This portion is given to Buyers) 
Roberts Enterprise, Inc. is a major U.S. engine manufacturer. During the last two quarters of 2005, 
total sales volume increased slightly; however, as a percent of market share, sales does not look 
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good. Roberts' market share remained constant during the third quarter and has dropped slightly 
during the fourth, despite vigorous sales effort.  
In an effort to reverse this trend, the marketing research department has proposed introducing a 
lower priced engine, which would sell for approximately $3,000. An important subcomponent for 
this engine is the turbocharger, which Roberts can purchase for substantially less than they can 
manufacture themselves. The negotiation in which you are about to participate concerns the 
specific terms of a three-year contract to purchase this subcomponent.  
Roberts' marketing department hopes that turbocharger delivery can begin within five months in 
order to penetrate the fall, 2006 boating market. The engineering department estimates that 
$200.00/unit is a reasonable price to pay for the turbocharger. Marketing has advised the 
purchasing department that a contract which guarantees purchase of more than 5,000 units per 
year would be risky. In addition, it is very desirable to Roberts to obtain a full four year 
warranty (parts and labor) on turbochargers, as they have just lengthened their engine warranty 
to four years.  
Roberts deals regularly with three major suppliers. All offer quality parts and good service and all 
have made good on all aspects of previous purchase agreements. Roberts is confident it can 
expect the same good performance in the future from these companies.  
 
Background Information on Seller, Simo Parts Distributor (This portion is given to Sellers) 
Simo Parts Distributor has enjoyed a good working relationship with Roberts Enterprise for 
several years. The company began as a small engine parts supplier, with pistons and connecting 
rods accounting for the majority of their sales. Over the past several years the small engine parts 
market has become extremely competitive due to the increase in foreign imports. Simo responded 
by expanding its product line to include more expensive engine subcomponents such as 
crankshafts and turbochargers. They have found they can be very competitive in this area because 
they have the technical skill to build components to buyers' specifications and can use existing 
distribution channels.  
Both marketing and production are in agreement that several less profitable small parts should be 
dropped from their production line in order to place more emphasis on the specialty 
subcomponent market. Simo is building a good reputation in this area and the company's future 
looks bright.   
When a Roberts purchasing agent first mentioned the special turbocharger to Simo's sales 
representatives, the representatives called a meeting with major department heads to discuss what 
would be--in Simo's terms-- a “fair agreement". During the meeting the Vice-President of 
production explained that a significant investment in research and development would be required 
to finalize the design of the turbocharger. Additionally, the company would incur set up costs and 
lost production costs on the small parts lines which would have to be converted for turbocharger 
processing. The production VP is confident, however, that the first shipment could be ready 
within eight months. They are also very willing to offer a full one-year warranty on parts and 
labor.  
In order to recoup costs, the production, marketing, and finance departments agree that the 
absolute minimum price they would be willing to commit to over the next three years is 
$224.00/uint. Further, they could only agree to this low price if Roberts agreed to purchase a 
minimum of 8,000 units per year. Considering the quality of the product they will be delivering 
and the development and production costs they will incur, Simo considers this to be a very 
reasonable offer.  
 
Summary (This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
In summary, the two companies have a good working relationship with each other, and both 
would like to come to agreement on the terms of the purchase/sales contract. At the present time, 
however, their stands on the four issues of price, minimum purchase quantity, warranty 
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period, and time of first delivery are not compatible. It may be difficult to negotiate a 
compromise. Neither side should enter into an agreement where they feel they are "being taken"; 
conversely, neither should be so inflexible that compromise is impossible.  
Due to the long geographic distance and the inconvenient timing for the managers to travel, the 
Management Committees of the two companies had a prior discussion and jointly decided that 
they would use a web-based Negotiation Support System, ProNeg that is offered by a neutral 
third party, to negotiate for this business deal online. 
A.3 PRIVATE INFORMATION ON PAYOFF POINT STRUCTURE AND BATNA 
Point Structure and the Bottom Line (This portion is given to Buyers in Low Conflict 
treatments) 
This is the confidential information about your company guideline in this negotiation case. It 
consists of the important POINT STRUCTURE of the utility scores that represent how favorable 
an alternative contract meant for your company. 
It is of CRITICAL IMPORTANCE that the purchased quantity agreed upon does not exceed 
5,000 units per year significantly, because your company does not have the money or the 
inventory space for subcomponents that are not currently needed. Your company also concerned 
about the delivery time of the first shipment. In order to capitalize on fall boat sales, your 
company desires an early shipment date, the earlier the better. This is VERY IMPORTANT.  
Of course warranty time period and the price are IMPORTANT to your company. The less paid 
and the longer the warranty, the better. These issues are not as critical as quantity and delivery 
time. Thus, if the minimum quantity can be kept low and the product delivered quickly, your 
company would be willing to pay a higher price and sign a contract with a shorter warranty 
period.  
 
The utility point structure summarizing your confidential negotiation task is as follows:  
Price  $200 $204 $208 $212 $216 $220 $224 
Score  15 13 11 8 5 3 0 
   
Quantity 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 
Score  39 33 27 20 13 7 0 
 
Warranty 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year 
Score 17 10 5 0 
 
Delivery 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 
Score 29 19 10 0 
 
As shrewd purchasing manager you have explored possible agreements with your other two 
major suppliers. One could not make delivery before August, so you ruled that company out. The 
other has made the following final bid  
 
Price    $208/unit  
Quantity   7,000 units/year        Utility score on this alternative is 11+13+10+10 = 44 
Warranty  3 years    (based on the utility point structure) 
Delivery  7 months  
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Note that this is what you will get from another supplier if you do not reach agreement with Simo, 
in other words, the final agreement you would make with Simo should be higher than this offer – 
the bottom line of this negotiation.  
 
Point Structure and the Bottom Line (This portion is given to Sellers in Low Conflict 
treatments) 
This is the confidential information about your company guideline in this negotiation case. It 
consists of the important POINT STRUCTURE of the utility scores that represent how favorable 
an alternative contract meant for your company. 
The most critical issue for your company is the price. Your company will have a large investment 
in research and development and etc. Setting a higher price in this contract is EXTREMELY 
IMPORTANT; not only it will be the price per unit for the next three years, but also it will form 
the price basis of any future negotiations. Also, the warranty period is VERY IMPORTANT. 
Your company has always offered a one-year warranty on all its parts, and intends to continue. 
Each year extended, will add a considerable expense to your company. So the shorter the 
warranty period the better!  
Of course it is IMPORTANT that Roberts agree to buy a minimum quantity per year, and your 
company's marketing research department believes the 8,000/year request is reasonable. Delivery 
time is also IMPORTANT. Your company could deliver the product in five months, but desires a 
longer delivery time in order to properly research the product and set up production. To 
summarize, the minimum quantity and delivery time are both important issues. These issues 
should NOT be ignored; however, keep in mind that your company would be willing to accept a 
shorter delivery time and a smaller purchase quantity if Roberts agrees to a higher price and 
shorter warranty period.  
 
The utility point structure summarizing your confidential negotiation task is as follows:  
Price      $200 $204 $208 $212 $216 $220 $224 
Score  0 6 12 19 25 31 37 
 
Quantity 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 
Score  0 3 5 8 10 13 15 
 
Warranty 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year 
Score 0 9 19 28 
 
Delivery 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 
Score 0 7 13 20 
 
Unknown by Roberts is that one of their major competitors has also demonstrated an interest in a 
small engine turbocharger. Your company does not have the capacity to handle contracts for both 
Roberts and Roberts’ competitor, so only one agreement will be made. If you and Roberts' 
purchasing agent cannot come to terms, you will accept the following final offer made by the 
competitor: 
 
Price    $208/unit  
Quantity   7,000 units/year        Utility score on this alternative is 12+10+9+13 = 44 
Warranty  3 years    (based on the utility point structure) 
Delivery  7 months  
 Appendix A Experimental Materials 
A-5 
Note that this is what you will get for selling the products if you do not reach agreement with 
Roberts, in other words, the final agreement you would make with Roberts should be higher than 
this alternative – the bottom line of this negotiation. 
 
Point Structure and the Bottom Line (This portion is given to Buyers in High Conflict 
treatments) 
This is the confidential information about your company guideline in this negotiation case. It 
consists of the important POINT STRUCTURE of the utility scores that represent how favorable 
an alternative contract meant for your company. 
The most CRITICAL issue for your company is price. Your company is counting on sales of this 
new engine to reverse the trend of declining market share. The only way for this engine to 
penetrate the market, however, is to price it competitively. Thus the subcomponent price must be 
kept at a minimum. It is also important to keep the price low because the amount agreed upon in 
this contract will form the basis for any future turbocharger negotiations with Simo. It is VERY 
IMPORTANT that the purchased quantity agreed upon does not exceed 5,000 units per year 
significantly, because your company does not have the money or the inventory space for 
subcomponents that are not currently needed.  
 Your company is also concerned about the delivery time of the first shipment. In order to 
capitalize on fall boat sales, your company desires an early shipment date, the earlier the better. 
This is IMPORTANT. Of course warranty time period is also IMPORTANT to your company. 
These issues are not as critical as price and quantity. Thus, if the price and minimum quantity can 
be kept low, your company would be willing to sign a contract with a shorter warranty period and 
accept later delivery.  
 
The utility point structure summarizing your confidential negotiation task is as follows:  
Price $200 $204 $208 $212 $216 $220 $224 
Score 39 33 26 20 13 7 0 
 
Quantity 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 
Score 29 24 19 15 10 5 0 
  
Warranty 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year 
Score 15 10 5 0 
 
Delivery 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 
Score 17 11 6 0 
 
As shrewd purchasing manager you have explored possible agreements with your other two 
major suppliers. One could not make delivery before August, so you ruled that company out. The 
other has made the following final bid  
Price    $216/unit  
Quantity   7,000 units/year      Utility score on this alternative is 13+10+10+11 = 44 
Warranty  3 years    (based on the utility point structure) 
Delivery  6 months  
Note that this is what you will get from another supplier if you do not reach agreement with Simo, 
in other words, the final agreement you would make with Simo should be higher than this offer – 
the bottom line of this negotiation.  
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Point Structure and the Bottom Line (This portion is given to Sellers in High Conflict 
treatments) 
This is the confidential information about your company guideline in this negotiation case. It 
consists of the important POINT STRUCTURE of the utility scores that represent how favorable 
an alternative contract meant for your company. 
The most critical issue for your company is the price of the turbocharger. Your company will 
have a large investment in research and development and etc. Setting a higher price in this 
contract is EXTREMELY IMPORTANT; not only it will be the price per unit for the next three 
years, but also it will form the price basis of any future negotiations. Also, the minimum quantity 
purchased is VERY IMPORTANT. Your company wants to use this opportunity to drop some of 
its small parts lines and get more entrenched in the larger parts market. Assuring a large quantity 
of sales of products will help your company achieve this goal. In addition, sales of more units will 
help recover the setup costs.  
Of course it is IMPORTANT that the warranty period be kept to a minimum. Every year it is 
extended adds additional expense to the company. Also IMPORTANT is the delivery time. Your 
company could deliver the product in five months, but desires a longer delivery time in order to 
properly research the product and set up production. To summarize, warranty period and delivery 
time are both important issues. These issues should NOT be ignored; however, keep in mind that 
your company would be willing to accept a shorter delivery time and a longer warranty period if 
Roberts will agree to a higher price and larger minimum annual quantity.  
 
The utility point structure summarizing your confidential negotiation task is as follows:  
Price  $200 $204 $208 $212 $216 $220 $224 
Score  0 6 11 18 23 29 35 
 
Quantity 5,000 5,500 6,000 6,500 7,000 7,500 8,000 
Score  0 5 10 15 19 24 29 
  
Warranty 4 years 3 years 2 years 1 year 
Score 0 7 12 19 
 
Delivery 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 
Score 0 6 11 17 
 
Unknown by Roberts is that one of their major competitors has also demonstrated an interest in a 
small engine turbocharger. Your company does not have the capacity to handle contracts for both 
Roberts and Roberts’ competitor, so only one agreement will be made. If you and Roberts' 
purchasing agent cannot come to terms, you will accept the following final offer made by the 
competitor: 
Price    $208/unit  
Quantity   6,000 units/year        Utility score on this alternative is 11+10+12+11 = 44 
Warranty  2 years    (based on the utility point structure) 
Delivery  7 months  
Note that this is what you will get for selling the products if you do not reach agreement with 
Roberts, in other words, the final agreement you would make with Roberts should be higher than 
this alternative – the bottom line of this negotiation.  
 
Understand Your Task (This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
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1.  My role is ________ (buyer/seller). 
2.  I will negotiate________ (how many) issues. 
3.  The two most important issues to my company are _______and_____. 
4.  How many possible alternatives for the final agreement? ______________ (Hint: there are 7 
choices for the price issue, 7 choices for quantity, 4 for warranty and 4 for delivery.) 
5.   At the end of the bargaining session, the utility score for the final contract agreement must be 
no less than _________ points. (Hint: please refer to bottom line of your company) 
6.  I expect to obtain approximately _______ points, which will make me satisfied for my 
negotiation task. (Hint: This depends on your own expectation.) 
A.4 USER MANUAL ON THE THREE PRONEG SYSTEMS 
User Manual on ProNeg (This portion is given to subjects in Level-1 system treatments) 
ProNeg is the name of the web-based negotiation support system that facilitates negotiation 
activities online. It consists of pages for Log In, Determine Issue Ratings, Point Structure, 
Specify Bottom Line and the main page with the following components: 
 
 
Figure 1. Screen Shot of the Main Page of ProNeg. 
 
1. Alternative Evaluator: 
It can help you to calculate your own utility scores for certain contract alternative that your 
opponent offered/proposed or contracts you want to offer to him/her. 
2. Alternative Generator: 
It can be used to generate the best three contract alternatives that give the highest JOINT 
OUTCOME. You need to input your estimation on how your opponents weight the four issues, 
i.e., to inform the system how you estimate the point structure of your opponents.  
With this information and the point structure of your own (already built in the system), the 
component can compute from the 784 alternatives and suggest the best 3 alternatives in terms of 
joint utility score. 
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Note that the more you communicate with your opponent, the more accurate you would estimate 
your opponent’s approximate point structure. With an accurate or near-accurate point structure, 
this component will give the contract alternative leading to highest joint outcome. 
3. Text Messaging: 
This component enables text-based electronic communication between you and your opponent. 
With this, you can Propose for new alternatives to your opponent, Reject offers from your 
opponent, or Accept an offer from your opponent. 
 
User Manual on ProNeg (This portion is given to subjects in Level-2 system treatments) 
ProNeg is the name of the web-based negotiation support system that facilitates negotiation 
activities online. It consists of pages for Log In, Determine Issue Ratings, Point Structure, 




Figure 1. Screen Shot of the Main Page of ProNeg. 
 
1. Intelligent Agent (reflected through Proposal History): 
ProNeg works as an intelligent agent that automatically negotiates for the final agreement on 
behalf of you. Its activity is reflected in the proposal history (offers, rejections and final 
acceptation) made by the agent working on behalf of you and your opponents. 
By inputting your own point structure and bottom line information, the agent starts from the 
highest utility score (100), make concessions slowly (propose alternative one by one that is 
favorable to you), until an agreement is reached. It will ensure to satisfy your bottom line (44), 
and achieve the highest possible final contract alternative while the opponent would agree with. 
In the mean time while your agent is negotiating, you can take your time to chat with your 
opponent or leave the system idle to do other things, such as surfing net. 
2. Text Messaging: 
This component enables text-based electronic communication between you and your opponent.  
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User Manual on ProNeg (This portion is given to subjects in Level-3 system treatments) 
ProNeg is the name of the web-based negotiation support system that facilitates negotiation 
activities online. It consists of pages for Log In, Determine Issue Ratings, Point Structure, 
Specify Bottom Line and the main page with the following components: 
 
 
Figure 1. Screen Shot of the Main Page of ProNeg. 
1. Alternative Evaluator: 
It can help you to calculate your own utility scores for certain contract alternative that your 
opponent offered/proposed or contracts you want to offer to him/her. 
2. Text Messaging: 
This component enables text-based electronic communication between you and your opponent.  
3. Intelligent Agent: 
ProNeg works as an intelligent agent that automatically negotiates for the final agreement on 
behalf of you. Its activity is reflected in the proposal history (offers, rejections and final 
acceptation) made by the agent working on behalf of you and your opponents. 
Generally, with your own point structure and bottom line information built in, the agent starts 
from the highest utility score (100), make concessions slowly (propose alternative one by one that 
is favorable to you), until an agreement is reached. It will ensure to satisfy your bottom line (44), 
and achieve the highest possible final contract alternative while the opponent would agree with. 
You can start from chat with your opponent and estimate his/her issue weightages, then input 
your estimation on how your opponents weight the four issues, i.e., to inform the agent how 
you estimate the point structure of your opponents.  
You can also personalize your agent by choosing negotiation strategies, soft or hard, whenever 
deemed appropriate. The Conceder/Soft strategy concedes faster while the Boulware/Tough 
strategy concedes slower. (Try NOT to use Conceder strategy when your self utility approaches 
BATNA since it may miss out some good offers) 
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* You can modify your estimation and negotiation strategy at any time to adjust the agent’s 
concession-based automated negotiation process. 
After the agent is started for some time, it can learn from the behavior of the opponent and 




By clicking then enabled button, you will be able to see the agent’s estimation on your 
opponent’s issue priorities that is highly accurate.  
Note that the more you communicate with your opponent using the Text Messaging component, 
the more accurate you would estimate your opponent’s approximate point structure. With an 
accurate or near-accurate point structure and appropriate strategies, the agent can work faster as 
well obtain better joint outcome. 
In the mean time while your agent is negotiating, you can also take your time to chat with your 
opponent or leave the system idle to do other things, such as surfing net. 
A.5 PRE-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
(This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
1. What is your level of experience in working in groups? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Very Low         Medium            Very High 
2. What is your level of experience in making business decisions? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Very Low         Medium            Very High 
3. What is your level of experience in using computers? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Very Low         Medium            Very High 
4. Have you ever used Negotiation Support System or other decision support systems? __ 
(Yes/No) 
If your answer is yes, what is your level of experience in using Negotiation Support System or 
other decision support systems? 
   1  2  3  4  5 
Very Low         Medium            Very High 
5. I could complete a job using a software package: 
 
Strongly            Strongly                                                                             
Disagree                                           Agree 
if there was no one around to tell me what to do as I go. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
if I had never used a package like it before. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
if someone showed me how to do it first. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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A.6 NEGOTIATION MEMO 
(This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
NUSNET ID: _______________ 
URL of ProNeg: http://172.18.181.137/nss 




- Strive to maximize your own utility score, and aim for higher joint outcome. 
- You are not supposed to reveal confidential information about your company (File C). 
- Utilize the tools/components of ProNeg to facilitate your negotiation activities. 
- No time limit for reaching agreement. 
Final Agreement 
No. Issue Agreed Value 
1 Unit price  
2 Minimum quantity purchased  
3 Warranty period  
4 Time of first delivery  
 
The utility score that you achieved on this agreement: ___ (should be at least 44). 
A.7 POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
(This portion is given to subjects in all treatments) 
A seven point Likert scale is used for the following post-negotiation questionnaire items, with 1 
being the negative end indicating “Strongly Disagree” and 7 being the positive end representing 
“Strongly Agree”. 
Table A-1. Items for Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere and Satisfaction 
Variables Item No. Items 
CA_1 For the most part of negotiation, the opponent was considerate. Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere CA_2 For the most part of negotiation, the opponent was flexible. 
if I had seen someone else using it before trying it 
myself. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
if I could call someone for help if I get stuck. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
if someone else had helped me get started. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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CA_3 During the negotiation, the opponent was not a cooperative bargainer. (R) 
CA_4* The atmosphere of the negotiation with my opponent is friendly. 
SA_PE_1* I am satisfied with the final agreement in this negotiation. 
SA_PE_2* I am satisfied with my own performance as a negotiator. 
SA_PE_3 I am satisfied with the number of utility points I earned. 
Perceived 
Efficiency 
SA_PE_4* I think the outcome of the negotiation is satisfactory for my 
company. 
SA_PF_1 I think the outcome of the negotiation was fair to both companies. 






SA_PF_1 Neither of us is better off than the other. 
* Items are used in post-negotiation attitude questionnaire in experiment 3. 
 
Table A-2. Items for Perceived control 
 PC_CC_1  It was easy for me to visualize the way in which ProNeg works. 
 PC_CC_2  I understood, at least abstractly, the components of ProNeg and how they work. 
 PC_CC_3  I have used other systems that are similar to ProNeg in terms of the functionality. 
Cognitive  
Control 
 PC_CC_4  The objectives I attempt on ProNeg are very similar to the ones that I have 
successfully completed in the past. 
 PC_DC_1  ProNeg allowed me to make decisions about the way I would achieve my expected 
outcome. 
 PC_DC_2  ProNeg allowed me to devise my own strategies to complete my negotiation task. 




 PC_DC_4  ProNeg allowed me to attempt to achieve my expected outcome in any manner I 
want. 
 PC_BC_1  I was able to use a very flexible approach to complete my negotiation task using ProNeg. Behavior 
Control 
 PC_BC_2  I easily adjusted my negotiation strategies when I felt necessary to do so. 
 
Table A-3. Items for System anxiety 
 SA_1  Using ProNeg made me nervous. 
 SA_2  Using ProNeg made me uneasy. 
 SA_3  I felt comfortable using ProNeg. (R) 
 SA_4  I felt tense using ProNeg. 
 
 
 System Anxiety  
 SA_5  I felt uncertain using ProNeg. 
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APPENDIX B MORE STATISTICAL OUTPUTS FOR 
EXPERIMENT 4 (CHAPTER 8) 
B.1 VALIDATION TESTS ON CONTROLLED VARIABLES  
(1) Age, Experiences and Computer Efficacy 
The descriptive statistics for the control variables are presented in Table B-1. 
Two-way MANOVA test are performed on age, past experiences and computer self-efficacy of 
subjects to examine differences caused by control variables across different treatment groups. 
Results of MANOVA tests are presented in Table B-2. 
The MANOVA results showed no significant differences for past experiences and computer self-
efficacy of subjects across different conditions, ensuring the effects of these variables are 
effectively controlled.  
Age was not differed by system types but differed by conflict levels, i.e., main effects of conflict 
level on age were detected. To control the potential effect of age on dependent variables, further 
data analysis used age as covariate was conducted. MANOVA tests with/without age as the 
covariate was further performed to examine the impact of age on dependent variables. The results 
showed that age did not have main effect on all dependent variables expect perceived control. 
However, it did not influence the conclusion for effects of independent variables on perceived 
control. Table B-3 presents the MANCOVA results with age as the covariate. (Comparing results 
in Table B-3 and Table B-11 without engaging age as covariate, no differences due to effects of 
age are found) Control check on age was also completed. 
Table B-1. Descriptive Statistics for Age, Past Experiences and Computer Self-efficacy 
across Treatment Groups 
 Conflict Level System Intelligence Level Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 1 22.70 2.473 20 
  2 21.94 1.434 18 
  3 22.56 2.406 18 
  Total 22.41 2.156 56 
2 1 23.80 2.484 20 
  2 22.81 1.974 16 
  3 23.95 2.800 20 
  Total 23.57 2.478 56 
Total 1 23.25 2.509 40 
  2 22.35 1.739 34 













  Total 22.99 2.384 112 
1 1 3.65 .988 20 




  3 3.78 1.003 18 
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  Total 3.75 .995 56 
2 1 3.30 .801 20 
  2 3.88 .885 16 
  3 3.80 .894 20 
  Total 3.64 .883 56 
Total 1 3.48 .905 40 
  2 3.85 .958 34 










 Total 3.70 .938 112 
1 1 2.50 1.000 20 
  2 2.44 .922 18 
  3 2.56 .984 18 
  Total 2.50 .953 56 
2 1 2.00 .725 20 
  2 2.13 1.147 16 
  3 2.35 .933 20 
  Total 2.16 .930 56 
Total 1 2.25 .899 40 
  2 2.29 1.031 34 














  Total 2.33 .953 112 
1 1 4.60 .598 20 
  2 4.56 .705 18 
  3 4.56 .616 18 
  Total 4.57 .628 56 
2 1 4.55 .605 20 
  2 4.50 .730 16 
  3 4.60 .598 20 
  Total 4.55 .630 56 
Total 1 4.58 .594 40 
  2 4.53 .706 34 














  Total 4.56 .626 112 
1 1 .10 .447 20 
  2 .06 .236 18 
  3 .17 .707 18 
  Total .11 .493 56 
2 1 .15 .489 20 
  2 .31 .873 16 
  3 .10 .447 20 
  Total .18 .606 56 
Total 1 .13 .463 40 











  3 .13 .578 38 
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  Total .14 .551 112 
1 1 5.2500 .93111 20 
  2 5.2222 1.07558 18 
  3 5.2222 .88377 18 
  Total 5.2321 .94798 56 
2 1 4.9917 .99041 20 
  2 4.7083 1.05321 16 
  3 5.3417 1.12192 20 
  Total 5.0357 1.06871 56 
Total 1 5.1208 .95779 40 
  2 4.9804 1.08072 34 














  Total 5.1339 1.01042 112 
 
Table B-2. Two-Way ANOVA Results on Age, Past Experiences and Computer Self-efficacy 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III  
Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
ConflictLevel Age 34.938 1 34.938 6.450 .013* 
  Level of Experience in Groupwork 
.253 1 .253 .287 .593 
  Level of Experience in Business 
Decision 3.247 1 3.247 3.578 .061 
  Level of Experience in Computer .012 1 .012 .028 .867 
  Level of Experience in NSS .178 1 .178 .573 .451 
  Computer Efficacy 1.317 1 1.317 1.285 .260 
SystemLevel Age 17.990 2 8.995 1.661 .195 
  Level of Experience in Groupwork 3.128 2 1.564 1.777 .174 
  Level of Experience in Business 
Decision .897 2 .448 .494 .612 
  Level of Experience in Computer .056 2 .028 .068 .934 
  Level of Experience in NSS .073 2 .036 .117 .890 
  Computer Efficacy 1.797 2 .899 .877 .419 
ConflictLevel 
* SystemLevel 
Age 1.253 2 .626 .116 .891 
  Level of Experience in Groupwork .936 2 .468 .532 .589 
  Level of Experience in Business 
Decision .430 2 .215 .237 .789 
  Level of Experience in Computer .059 2 .030 .072 .931 
  Level of Experience in NSS 
.477 2 .238 .765 .468 
  Computer Efficacy 1.834 2 .917 .895 .412 
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Table B-3. Results of Two-Way MANCOVA Tests Using Age as Covariance 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
age Joint Outcome .071 1 .071 .006 .936 
  Contract Balance 106.896 1 106.896 2.182 .143 
  Negotiation Time 570.409 1 570.409 2.637 .107 
  Satisfaction with 
Settlement .002 1 .002 .002 .968 
  Perceived Efficiency .002 1 .002 .001 .974 
  Perceived Fairness .003 1 .003 .002 .964 
  Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 1.613 1 1.613 1.415 .237 
  Perceived Control 8.030 1 8.030 5.337 .023* 
  PCONTROL_CC 4.049 1 4.049 2.114 .149 
  PCONTROL_DCBC 9.657 1 9.657 5.378 .022* 
  System Anxiety .199 1 .199 .138 .711 
ConflictLevel Joint Outcome 17679.711 1 17679.711 1593.920 .000** 
  Contract Balance 289.721 1 289.721 5.915 .017* 
  Negotiation Time 1821.893 1 1821.893 8.422 .005** 
  Satisfaction with 
Settlement 18.139 1 18.139 11.998 .001** 
  Perceived Efficiency 27.141 1 27.141 13.418 .000** 
  Perceived Fairness 8.947 1 8.947 6.167 .015* 
  Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 12.606 1 12.606 11.056 .001** 
  Perceived Control 1.736 1 1.736 1.154 .285 
  PCONTROL_CC 5.582 1 5.582 2.914 .091 
  PCONTROL_DCBC .939 1 .939 .523 .471 
  System Anxiety 17.473 1 17.473 12.117 .001** 
SystemLevel Joint Outcome 75.411 2 37.705 3.399 .037* 
  Contract Balance 196.917 2 98.458 2.010 .139 
  Negotiation Time 607.063 2 303.532 1.403 .250 
  Satisfaction with 
Settlement 11.182 2 5.591 3.698 .028* 
  Perceived Efficiency 25.387 2 12.694 6.275 .003** 
  Perceived Fairness 1.290 2 .645 .445 .642 
  Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere .749 2 .375 .328 .721 
  Perceived Control 24.966 2 12.483 8.296 .000** 
  PCONTROL_CC 2.622 2 1.311 .684 .507 
  PCONTROL_DCBC 40.441 2 20.220 11.261 .000** 
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  System Anxiety 6.861 2 3.430 2.379 .098 
Joint Outcome 28.113 2 14.056 1.267 .286 ConflictLevel 
* SystemLevel Contract Balance 125.667 2 62.834 1.283 .282 
  Negotiation Time 6864.959 2 3432.479 15.867 .000** 
  Satisfaction with 
Settlement 1.780 2 .890 .589 .557 
  Perceived Efficiency 3.512 2 1.756 .868 .423 
  Perceived Fairness 1.740 2 .870 .600 .551 
  Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 12.998 2 6.499 5.700 .004** 
  Perceived Control 3.558 2 1.779 1.182 .311 
  PCONTROL_CC 1.535 2 .767 .401 .671 
  PCONTROL_DCBC 4.663 2 2.331 1.298 .277 
  System Anxiety 2.225 2 1.112 .771 .465 
 
(2) Gender 
Mann-Whitney U and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests are performed on the gender of subjects to examine 
differences across different treatment groups under conflict level and intelligence level respectively. 
The results showed no significant difference across different treatment conditions. Table B-5 and B-6 
presented the descriptive statistics and Mann-Whitney U and Jonckheere-Terpstra tests respectively. 
Table B-4. Frequencies of Male and Female Subjects across Treatment Groups 
 Intelligence Level of NSS  
        Level-1      Level-2      Level-3  











High 13, 7 4, 12 17, 3 34, 22 
  
28, 12 18, 16 30, 8 
 
Table B-5. Mann-Whitney U and Jonckheere-Terpstra Tests Results on Gender 
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Mann-Whitney Test Statistics(a) 
  Gender 
Mann-Whitney U 1344.000 
Wilcoxon W 2940.000 
Z -1.611 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .107 
a  Grouping Variable: Conflict Level 
 
Jonckheere-Terpstra Test(a) 
  Gender 
Number of Levels in 
System Intelligence Level 3 
N 112 
Observed J-T Statistic 1966.000 
Mean J-T Statistic 2086.000 
Std. Deviation of J-T 
Statistic 151.212 
Std. J-T Statistic -.794 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .427 
a  Grouping Variable: System Intelligence Level 
B.2 FACTOR ANALYSIS AND RELIABILITY TESTS 
Factor analysis was performed to validate the measurement model for items describing dependent 
variables. Exploratory factor analysis was used for instrument revision and verification. 
Subsequently, confirmatory factor analysis was used to confirm the grouping items. Reliability 
tests were then conducted to test the convergent validity. 
Table B-6. Exploratory Factor Analysis - Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
CA_1 .393 .086 .000 -.029 .775 .138 
CA_2 .351 .193 -.024 .009 .826 .032 
CA_3 .048 .091 -.130 .066 .633 -.454 
CA_4 .092 .154 -.293 .311 .609 -.242 
SA_PE_1 .861 .244 -.148 .029 .109 .055 
SA_PE_2 .754 .229 -.176 .130 .162 .096 
SA_PE_3 .877 .253 -.154 -.005 .092 .064 
SA_PE_4 .819 .327 -.193 .061 .111 .048 
SA_PF_5 .767 .220 -.033 .238 .182 -.040 
SA_PF_6 .694 -.033 .054 .417 .234 .076 
SA_PF_7 .531 -.112 .106 .408 .278 -.023 
PC_CC_1 .216 .258 -.182 .782 .117 .074 
PC_CC_2 .170 .264 -.135 .722 .029 -.014 
PC_CC_3 .096 .058 .079 .014 .002 .842 
PC_CC_4 .070 .190 -.022 .030 -.104 .770 
PC_DC_5 .134 .570 -.120 .543 -.003 .222 
PC_DC_6 .235 .799 -.181 .258 .112 .144 
PC_DC_7 .094 .844 -.162 .089 .087 .101 
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PC_DC_8 .216 .868 -.096 .066 .075 .063 
PC_BC_9 .296 .813 -.087 .216 .114 .070 
PC_BC_10 .181 .842 -.069 .169 .132 -.050 
ANXIETY_1 -.019 -.106 .818 -.164 -.094 -.106 
ANXIETY_2 -.191 -.292 .753 -.320 -.036 .052 
ANXIETY_3 -.075 -.373 .317 -.474 .017 .183 
ANXIETY_4 -.078 -.012 .778 .116 -.185 .077 
ANXIETY_5 -.282 -.265 .656 -.295 .150 .163 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 7 iterations. 
 
Table B-7. Confirmatory Factor Analysis - Rotated Component Matrix 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
CA_1 .468 .115 .073 .680 -.048 
CA_2 .408 .207 .032 .771 -.014 
CA_3 .005 .025 -.157 .772 .061 
CA_4 .077 .127 -.302 .696 .279 
SA_PE_1 .851 .240 -.168 .100 .037 
SA_PE_2 .755 .239 -.188 .138 .129 
SA_PE_3 .879 .254 -.163 .066 -.009 
SA_PE_4 .821 .328 -.203 .093 .047 
SA_PF_5 .750 .218 -.065 .188 .244 
SA_PF_6 .706 -.003 .046 .180 .442 
SA_PF_7 .537 -.088 .094 .234 .445 
PC_CC_1 .209 .299 -.212 .111 .759 
PC_CC_2 .136 .290 -.187 .051 .735 
PC_DC_5 .142 .617 -.133 -.041 .512 
PC_DC_6 .243 .825 -.187 .084 .224 
PC_DC_7 .096 .853 -.164 .082 .060 
PC_DC_8 .216 .874 -.106 .066 .034 
PC_BC_9 .293 .825 -.104 .106 .185 
PC_BC_10 .161 .833 -.096 .166 .146 
ANXIETY_1 -.036 -.132 .794 -.072 -.130 
ANXIETY_2 -.171 -.288 .773 -.092 -.263 
ANXIETY_4 -.077 -.001 .762 -.210 .139 
ANXIETY_5 -.232 -.247 .711 .068 -.253 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Table B-8. Results of Reliability Tests 
Constructs Number of Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Satisfaction with Settlements (SA) 7 0.920 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere (CA) 4 0.792 
Perceived Control (PC) 8 0.919 
System Anxiety (ANXIETY) 4 0.822 
B.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND PROFILE PLOTS  
Mean, standard deviation and number of cases are presented for each of the dependent variables. 
Profile plots for the seven dependent variables were presented below for better visualization 
purpose. Note that for each profile plots, (a) used intelligence level as horizontal axis and conflict 
level as separated line, whereas (b) and used conflict level as horizontal axis and intelligence 
level as separated line. 
(1) Descriptive Statistics (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
Table B-9. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables across Treatment Groups 
 Conflict Level System Intelligence Level Mean Std. Deviation N 
Joint Outcome 1 1 127.20 3.334 20 
    2 126.11 3.894 18 
    3 129.33 4.144 18 
    Total 127.54 3.950 56 
  2 1 101.30 2.203 20 
    2 101.38 4.048 16 
    3 102.10 1.861 20 
    Total 101.61 2.735 56 
  Total 1 114.25 13.408 40 
    2 114.47 13.127 34 
    3 115.00 14.127 38 
    Total 114.57 13.454 112 
Contract Balance 1 1 11.80 8.231 20 
  
  2 6.33 6.362 18 
  
  3 6.89 7.251 18 
  
  Total 8.46 7.649 56 
  
2 1 6.00 5.749 20 
  
  2 5.00 9.223 16 
  
  3 5.50 5.011 20 
  
  Total 5.54 6.592 56 
  
Total 1 8.90 7.598 40 
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  2 5.71 7.744 34 
  
  3 6.16 6.127 38 
  
  Total 7.00 7.258 112 
Negotiation Time 1 1 28.8500 10.03385 20 
  
  2 54.7700 18.77115 18 
  
  3 40.1411 10.65358 18 
  
  Total 40.8107 17.16718 56 
  
2 1 54.8030 18.01568 20 
  
  2 42.2569 16.30822 16 
  
  3 48.3590 13.17078 20 
  
  Total 48.9170 16.43768 56 
  
Total 1 41.8265 19.49043 40 
  
  2 48.8815 18.50940 34 
  
  3 44.4663 12.59042 38 
  
  Total 44.8638 17.21877 112 
1 1 5.8071 .71093 20 
  2 4.9762 1.12085 18 
  3 5.3333 1.02549 18 
  Total 5.3878 1.00415 56 
2 1 4.7357 1.27798 20 
  2 4.0357 1.78467 16 
  3 4.8429 1.27935 20 
  Total 4.5740 1.45546 56 
Total 1 5.2714 1.15597 40 
  2 4.5336 1.52380 34 











  Total 4.9809 1.31008 112 
1 1 5.9375 .85792 20 
  2 4.8889 1.39648 18 
  3 5.3889 1.35099 18 
  Total 5.4241 1.26932 56 
2 1 4.7625 1.35839 20 
  2 3.5313 1.99348 16 
  3 4.8625 1.44294 20 
  Total 4.4464 1.66836 56 
Total 1 5.3500 1.26946 40 
  2 4.2500 1.81221 34 








  Total 5.9375 .85792 20 
1 1 5.6333 .81578 20 
  2 5.0926 1.00200 18 





  Total 5.3393 .91340 56 
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2 1 4.7000 1.36754 20 
  2 4.7083 1.67719 16 
  3 4.8167 1.29088 20 
  Total 4.7440 1.41134 56 
Total 1 5.1667 1.20776 40 
  2 4.9118 1.35415 34 








  Total 5.0417 1.22055 112 
1 1 5.7875 .73572 20 
  2 5.0000 .91956 18 
  3 5.3333 .80896 18 
  Total 5.3884 .87115 56 
2 1 4.2125 1.34818 20 
  2 4.9688 1.21063 16 
  3 5.0375 1.23617 20 
  Total 4.7232 1.30530 56 
Total 1 5.0000 1.33613 40 
  2 4.9853 1.04979 34 













  Total 5.0558 1.15407 112 
1 1 5.5625 .65707 20 
  2 4.4236 1.45783 18 
  3 4.5694 1.47043 18 
  Total 4.8772 1.32040 56 
2 1 4.8750 .94416 20 
  2 3.8672 1.45378 16 
  3 4.6438 1.38202 20 
  Total 4.5045 1.31122 56 
Total 1 5.2188 .87511 40 
  2 4.1618 1.46115 34 












  Total 4.6908 1.32319 112 
PCONTROL_CC 1 1 5.8000 1.10501 20 
  
  2 5.5000 1.47529 18 
  
  3 5.1667 1.30609 18 
  
  Total 5.5000 1.30035 56 
  
2 1 4.9500 1.28657 20 
  
  2 5.0000 1.72240 16 
  
  3 4.8500 1.45186 20 
  
  Total 4.9286 1.45361 56 
  
Total 1 5.3750 1.25958 40 
  
  2 5.2647 1.59181 34 
  
  3 5.0000 1.37546 38 
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  Total 5.2143 1.40256 112 
1 1 5.4833 .60432 20 
  2 4.0648 1.69981 18 
  3 4.3704 1.60020 18 
  Total 4.6696 1.48341 56 
2 1 4.8500 .91431 20 
  2 3.4896 1.67384 16 
  3 4.5750 1.46347 20 
  Total 4.3631 1.45509 56 
Total 1 5.1667 .82948 40 
  2 3.7941 1.68728 34 




  Total 4.5164 1.47076 112 
System Anxiety 1 1 1.8250 .95663 20 
  
  2 2.3194 .89445 18 
  
  3 2.7500 1.08465 18 
  
  Total 2.2813 1.03689 56 
  
2 1 3.0250 1.38815 20 
  
  2 3.0938 1.51898 16 
  
  3 3.2875 1.24413 20 
  
  Total 3.1384 1.35757 56 
  
Total 1 2.4250 1.32433 40 
  
  2 2.6838 1.27075 34 
  
  3 3.0329 1.18717 38 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
  Total 2.7098 1.27721 112 
(2) Profile Plots 
 
 
Figure B-1. Profile Plots for Joint Outcome 
(a) (b) 




Figure B-2. Profile Plots for Contract Balance 
 
 
Figure B-3. Profile Plots for Time to Settlement 
 
 









Figure B-5. Profile Plots for Satisfaction with Settlement (Perceived Efficiency) 
 
 
Figure B-6. Profile Plots for Satisfaction with Settlement (Perceived Fairness) 
 
 








Figure B-8. Profile Plots for Perceived Control (All Dimensions) 
 
 
Figure B-9. Profile Plots for Perceived Control (Cognitive Control Dimension Only) 
 
 









Figure B-11. Profile Plots for System Anxiety 
B.4 TWO-WAY MANOVA TESTS OUTPUTS ON DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Prior to ANOVA tests, Levene's test of homogeneity of variance is computed by SPSS to test the 
ANOVA assumption that each group (category) of the independent variables has the same 
variance (Box, 1954). Results are shown in Table B-10. In the event that the assumption is not 
met, Games-Howell method is used to test the significance of the effects (Tootharer, 1993). 
ANOVA test outputs are also shown in Table B-11.  
(1) Tests of Homogeneity of Variances 
Table B-10. Tests of Homogeneity of Variances - Levene's Test of Equality of Error 
Variances 
  F df1 df2 Sig. 
Joint Outcome 5.214 5 106 .000** 
Contract Balance .940 5 106 .459 
Negotiation Time 4.572 5 106 .001** 
Satisfaction with Settlement 2.217 5 106 .058 
Perceived Efficiency 1.723 5 106 .136 
Perceived Fairness 2.316 5 106 .049* 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 1.429 5 106 .220 
Perceived Control 3.522 5 106 .006** 
PCONTROL_CC .869 5 106 .505 
PCONTROL_DCBC 5.420 5 106 .000** 
System Anxiety 1.313 5 106 .264 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a  Design: Intercept+age+ConflictLevel+SystemLevel+ConflictLevel * SystemLevel 
 
(a) (b) 
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(2) Results of Two-Way MANOVA Tests 
Table B-11. Results of Two-Way MANOVA Tests – Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Joint Outcome 18737.460 1 18737.460 1705.266 .000** 
Contract Balance 224.431 1 224.431 4.531 .036* 
Negotiation Time 1449.452 1 1449.452 6.598 .012* 
Satisfaction with Settlement 19.350 1 19.350 12.921 .000** 
Perceived Efficiency 28.916 1 28.916 14.431 .000** 
Perceived Fairness 9.574 1 9.574 6.662 .011* 
Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 11.180 1 11.180 9.767 .002** 
Perceived Control 4.227 1 4.227 2.699 .103 
PCONTROL_CC 8.584 1 8.584 4.434 .038* 
PCONTROL_DCBC 3.114 1 3.114 1.666 .200 
ConflictLevel 
System Anxiety 19.496 1 19.496 13.630 .000** 
Joint Outcome 77.030 2 38.515 3.505 .034* 
Contract Balance 229.225 2 114.613 2.314 .104 
Negotiation Time 830.610 2 415.305 1.891 .156 
Satisfaction with Settlement 11.453 2 5.727 3.824 .025* 
Perceived Efficiency 26.068 2 13.034 6.505 .002** 
Perceived Fairness 1.301 2 .651 .453 .637 
Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere .933 2 .467 .408 .666 
Perceived Control 21.494 2 10.747 6.862 .002** 
PCONTROL_CC 2.683 2 1.342 .693 .502 
PCONTROL_DCBC 35.496 2 17.748 9.492 .000** 
SystemLevel  
System Anxiety 6.861 2 3.431 2.398 .096 
Joint Outcome 28.042 2 14.021 1.276 .283 
Contract Balance 126.452 2 63.226 1.277 .283 
Negotiation Time 6785.679 2 3392.839 15.446 .000** 
Satisfaction with Settlement 1.778 2 .889 .594 .554 
Perceived Efficiency 3.512 2 1.756 .876 .419 
Perceived Fairness 1.740 2 .870 .605 .548 
Perceived Collaborative 
Atmosphere 12.972 2 6.486 5.666 .005** 
Perceived Control 3.162 2 1.581 1.009 .368 
PCONTROL_CC 1.432 2 .716 .370 .692 













System Anxiety 2.198 2 1.099 .768 .466 
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B.5 HYPOTHESES TESTING 
Our hypotheses on dependent variables (joint outcome, contract balance, time, Perceived 
Collaborative Atmosphere) are specified in terms of the impact of different system types by 
intelligence levels and two conflict situations respectively.  
 
(1) For those dependent variables where system type has significant effects shown in Table B-1 
(i.e., Joint Outcome, Satisfaction with Settlement (and on the Perceived Efficiency dimension), 
and Perceived Control (and on the Decisional and Behavioral Dimensions)), to investigate the 
effects of specific system types (Level-3 Vs. Level-1, and Level-3 Vs. Level-2), contrast tests 
option with the last level (Level-3) as reference category was selected in the two-way MANOVA 
analysis procedure. Results of contrast tests were obtained from outputs of two-way MANOVA 
tests and are presented in Table B-12.  
 
For Level-3 Vs. Level-1: Significant main effects were detected on Joint Outcome, Perceived 
Control (and on the Decisional and Behavioral Dimensions)54 . Before conclusion, results of 
homogeneity of variances tests (Table B-10) were references to check if the assumption of 
ANOVA has been violated in order to prevent type I errors in the F test (wrongly rejecting the 
null hypothesis). All the mentioned dependent variables have unequal variances (sig > 0.05) 
except for Anxiety. We then refer to the post-hoc analysis of the two-way ANOVA outputs 
(Table B-13). As equal variances cannot be assumed, Games-Howell statistics were used and the 
results indicated no significant differences on Joint Outcome across the two system types 
(p=0.969). We conclude that Level-3 and Level-1 systems are significantly differed only on 
Perceived Control (the Decisional and Behavioral Dimensions) (p=0.042) based on Table B-
13 without assuming equal variances. 
 
For Level-3 Vs. Level-2: Significant main effects were detected on Joint Outcome, Satisfaction 
(and on the Perceived Efficiency dimension), and Perceived Control (the Decisional and 
Behavioral Dimensions). Before reaching conclusion, similar processes checking ANOVA 
assumptions and use respective statistics were used. We conclude that Level-3 and Level-2 
systems are significantly differed only on Satisfaction (the Perceived Efficiency dimension) 
(p=0.030) based on Table B-13 assuming equal variances are met. 
 
(2) Furthermore, for those dependent variables where interaction terms are significant as shown in 
Table B-11 (i.e., Negotiation Time, and Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere), one-way ANOVA 
are performed to examine significant main effects of system types under different conflict levels 
for (i) under low conflict (see Table B-15), and (ii) under high conflict (see Table B-18). Other 
related outputs are presented in Table B-16, B-17 and B-19.  
 
For each conflict level, similar data analysis procedures as illustrated in (1) were applied.  We 
conclude that (i) under low conflict level, Level-3 and Level-1 systems are significantly differed 
only on Negotiation Time (p=0.005); Level-3 and Level-2 systems are significantly differed only 
on Negotiation Time (p=0.021) and (ii) under high conflict level, Level-3 and Level-1 systems 
are significantly differed only on Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere (p=0.045). 
                                                     
54
 The level of significance at 0.054 is considered as significant in this case as it is marginally bigger than 
the recommended value 0.05. 
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(1) Results of Two-Way MANOVA Tests – Contrasts and Post-Hoc Analysis 
Table B-12. Results of Two-Way MANOVA Tests – Contrast Results (K Matrix) 
System Intelligence 
Level Simple 
Contrast(a)   Dependent Variable 
















Level-1 vs. Level-3 Contrast Estimate -1.467 -3.947 .183 .224 .612 .694 -.594 
  Hypothesized Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Difference (Estimate - 
Hypothesized) -1.467 -3.947 .183 .224 .612 .694 -.594 
  Std. Error .751 3.338 .277 .321 .284 .310 .271 
  Sig. .054 .240 .510 .486 .033* .027* .031* 
  95% Confidence  
Interval for Difference -2.956 -.367 -.412 -.413 .168 .197 -.565 -1.131 
    .023 .733 .860 .877 1.286 1.406 .576 -.056 
Level-2 vs. Level-3 Contrast Estimate -1.974 3.133 -.582 -.916 -.461 -.695 -.312 
  Hypothesized Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  Difference (Estimate - 
Hypothesized) -1.974 3.133 -.582 -.916 -.461 -.695 -.312 
  Std. Error .784 3.555 .289 .335 .296 .323 .283 
  Sig. .013* .380 .047* .007** .122 .034* .272 
  95% Confidence  
Interval for Difference -3.527 -1.156 -1.579 -1.532 -1.072 -1.407 -.776 -.873 
    -.420 -.008 -.252 -.157 .119 -.119 .440 .248 
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Table B-13. Results of Two-Way MANOVA Tests – Post-Hoc Tests  
95% Confidence Interval 
 
Dependent Variable   
(I) System  
Intelligence  
Level 





(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Joint Outcome Tukey HSD 1 2 -.22 .773 .956 -2.06 1.62 
      3 -.75 .751 .579 -2.53 1.03 
    2 1 .22 .773 .956 -1.62 2.06 
      3 -.53 .783 .778 -2.39 1.33 
    3 1 .75 .751 .579 -1.03 2.53 
      2 .53 .783 .778 -1.33 2.39 
  Games-Howell 1 2 -.22 3.092 .997 -7.62 7.18 
      3 -.75 3.122 .969 -8.21 6.71 
    2 1 .22 3.092 .997 -7.18 7.62 
      3 -.53 3.212 .985 -8.22 7.16 
    3 1 .75 3.122 .969 -6.71 8.21 
      2 .53 3.212 .985 -7.16 8.22 
Satisfaction with Settlement Tukey HSD 1 2 .7378(*) .28546 .030* .0593 1.4164 
      
3 .1962 .27722 .759 -.4627 .8552 
    
2 1 -.7378(*) .28546 .030 -1.4164 -.0593 
      
3 -.5416 .28889 .151 -1.2283 .1451 
    
3 1 -.1962 .27722 .759 -.8552 .4627 
      
2 .5416 .28889 .151 -.1451 1.2283 
  
Games-Howell 1 2 .7378 .31890 .061 -.0283 1.5039 
      
3 .1962 .26431 .739 -.4357 .8281 
    
2 1 -.7378 .31890 .061 -1.5039 .0283 
      
3 -.5416 .32365 .224 -1.3188 .2356 
 Appendix B     More Statistical Outputs for Experiment 4 
 
B-20 
    
3 1 -.1962 .26431 .739 -.8281 .4357 
      
2 .5416 .32365 .224 -.2356 1.3188 
Perceived Efficiency Tukey HSD 1 2 1.1000(*) .33019 .003** .3151 1.8849 
      
3 .2382 .32066 .739 -.5241 1.0004 
    
2 1 -1.1000(*) .33019 .003 -1.8849 -.3151 
      
3 -.8618(*) .33416 .030 -1.6562 -.0675 
    
3 1 -.2382 .32066 .739 -1.0004 .5241 
      
2 .8618(*) .33416 .030* .0675 1.6562 
  
Games-Howell 1 2 1.1000(*) .36997 .012 .2100 1.9900 
      
3 .2382 .30391 .714 -.4887 .9650 
    
2 1 -1.1000(*) .36997 .012 -1.9900 -.2100 
      
3 -.8618 .38557 .073 -1.7877 .0640 
    
3 1 -.2382 .30391 .714 -.9650 .4887 
      
2 .8618 .38557 .073 -.0640 1.7877 
Perceived Control Tukey HSD 1 2 1.0570(*) .29193 .001 .3631 1.7509 
      
3 .6102 .28350 .084 -.0637 1.2841 
    
2 1 -1.0570(*) .29193 .001 -1.7509 -.3631 
      
3 -.4468 .29543 .289 -1.1491 .2555 
    
3 1 -.6102 .28350 .084 -1.2841 .0637 
      
2 .4468 .29543 .289 -.2555 1.1491 
  
Games-Howell 1 2 1.0570(*) .28625 .002** .3664 1.7476 
      
3 .6102 .26671 .065 -.0304 1.2508 
    
2 1 -1.0570(*) .28625 .002 -1.7476 -.3664 
      
3 -.4468 .33880 .390 -1.2585 .3649 
    
3 1 -.6102 .26671 .065 -1.2508 .0304 
      
2 .4468 .33880 .390 -.3649 1.2585 
PCONTROL_BCDC Tukey HSD 1 2 1.3725(*) .31896 .000 .6144 2.1307 
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      3 .6886 .30975 .072 -.0477 1.4249 
    2 1 -1.3725(*) .31896 .000 -2.1307 -.6144 
      3 -.6840 .32279 .091 -1.4513 .0834 
    3 1 -.6886 .30975 .072 -1.4249 .0477 
      2 .6840 .32279 .091 -.0834 1.4513 
  Games-Howell 1 2 1.3725(*) .31770 .000** .6033 2.1418 
      3 .6886(*) .27818 .042 .0191 1.3581 
    2 1 -1.3725(*) .31770 .000 -2.1418 -.6033 
      3 -.6840 .37936 .176 -1.5933 .2254 
    3 1 -.6886(*) .27818 .042* -1.3581 -.0191 
      2 .6840 .37936 .176 -.2254 1.5933 
(2) Results of One-Way ANOVA Tests under Different Conflict Level Treatments – Contrasts and Post-Hoc Analysis 
Table B-14. Tests of Homogeneity of Variances under Low Conflict - Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
  F df1 df2 Sig. 
Negotiation Time 9.588 2 53 .000** 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere .401 2 53 .672 
 
Table B-15. Results of One-Way MANOVA Tests under Low Conflict– Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Negotiation Time 6376.754 2 3188.377 17.186 .000** 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 5.956 2 2.978 4.410 .017* 
 




Table B-16. Results of One-Way MANOVA Tests under Low Conflict– Results of Two-Way ANOVA Tests – Post-hoc Tests 
95% Confidence Interval 
Dependent Variable   








(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Negotiation Time Tukey HSD 1 2 -25.9200(*) 4.42520 .000 -36.5903 -15.2497 
      
3 -11.2911(*) 4.42520 .036 -21.9614 -.6208 
    
2 1 25.9200(*) 4.42520 .000 15.2497 36.5903 
      
3 14.6289(*) 4.54016 .006 3.6814 25.5764 
    
3 1 11.2911(*) 4.42520 .036 .6208 21.9614 
      
2 -14.6289(*) 4.54016 .006 -25.5764 -3.6814 
  
Games-Howell 1 2 -25.9200(*) 4.96077 .000** -38.2654 -13.5746 
      
3 -11.2911(*) 3.36740 .005 -19.5319 -3.0503 
    
2 1 25.9200(*) 4.96077 .000 13.5746 38.2654 
      
3 14.6289(*) 5.08732 .021 2.0132 27.2446 
    
3 1 11.2911(*) 3.36740 .005** 3.0503 19.5319 
      
2 -14.6289(*) 5.08732 .021* -27.2446 -2.0132 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere Tukey HSD 1 2 .7875(*) .26696 .013* .1438 1.4312 
      
3 .4542 .26696 .214 -.1895 1.0979 
    
2 1 -.7875(*) .26696 .013 -1.4312 -.1438 
      
3 -.3333 .27390 .449 -.9938 .3271 
    
3 1 -.4542 .26696 .214 -1.0979 .1895 
      
2 .3333 .27390 .449 -.3271 .9938 
  
Games-Howell 1 2 .7875(*) .27211 .018 .1194 1.4556 
      
3 .4542 .25183 .183 -.1625 1.0708 
    
2 1 -.7875(*) .27211 .018 -1.4556 -.1194 
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3 -.3333 .28868 .488 -1.0412 .3746 
    
3 1 -.4542 .25183 .183 -1.0708 .1625 
      
2 .3333 .28868 .488 -.3746 1.0412 
 
Table B-17. Tests of Homogeneity of Variances under High Conflict – Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances 
  F df1 df2 Sig. 
Negotiation Time .913 2 53 .408 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere .185 2 53 .831 
 
Table B-18. Results of One-Way MANOVA Tests under High Conflict – Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Negotiation Time 1408.843 2 704.422 2.775 .071 
Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 8.157 2 4.078 2.527 .090 
 
Table B-19. Results of One-Way MANOVA Tests under High Conflict – Contrast Results (K Matrix) 
Dependent Variables System Intelligence Level Simple Contrast(a) 
  Negotiation Time Perceived Collaborative Atmosphere 
Level-1 vs. Level-3 Contrast Estimate 6.444 -.825 
  Hypothesized Value 0 0 
  Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) 6.444 -.825 
  Std. Error 5.038 .402 
  Sig. .206 .045* 
  95% Confidence Interval for Difference -3.661 -1.631 -.412 
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16.549 -.019 .860 
Level-2 vs. Level-3 Contrast Estimate -6.102 -.069 
  Hypothesized Value 0 0 
  Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) 
-6.102 -.069 
  Std. Error 5.344 .426 
  Sig. .259 .872 
  95% Confidence Interval for Difference -16.820 -.923 -1.579 
    
4.616 .786 -.252 
Level 2 vs. Level 1 Contrast Estimate -12.546 .756 
  Hypothesized Value 0 0 
  Difference (Estimate - Hypothesized) 
-12.546 .756 
  Std. Error 5.344 .426 
  Sig. .023* .082 
  95% Confidence Interval for Difference -16.820 -23.264 -.098 
    
4.616 -1.828 1.611 
 
 Appendix C Guides and Summary of Interviews 
C-1 
APPENDIX C GUIDES AND SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
C.1 FACILITATIVE GUIDES TO INTERVIEW  
A Field Research on e-Negotiation systems 
e-协谈系统的企业调查研究 
 
Figure 1 shows the overall architecture for an e-Negotiation system in e-marketplace website.  
Suppliers and buyers can contact each other and conduct business negotiations through the e-
Negotiation system offered by e-marketplace website. 图 1展示 e-协谈系统的基本架构. 买方
和供应方可以通过由电子商务网站提供的 e-协谈系统联系对方和进行商业谈判. 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the main interface of the e-Negotiation system. It includes a decision 
support component and a text messaging facility. 图 2展示 e-协谈系统的主要界面,包括决策分
析功能和即时通讯功能. 
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C.2 SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS 
Table C-1. Summary of Interviews 









Interviewees’ General Attitudes towards 
Accepting e-Negotiations Functions 
Key Concerns in Accepting e-Negotiations Functions 
1 This company sells 
low-end tote bags and 
athletic bags. It is 
targeting clients who 
order in large 
quantity; and relative 
low price products. 
No - Sales Manager 
- Female 
- 20-30 
- Rather than using the NSS, emails are 
convenient and sufficient. 
- Quotation format is standardized, and 




- The system may not meet all the needs in negotiating 
with new clients.  
- The physical display of their products are important, 
while it is not feasible for online product exhibition. 
- The only drawback of using email is that it has 
difficulty in communicating and keep track of clients’ 
customization needs. 
- For new customers, risk is involved but willing to 
take it. 
2 This company is 
specialized in the 
production of 
rucksacks and bags. 
Yes 












- The NSS functions of multilingual, 
contract drafting and mediation 
functions are found to be meaningful 
and useful in facilitating negotiation. 
-There is concern about the capability of the NSS to 
include all issues in negotiation. 
- The actual adoption depends on the system’s 
accuracy in supporting decision makings, cost of the 
systems, and convenience of usage.  
- The most difficult issue about the current negotiation 
is to confirm with the clients the prices, and the 
customization requirement. 
-Payment is another major concern in international 
trading; this is even more crucial than the price. 
3 This company is 
specialized in making 
sport shoes and causal 
footwear. 
Yes - Sales Manager 
- Male 
- 30-40 
- The ability of computer to automate 
the whole process is an important 
concern. Its effectiveness is questioned 
though. This feature is perceived to be 
- E-marketplace, as a third part, may cause additional 
security issues in mediation process. 
- Change management is required for the adoption. 
- This company has their own software to draft 
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more suitable for small orders. 
- Multilingual support is not appreciated 
due to the high self-efficacy in using 
English (Interviewee has negative prior 
experience in using similar software).  
contracts. The contract drafting function of e-
Negotiation system is reported to be very attractive. 
















- She does not perceive the NSS 
different from emails. She prefers to use 
email, which can well serve as a valid 
documentation. 
- She does not regard e-marketplace is 
able to carry out the mediation role. 
- The NSS in e-market place, being a third party, is a 
concern. 
- System is not sophisticated enough to translate the 
negotiation messages in real time.  
- Contract should be drafted case by case, instead of by 
software. 
- Internet cannot ensure credibility of clients. 
















- NSS is perceived useful to confirm an 
order in the latter stage of negotiation. 
- Relatively higher margin for the 
products is required to use the system, 
compared to face-to-face negotiation. 
- He is willing to subscribe to the 
mediation function. 
- Negotiation agent cannot maximize 
their profits as a same price is always 
quoted to all their clients. 
- The cost of the system is a crucial concern. 
- The text-based nature is not desirable, though it can 
serve as proof.  
- Contracts should be drafted combining some decision 
support functions (e.g., interest calculation in various 
payment methods). 
 




6 This company is 
specialized in 
producing a wide 
range of digital 
products including 
digital camera, mp3, 
and digital video. 
Yes 
- Account 




- With tight control enabled, this kind of 
system (e-Negotiations and alike) can 
facilitate in filtering potential clients in 
the early stages of negotiation. 
- Multilingual function can provide 
references during negotiation but their 
effects are limited. 
- The DSS component in NSS is not 
useful; negotiation is too flexible in 
nature. 
- Some concerns about NSS if they can be adjust to 
negotiate with different buyers 
- Trust is always an issue; the company will pay 
greater attention and feel more skeptical when 
negotiating with client from some foreign regions. 
- The capability of the negotiation agent in handling 
flexibility is questionable.  
7 This company is Yes - Vice General - Instead of the DSS component, the - The main concern about the systems is that they 
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dedicated to the 
development of 
traditional cotton 
knitwear, and has 
gradually boasted vast 
main businesses like 
garments, accessories, 
and home textiles. 
(It is noted that 












manager prefers to make his own 
decision as he feels he understand his 
business very well; inputting to the 
system is tedious and less efficient. 
- The mediation role cannot be achieved 
as intended since e-marketplace website 
is not a law-enforcing entity. 
- Negotiation agents can be used to filter 
out potential buyers at the early stage.  
cannot consider customer relationship flexibly; it is 
less risky to do business with an established customer.  
- Initial contact with new customer is crucial; he 
prefers to handle it face to face. 
- He has great concern regarding the trust issues in 
negotiation; in particular he perceived buyers known 
form the internet are less familiar and less trustworthy. 
- Though the contract drafting function is not perceived 
favorable, this company has an existing system in 
handling the contract drafting. 
8 This company is a 
professional supplier 
for power supply and 
PC casings. 
No - Export Manager 
- Male 
- 40-50 
- NSS is perceived to be particularly 
useful in evaluating clients’ offers.  
- The system is believed to be helpful in 
handling the negotiations with multiple 
issues. 
- The NSS functions, namely 
multilingual, mediation functions, and 
negotiation agents, are found to be 
meaningful and useful in facilitating 
negotiation. 
- He has concern related to contract management 
solutions: one standard template cannot meet the needs 
of all contracts. 
9 This company 
supplies leather 
material for bags, 
shoes, and 
accessories. They 
target in brand 
building and establish 
long-term 
partnerships with 
large buyers who can 




They have web 








- NSS is perceived to be useful in 
confirming an order in the latter stage of 
negotiation. 
- Negotiation agent is more helpful in 
the early stage, filtering potential 
buyers. 
- NSS is not deemed suitable in this 
company, because they do not expect to 
meet too many new customers online. 
 
- The final negotiation outcome should always be 
determined by users rather than system or agents. 
- This company has simple template in drafting 
contracts; the contract drafting is not deemed 
attractive,  
- Both seller and buyer sites are customers of the e-
marketplace; this may cause role conflict for e-
marketplaces to assume mediator role. 
 
 
10 This company 
produces high quality 
products of Liquid 
Crystal Displayers 
No - Manager 
- Male 
- 40-50 
- He is willing to use NSS as a tool to 
assist him in decision making. 
- He questions the detailed mechanism 
for e-marketplaces to be e-mediators. 
- It is really hard to build up trust with clients if 
communication and negotiation only take place using 
computer. 
- Quantifying issues is very difficulty and inefficient 
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(LCD) and Liquid 
Crystal Modules 
(LCM), either 
standard series or 
customer-tailored 
product. 
- Negotiation agents are only perceived 
useful in small, routine orders. 
- The contract drafting function is 
appreciated.  
sometimes. There are a lot of issues that cannot be 
quantified. 
- The network bandwidth is a major concern; broad 
bandwidth is required to support real time 
communication in negotiation (e.g., 
videoconferencing). 
- Third party issue in mediation is another concern. 
11 This company trades 
professional audio 
system, mainly 
targeting to European 
market. 
Yes 









- He intends to use NSS to facilitate 
analysis during the negotiation process. 
- In his opinion, NSS is more beneficial 
for big company. Having a small 
number of customers, he finds it not 
necessary to have the system to support 
negotiations.  
- NSS should be incorporated into some enterprise 
systems and online business directory. 
- Email is preferred to NSS, as both he and his partners 
are very familiar with Email use. 















- NSS is regarded to be a useful tool in 
providing clients the product quotations. 
- The system can facilitate in filtering 
out the potential clients in the early 
stage. 
- Agents are not deemed meaningful in 
this context; he prefers to be flexible in 
setting price to different customers. 
- The actual negotiation practice is quite different from 
the NSS design assumptions; there are a lot of concerns 
which is very difficult to quantify. 
- Negotiation is very flexible while the system may not 
be flexible enough. 
- The cost of the subscription to the mediation function 
is a concern. 
- Trust is an issue; lower price is usually quoted to 
customers with established relationships. 
 
